Formalism and Realism in Commerce Clause Jurisprudence
Barry Cushman
This Article attempts a reconceptualization of developments in Commerce
Clause jurisprudence between the Civil War and World War II by identifying
ways in which that jurisprudence was structurally related to and accordingly
deeply influenced by the categories of substantive due process and dormant
Commerce Clause doctrine. Antecedent dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence
set the terms within which Commerce Clause doctrine was worked out;
coordinate developments in substantive due process doctrine set limits
upon the scope of Commerce Clause formulations and thus played a critical
and underappreciated role in maintaining the federal equilibrium. The
subsequent erosion of those due process limitations vastly expanded
federal power and prompted a crisis in Commerce Clause jurisprudence
that was ultimately resolved by adoption of a political process approach
to both affirmative and dormant Commerce Clause adjudication. The categories
that had unified affirmative and dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence
were abandoned, decoupling the two lines of doctrine and rendering them
no longer developmentally interdependent. The two lines went their separate
ways, economic substantive due process disappeared, and the enterprise
of interdoctrinal coordination that had held a vast body of constitutional
law together was lost to history.
We continue to study the development of these lines of doctrine in
our Constitutional Law curricula, but we do so in an ahistorical manner
that obscures understanding. We study the development of doctrine topically
rather than synchronically, wresting lines of doctrine from the related
doctrinal contexts in which they developed. Such decontextualization,
in this case as in others, is a surefire method of making the entire
undertaking look preposterous. Looking back at this jurisprudence from
the vantage and through the categories of our contemporary constitutional
sensibility, it becomes difficult to understand how any intelligent
person could ever have taken the enterprise seriously. Yet a very great
many clearly did. This piece seeks to understand why and how that could
have been, while at the same time explaining why the enterprise unraveled
in the way it did when it did. What emerges, I hope, is a new way of
thinking and teaching about constitutional development in this critical
period.
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