Allocating Pollution
Many thanks to Michael Abramowicz, Amitai Aviram, Eric Biber, Ralph Brubaker, Thomas Colby, Dan Cole, John Colombo, Dhammika Dharmapala, Kirsten Engel, Lee Fennell, David Fontana, Eric Freyfogle, Robert Glicksman, Shi-Ling Hsu, Bruce Huber, Heidi Hurd, Christine Hurt, David Hyman, Charles Imohiosen, Eric Johnson, Robin Juni, Richard Kaplan, Robin Kar, Patrick Keenan, Dan Kelly, Jay Kesan, Scott Kieff, William Kovacic, Robert Lawless, Michael Livermore, Tim Malloy, Jonathan Masur, Jud Mathews, Brian McCall, Emily Meazell, John Nagle, Jonathan Nash, Lee Paddock, Richard Pierce, Jeffrey Pojanowski, Dara Purvis, Andrew Reeves, Larry Ribstein, Richard Ross, J.B. Ruhl, Steven Schooner, Karen Bradshaw Schulz, Justin Sevier, Jamelle Sharpe, Nicola Sharpe, Paul Stancil, Suja Thomas, Robert Tuttle, Lesley Wexler, Jonathan Wiener and Verity Winship for their comments and suggestions. Thanks also to the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review, including Liz Austin, Brad Hubbard, and Matt Rozen, for outstanding editorial support.
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Law can often be used to reduce or even eliminate the harm from pollution by manipulating “exposure allocation,” or how pollution is allocated across a target population. Opportunities for exposure allocation arise whenever the relationship between exposure to a pollutant and harm is nonlinear, as is the case for many pollutants. For these pollutants, exposure allocation presents the potential for reducing the harm from pollution even when it is not possible to reduce either the total amount of pollution emitted or the total amount of exposure. After identifying the conditions under which changing exposure allocations can improve health and save lives, this Article identifies legal strategies for managing exposure allocation to minimize the harm caused by pollution.
The authors thank James Goodwin for helpful comments on an early draft and Lucas Gorak for his research assistance.
In Suncor Energy v. Boulder County, the Supreme Court will consider whether the Clean Air Act and the foreign-affairs doctrine preempt state-law climate claims brought by state and local governments seeking to recover the mounting costs of climate adaptation. Because the Court has held that neither federal common law nor any federal statute affords these plaintiffs a damages remedy, state law is their only avenue; a finding of preemption would close the courthouse door on communities left to absorb costs caused by others.
This Essay argues that the Court should not find preemption. It shows that the Clean Air Act neither expressly nor impliedly preempts these claims but affirmatively preserves them; that the foreign-affairs theory has no limiting principle and has already been rejected by courts; and that damages and locally confined relief lack the extraterritorial reach that alone justifies centralizing authority over emissions. The Essay develops two additional arguments: the implications of the 2026 endangerment-finding rescission, and why, after Loper Bright, courts owe no deference to EPA’s theory of preemption-by-inaction.
We thank Mike Livermore, Mike Gilbert, Greg Mitchell, Pierre Verdier, Bobbie Spellman, Michal Barzuza, Rip Verkerke, and John Harrison for helpful comments and suggestions.
We thank Mike Livermore, Mike Gilbert, Greg Mitchell, Pierre Verdier, Bobbie Spellman, Michal Barzuza, Rip Verkerke, and John Harrison for helpful comments and suggestions.
This Essay was written for the L&E vs. LPE Symposium organized by The University of Chicago Law Review. We thank Mike Livermore, Mike Gilbert, Greg Mitchell, Pierre Verdier, Bobbie Spellman, Michal Barzuza, Rip Verkerke, and John Harrison for helpful comments and suggestions.
Law and economics (L&E) emerged as a field in the middle of the twentieth century, it focused on using economic theory to study the common law. During this period, L&E offered insights so novel that it not only profoundly influenced legal doctrine, but the movement’s key figures also became some of the most cited and acclaimed scholars in the American academy. The field of law and economics has since continued to grow and become more technically sophisticated, but it is also a less cohesive movement. Moreover, L&E has been misunderstood and misrepresented by the emerging law and political economy (LPE) movement. This Essay starts the process of reclaiming L&E by offering a definition of the current field: Contemporary law and economics is an academic field that (1) has a commitment to using the social scientific method of inquiry to (2) study questions about the law and legal institutions (3) in a way that is typically informed by economic insights. It then describes L&E’s comparative advantages, explains its relationship to the LPE movement, and suggests a roadmap for its renewed relevance.
For helpful comments, we are grateful to Kiran Chawla, Lee Fennell, Louis Kaplow, Adi Leibovitch, Richard McAdams, David Weisbach, workshop participants at the University of Chicago, and the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review. We thank Hannah Lu and Safia Sayed for excellent research assistance.
For helpful comments, we are grateful to Kiran Chawla, Lee Fennell, Louis Kaplow, Adi Leibovitch, Richard McAdams, David Weisbach, workshop participants at the University of Chicago, and the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review. We thank Hannah Lu and Safia Sayed for excellent research assistance.
Should legal rules be designed exclusively based on efficiency considerations, or should they also attempt to promote an equitable distribution of social resources? The answer traditionally associated with scholarship in law and economics is that they should focus only on efficiency. Even for a society that cares about achieving an equitable distribution of resources by income, the argument goes, it is generally better to adopt legal rules based exclusively on efficiency considerations while relying on the income tax and transfer system to promote distributional goals. However, even proponents of the claim that social welfare is best promoted through the adoption of efficient legal rules agree that there are certain conditions under which it does not apply. This Essay considers when legal rules should be efficient and when they should not. It focuses on conditions that can cause the socially optimal legal rule to diverge from the efficient legal rule—i.e., the legal rule that would be optimal absent distributional considerations. Its goal is to translate these arguments to settings where the question of interest relates to the design of a legal rule rather than, say, the design of a commodity tax. In particular, it seeks to clarify the types of arguments that can support the adoption of inefficient legal rules when income taxation is available as a policy tool.