86.6

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86.6
Standing for Statues, but Not for Statutes? An Argument for Purely Stigmatic Harm Standing under the Establishment Clause
Merav Bennett
BA 2013, Yale University; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School

In 2016, Mississippi passed the Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination Act, a law exempting Mississippians with “sincerely held religious beliefs or moral convictions” that marriage should be restricted to heterosexual couples from the state’s antidiscrimination laws.

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86.6
Tangled Arms: Modernizing and Unifying the Arm-of-the-State Doctrine
Kelsey Joyce Dayton
BA 2015, Stanford University; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School.

I would like to thank Professors Aziz Huq and William Baude for helping me turn my life interests and experiences into a legal question, as well as Parker Eudy, Parag Dharmavarapu, Peter Trombly, Jordan Golds, Kathy Bruce, and Will Admussen for their insights and persistent help. Special thanks to my grandma, Brenda Joyce Dayton, who edited my first childhood ramblings and inspired me to write more.

A police officer suspects someone of being an undocumented immigrant and detains them. Later, that individual sues the local police department in federal court for establishing a policy of hardline immigration enforcement that violated their Fourth Amendment rights.

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86.6
Clarity Doctrines
Richard M. Re
Professor, UCLA School of Law.

Many thanks to Will Baude, Pamela Bookman, Dan Epps, Barry Friedman, Mark Greenberg, Josia Klein, Anita Krishnakumar, Maggie Lemos, Marin Levy, Leah Litman, Michael Morley, Anne Joseph O’Connell, Larry Rosenthal, Steve Sachs, Joanna Schwartz, Dan Schweitzer, Mila Sohoni, and participants in the St. John’s Faculty Workshop and the Duke Law School Judicial Administration/Judicial Process Roundtable. I am also grateful to Caleb Peiffer and Taylor Pitz for excellent research assistance, and to the superb editors of The University of Chicago Law Review.

Legal practice is riddled with claims about when the law is or isn’t “clear.” If a statute is unclear or ambiguous, a court might defer to an agency, side in favor of lenity, or avoid interpretations that would render the statute unconstitutional.

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86.6
In Defense of the Hare: Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine and Scientific Uncertainty in State-Court Opioid Litigation
Anna Stapleton
AB 2014, The University of Chicago; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School.

The author wishes to thank Professor Jennifer Nou, Professor John Rappaport,Derek Carr, Braden Lang, and the Board and Staff of The University of Chicago Law Review for their insightful comments and guidance throughout this Comment’s life cycle.

From 2000 to 2017, more than three hundred thousand people died of overdoses involving opioids in the United States.

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86.6
Whether 8 USC § 1252(g) Precludes the Exercise of Federal Jurisdiction over Claims Brought by Wrongfully Removed Noncitizens
Matthew Miyamoto
BS 2016, University of Oregon; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School.

A foreign national is set to testify under subpoena to a grand jury about detainee abuse by certain Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents. The district court has issued an order prohibiting the ICE agents from removing the foreign national from the United States. But the foreign national’s testimony is damaging, and the ICE agents would rather deport him than allow him to testify.