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The Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment has long been understood to bar state-inflicted torture. In fact, torture is so morally abhorrent that fourteen states allow torture of a victim to elevate a murder into a death-eligible offense. Yet a fundamental paradox persists: The same circumstances that constitute torture sufficient to authorize an individual’s capital sentence are routinely present on death row.

Drawing on a systematic analysis of state definitions of torture utilized in capital proceedings, this Comment proposes a resolution to this paradox, arguing for the creation of a new, state-informedstandard to address Eighth Amendment violations on death row. This Comment identifies two key principles: that psychological pain, including the anticipatory terror of an impending execution, constitutes torture, and that torture does not require proof of specific intent to harm. Together, these principles form a new evaluative metric consistent with the Supreme Court’s evolving standards of decency framework and better suited to address the diffuse, structural nature of death row conditions than the Court’s existing Eighth Amendment criteria.

Applying this standard to conditions on death row, this Comment argues that three categories of pre-execution conditions permitted under current law should constitute torture prohibited under the Eighth Amendment: rescheduled botched executions, prolonged solitary confinement, and inordinate pre-execution delays. A new Eighth Amendment standard grounded in state definitions of torture brings coherence to a body of law defined by contradiction—and provides a path to meaningful constitutional protection for the thousands of individuals currently on death row.

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