Download PDF

Multiple circuit courts have extended quasi-judicial immunity—a form of judicially derived, absolute immunity—to sheriffs, marshals, and bailiffs when they execute judicial orders. In some circuits, that immunity extension covers the use of excessive force by the officer, even if that force is outside the scope of the order they are executing.

This Comment argues that the trend of lower courts extending quasi-judicial immunity to enforcement officers is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s absolute immunity doctrine. A survey of the opinions in which the Court has granted absolute immunity to a government official reveals four considerations guiding the Court’s decision. The Court is more likely to grant absolute immunity when the officer performs a deliberative function, alternative safeguards exist to constrain the officer, liability would negatively affect job performance, and the official would have been absolutely immune at common law. Enforcement officers do not share any of these characteristics. Judicial enforcement is not a deliberative function. Civil liability is the primary accountability mechanism for enforcement officers. Liability strengthens rather than impairs the judicial enforcement function. And, historically, sheriffs lacked immunity for executing court orders.

In light of these findings, this Comment proposes a rule: absolute immunity for deliberative functions and ordinary qualified immunity for enforcement functions. This rule tracks the common law’s ministerial-judicial divide and satisfies each of the four considerations that guide the Court’s absolute immunity determinations. It also restores § 1983 liability for officers who violate an individual’s rights while executing a judicial order

TABLE OF CONTENTS