Volume 93.4

June

2026

For decades, it has been black letter law that the informal exercise of government power can violate the First Amendment when it creates an “informal system of censorship.” Lower courts have been deeply divided about what kinds of government actions create this kind of informal system. The Court’s recent NRA v. Vullo decision holds that officials engage in informal censorship whenever they intentionally use informal power to evade First Amendment constraints on their formal powers. Vullo clarified that the rule against informal censorship is categorical: officials may never evade constitutional constraints by threatening harm or promising benefits to private parties, no matter how they attempt to do so. This Article argues that the Court's reaffirmation of the categorical nature of the First Amendment rule against informal censorship is very good and comes at a critical time. The Article examines the doctrine prior to the decision, the significance of Vullo’s intervention, and its implications.

The risk of deal breakage is central to merger and acquisition (M&A) dealmaking. Yet neither the finance nor corporate law literatures have systematically explored how and why deals fall apart. This Article rectifies this deficiency, making three principal contributions. First, it develops a comprehensive typology of eight M&A outcomes: completed-as-announced deals and seven types of deal breakage. Second, it unveils a novel dataset of 5,058 mergers and acquisitions involving U.S. public company targets signed between 1996 and 2020. Finally, it demonstrates how the Article's typology and data yield important implications for M&A practice and doctrine by casting new light on key debates over deal protection devices, the power of controlling shareholders, and “merger arbitrage” investors.

This Comment creates the first comprehensive taxonomy of state eminent domain regimes’ treatment of private-to-private takings for the purpose of preventing future blight. Following the Supreme Court’s expansion of the Public Use Clause, many states moved to limit takings justified solely by economic development, yet maintained broad blight statutes that continued to authorize the condemnation of property to eliminate or prevent blight. The Comment exposes the indeterminate contours of the future-blight takings landscape, urging legislatures and courts seeking to cabin sweeping public use determinations to find the prevention of future blight an invalid public use.

This Comment argues “reverse acquihires”—deals in which a Big Tech firm poaches an AI startup’s team and then paysits shell hundreds of millions—constitute asset acquisitions subject to Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) Act review. While regulators typically review only tangible asset acquisitions under the Act, this Comment argues that regulators can mandate review of certain intangible asset transfers as well. Drawing on regulatory treatment of intellectual property licensing agreements, language from divestiture orders, and guidance from foreign competition authorities, this Comment demonstrates that reverse acquihires are acquisitions of AI startups’ most valuable assets: their business information and know-how.

Multiple circuits have extended quasi-judicial immunity to sheriffs, marshals, and bailiffs when they execute judicial orders, including—in some circuits—when they use excessive force. This Comment argues that the extension of quasi-judicial immunity to enforcement officers is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s absolute immunity doctrine. A survey of the Court’s absolute immunity cases reveals four considerations guiding those determinations. Enforcement officers do not meet any of those considerations. This Comment proposes a simple rule to correct for this doctrinal inconsistency: absolute immunity for deliberative functions and qualified immunity for enforcement functions.