Institutional Design

Print
Essay
85.2
Democracy’s Deficits
Samuel Issacharoff
Bonnie and Richard Reiss Professor of Constitutional Law, New York University School of Law

Prior versions of this Essay were presented as lectures at the School of Law of the University of Buenos Aires, the Faculty of Law of the University of São Paolo, the University of Texas School of Law, and at the American Philosophical Association Pacific Division Meeting in Vancouver. My deep appreciation goes to Gregory Crane, David Drew, and Stephen Levandoski for their research assistance.

History confounds certainty. Barely a quarter century after the collapse of the Soviet empire, it is democracy that has entered an intense period of public scrutiny.

Print
Article
85.1
Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law
David Fontana
Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University

Our thanks to Michael Abramowicz, Joseph Blocher, Mary Anne Case, Justin Driver, Alison LaCroix, Jonathan Masur, Jon Michaels, Douglas NeJaime, Martha Nussbaum, David Pozen, David Schleicher, Paul Schied, Naomi Schoenbaum, Micah Schwartzman, Michael Selmi, Ganesh Sitaraman, Lior Strahilevitz, and Laura Weinrib for thoughtful comments and suggestions. Lael Weinberger, Brent Cooper, and other editors at the Review also supplied useful critical thoughts. We also received helpful feedback from workshops at the George Washington Law School and the University of Chicago Law School. Support for one of us (Huq) was supplied by the Frank J. Cicero, Jr. Fund. Our errors are our responsibility alone.

Aziz Z. Huq
Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School

The Constitution’s separation of powers implies the existence of three distinct and separate branches.

2
Essay
75.1
Privacy, Visibility, Transparency, and Exposure
Julie E. Cohen
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center

Thanks to Susan Cohen, Oscar Gandy, Ian Kerr, David Phillips, Neil Richards, Rebecca Tushnet, participants in the Unblinking Workshop at UC Berkeley, and participants in The University of Chicago Law School’s Surveillance Symposium for their comments on an earlier version of this paper, to Kirstie Ball for sharing her work in progress on exposure as an organizing concept for surveillance, and to Amanda Kane and Christopher Klimmek for research assistance.

2
Book review
75.2
The Political Economies of Criminal Justice
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar
Professor and Deane F. Johnson Faculty Scholar, Stanford Law School; Faculty Affiliate, Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation

My work on criminal justice has been greatly influenced by conversations with three extraordinary colleagues: Lawrence Friedman, Mark Kelman, and Robert Weisberg. I thank them for their generous willingness to share their thoughts on the field. Needless to say, I absolve them (and anyone else) of responsibility for any errors or omissions.

2
Book review
75.4
Some Realism about Mass Torts
David Marcus
Associate Professor of Law, University of Arizona James E. Rogers College of Law

I am grateful to Barbara Atwood, David Fontana, Andy Klein, Toni Massaro, Nina Rabin, Bob Rabin, David Shapiro, and Carol Rose for comments on earlier drafts and to Sam Issacharoff for his confidence. I owe particular thanks to Richard Nagareda for thorough and patient reactions to this Review.

2
Article
76.2
“Securing” the Nation: Law, Politics, and Organization at the Federal Security Agency, 1939–1953
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar
Professor and Deane F. Johnson Faculty Scholar, Stanford Law School; Faculty Affiliate, Stanford Center for International Security and Cooperation

I appreciate helpful conversations with Daniel Carpenter, Michele Dauber, John Ferejohn, George Fisher, Rich Ford, Lawrence Friedman, David Golove, Jill Hasday, Daniel Ho, Don Hornstein, Lewis Kornhauser, David Luban, Eric Muller, Hari Osofsky, Robert Tsai, and Barry Weingast, as well as feedback from workshop participants at Berkeley, Iowa, Oregon, NYU, North Carolina, Southwestern, and Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. David Kennedy provided extremely helpful written comments on an earlier version of this Article. I also benefited greatly from the research assistance of Mindy Jeng, Shivan Saran, Britt Grant, Mrinal Menon, Connor Raso, Brad Hansen, and Jennifer Liu, as well as the staff of the Stanford Law School Library. I am also grateful to the staff at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, and the Harry S. Truman Library. All of these people should be secure in the knowledge that they are not responsible for any errors or omissions. This is dedicated to Mateo, Ria, and Lucy.

2
Article
76.3
Executive Branch Contempt of Congress
Josh Chafetz
Assistant Professor of Law, Cornell Law School

Thanks to Greg Alexander, Akhil Amar, Will Baude, Aaron Bruhl, Michael Dorf, Joey Fishkin, Marin Levy, Bernadette Meyler, David Pozen, Catherine Roach, and Steve Sachs for helpful and thought-provoking comments on earlier drafts, and to Kevin Jackson for excellent research assistance. Any remaining errors or infelicities are, of course, my own.

2
Article
76.3
Notice-and-Comment Judicial Decisionmaking
Michael Abramowicz
Professor, The George Washington University Law School
Thomas B. Colby
Associate Professor, The George Washington University Law School

In the spirit of its subject matter, this Article was made available for public comment, and we incorporated excellent suggestions from Steve Charnovitz, David Fontana, Fred Lawrence, Ronald Levin, Eric Lipman, Chip Lupu, and Richard Pierce.