Understanding Equal Sovereignty
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Thanks to Laura Appleman, Monica Bell, Tan Boston, Curtis Bradley, Emily Buss, Adam Chilton, Justin Driver, Jessica Eaglin, Sheldon Evans, Lee Fennell, James Forman, Cynthia Godsoe, Nyamagaga Gondwe, Bernard Harcourt, Hajin Kim, Brian Leiter, Aaron Littman, Jamelia Morgan, Renagh O’Leary, Farah Peterson, James Gray Pope, Eric Posner, Judith Resnik, Mara Revkin, Anna Roberts, Cristina Rodríguez, Jocelyn Simonson, Kate Skolnick, Fred Smith, Stephen Smith, David Strauss, I. India Thusi, Christopher Williams, and Quinn Yeargain for thoughtful comments and conversations, and the participants of The University of Chicago Faculty Workshop, Northwestern Faculty Workshop, Yale Public Law Workshop, CrimFest, Decarceration Workshop, and Criminal Justice Roundtable for their helpful engagement. Thanks also to the editors at The University of Chicago Law Review for their excellent editorial support. The author thanks the Paul H. Leffmann Fund for research support.
In recent years, many states passed constitutional amendments prohibiting modern day slavery in the form of forced prison labor allowed by the Thirteenth Amendment. However, the state amendments' text alone has not ended prison slavery in those states. This Article examines why. It grounds its discussion in the history of American slavery after the Civil War as well as the various attempts of legislation, litigation, and constitutional amendments to dismantle forced prison labor. Drawing on this discussion, it suggests how organizers might craft these amendments and how judges and lawyers should interpret them. It argues that, ultimately, amending constitutional text alone is not enough. To achieve their goals amendments must work in tandem with litigation, governmental structural reform, and the inevitable political battles that arise over the shape of the criminal legal system.
I would like to thank Professor Douglas Baird, Professor Jared Mayer, and members of The University of Chicago Law Review, including Margaret Schaack, Zoë Ewing, Miranda Coombe, Eric Haupt, and Jack Brake, for their invaluable assistance.
Complete preemption is a jurisdictional doctrine in which a federal statute so wholly envelops certain state law claims that those claims effectively cease to exist. Aside from an explicit complete preemption hook, the Supreme Court has recognized just one way for a federal statute to completely preempt state law claims: it must provide an exclusive federal remedy and also have a special nature that makes it extra federal. In this Comment, Ryan Jain-Liu tracks the historical evolution of U.S. bankruptcy to make this second showing. In doing so, this Comment observes two entwined trends in the history of U.S. bankruptcy: bankruptcy simultaneously became more remedial—and thus more voluntary—as the federal government asserted increased control over bankruptcy law. The dual developments toward bankruptcy-as-remedy and bankruptcy-as-federal combine to provide involuntary debtors special protection and to give involuntary bankruptcy a special federal nature. Finally, this Comment expands on the case study of involuntary bankruptcy to argue that historical evolution can form the basis for recognizing an area of law’s special federal nature and support application of the complete preemption doctrine to novel contexts.
For feedback and suggestions at various stages of this project, I thank David Barron, Mary Sarah Bilder, Nikolas Bowie, Richard Chen, Noah Feldman, Idriss Fofana, Barry Friedman, Jack Goldsmith, Daniel Hulsebosch, Mark Jia, Michael Klarman, Chris Mirasola, and Susannah Barton Tobin. This project also benefitted from workshops with faculty at Boston College Law School, University of Chicago Law School, Cornell Law School, Harvard Law School, Loyola Law School, New York University School of Law, Notre Dame Law School, University of San Diego School of Law, Seattle University School of Law, University of Texas School of Law, University of Southern California Gould School of Law, and Washington University School of Law. I am also grateful to Emma Svoboda and Elaine Tsui for research assistance and to the members of the University of Chicago Law Review for their hard work editing the manuscript.
This Article by Marco Basile argues that U.S. constitutional law and international law diverged after the Civil War when courts came to apply them differently against the state as the United States consolidated a continental nation-state. On one hand, the Supreme Court came to assert authority over constitutional law more aggressively in the context of gutting Reconstruction in the South. At the same time, the Court stepped back from international law in deference to Congress as the United States conquered territories and peoples in the West. The simultaneous rise of judicial supremacy as to constitutional law and of judicial deference as to international law recast constitutional law as more “legal” than political and international law as more “political” than legal. By recovering the earlier understanding of public law, this Article challenges how we construct constitutional traditions from the past. The Article ultimately invites us to reimagine a more integrated public law today.