Judicial Decision-Making

2
Essay
84.1
The Absence of Method in Statutory Interpretation
Frank H. Easterbrook
Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, The Law School, The University of Chicago

This Essay was prepared for the Symposium “Developing Best Practices for Legal Analysis” at The University of Chicago on May 6 and 7, 2016, and is © 2017 by Frank H. Easterbrook.

A conference about “best practices” for legal inquiry supposes that there are practices. In the field of legal interpretation, that assumption is doubtful.

Best Practices Judicial Decision-Making Statutory Interpretation Textualism
2
Article
Group to Individual (G2i) Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony
David L. Faigman
John F. Digardi Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California Hastings College of the Law; Professor, University of California San Francisco, School of Medicine, Department of Psychiatry; Co-Director, UCSF/UC Hastings Consortium on Law, Science and Health Policy
John Monahan
John S. Shannon Distinguished Professor of Law, Professor of Psychology, and Professor of Psychiatric Medicine and Neurobehavioral Sciences, University of Virginia
Christopher Slobogin
Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Affiliate Professor of Psychiatry, Vanderbilt University
Courts Evidence Judicial Decision-Making Jury Trials
2
Book review
83.3
Courts of Good and Ill Repute: Garoupa and Ginsburg’s Judicial Reputation: A Comparative Theory
Tracey E. George
Charles B. Cox III and Lucy D. Cox Family Chair in Law and Liberty and Professor of Political Science, Vanderbilt University.
G. Mitu Gulati
Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law.

The authors thank the twenty-one judges in the Duke Judicial Studies LLM program (2016–17), Tom Ginsburg, and Jack Knight for comments. Susanna Rychlak provided excellent research assistance.

I.  The Core Claim

Courts Judges Judicial Decision-Making

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