Some Things Are Actually Nails: The Value of Randomized Experiments Across Legal Theories
All coauthors contributed equally. We thank The University of Chicago Law Review for this Symposium on “Law and Economics vs. Law and Political Economy” and John Cooper for excellent research support, and we are grateful to participants in the 2025 University of Chicago Law Review Symposium for thoughtful comments and suggestions.
All coauthors contributed equally. We thank The University of Chicago Law Review for this Symposium on “Law and Economics vs. Law and Political Economy” and John Cooper for excellent research support, and we are grateful to participants in the 2025 University of Chicago Law Review Symposium for thoughtful comments and suggestions.
All coauthors contributed equally. We thank The University of Chicago Law Review for this Symposium on “Law and Economics vs. Law and Political Economy” and John Cooper for excellent research support, and we are grateful to participants in the 2025 University of Chicago Law Review Symposium for thoughtful comments and suggestions.
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Experiments sometimes get a bad rap. Critics allege that they don’t illuminate how the real world works, are subject to p-hacking and manipulation, and often don’t study the most important populations of interest. This Essay examines historical uses of experiments to generate knowledge for legal academia. Recently, experiments have become associated with law and economics as part of a broader coupling of quantitative empirical work with law and economics. But experimentation is a highly adaptable, if imperfect, research method that can support causal claims and test assumptions that are useful across many legal theories, including law and political economy. The Essay discusses the strengths, limits, and future directions of experiments as a mode of legal research.
Professor Jonathan Choi’s Measuring Clarity in Legal Text adds to a growing literature in empirical legal interpretation, which uses corpus linguistics and survey-experiments to inform legal interpretation. Measuring Clarity offers two intriguing theses, one positive and one critical. On the “positive” reading, the article defends its word embedding approach as a useful method of first-order legal interpretation. On a “critical” reading, the article employs word embeddings as a new tool to assess textualism’s fundamental linguistic assumptions, concluding that there is a fundamental problem with textualism, or at least its current practice.
We thank Mike Livermore, Mike Gilbert, Greg Mitchell, Pierre Verdier, Bobbie Spellman, Michal Barzuza, Rip Verkerke, and John Harrison for helpful comments and suggestions.
We thank Mike Livermore, Mike Gilbert, Greg Mitchell, Pierre Verdier, Bobbie Spellman, Michal Barzuza, Rip Verkerke, and John Harrison for helpful comments and suggestions.
This Essay was written for the L&E vs. LPE Symposium organized by The University of Chicago Law Review. We thank Mike Livermore, Mike Gilbert, Greg Mitchell, Pierre Verdier, Bobbie Spellman, Michal Barzuza, Rip Verkerke, and John Harrison for helpful comments and suggestions.
Law and economics (L&E) emerged as a field in the middle of the twentieth century, it focused on using economic theory to study the common law. During this period, L&E offered insights so novel that it not only profoundly influenced legal doctrine, but the movement’s key figures also became some of the most cited and acclaimed scholars in the American academy. The field of law and economics has since continued to grow and become more technically sophisticated, but it is also a less cohesive movement. Moreover, L&E has been misunderstood and misrepresented by the emerging law and political economy (LPE) movement. This Essay starts the process of reclaiming L&E by offering a definition of the current field: Contemporary law and economics is an academic field that (1) has a commitment to using the social scientific method of inquiry to (2) study questions about the law and legal institutions (3) in a way that is typically informed by economic insights. It then describes L&E’s comparative advantages, explains its relationship to the LPE movement, and suggests a roadmap for its renewed relevance.
For helpful comments, we are grateful to Kiran Chawla, Lee Fennell, Louis Kaplow, Adi Leibovitch, Richard McAdams, David Weisbach, workshop participants at the University of Chicago, and the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review. We thank Hannah Lu and Safia Sayed for excellent research assistance.
For helpful comments, we are grateful to Kiran Chawla, Lee Fennell, Louis Kaplow, Adi Leibovitch, Richard McAdams, David Weisbach, workshop participants at the University of Chicago, and the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review. We thank Hannah Lu and Safia Sayed for excellent research assistance.
Should legal rules be designed exclusively based on efficiency considerations, or should they also attempt to promote an equitable distribution of social resources? The answer traditionally associated with scholarship in law and economics is that they should focus only on efficiency. Even for a society that cares about achieving an equitable distribution of resources by income, the argument goes, it is generally better to adopt legal rules based exclusively on efficiency considerations while relying on the income tax and transfer system to promote distributional goals. However, even proponents of the claim that social welfare is best promoted through the adoption of efficient legal rules agree that there are certain conditions under which it does not apply. This Essay considers when legal rules should be efficient and when they should not. It focuses on conditions that can cause the socially optimal legal rule to diverge from the efficient legal rule—i.e., the legal rule that would be optimal absent distributional considerations. Its goal is to translate these arguments to settings where the question of interest relates to the design of a legal rule rather than, say, the design of a commodity tax. In particular, it seeks to clarify the types of arguments that can support the adoption of inefficient legal rules when income taxation is available as a policy tool.