Inside or Outside the System?
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In a typical pattern in the literature on public law, the diagnostic sections of a paper draw upon political science, economics, or other disciplines to offer deeply pessimistic accounts of the motivations of relevant actors in the legal system. The prescriptive sections of the paper, however, then issue an optimistic proposal that the same actors should supply public-spirited solutions. Where the analyst makes inconsistent assumptions about the motivations of actors within the legal system, equivocating between external and internal perspectives, an inside/outside fallacy arises. We identify the fallacy, connect it to an economics literature on the “determinacy paradox,” and elicit its implications for the theory of public law.
We thank Will Baude, Tricia Bellia, Sam Bray, Christian Burset, Jud Campbell, Bill Dodge, Abbe Gluck, Tara Grove, Randy Kozel, John Manning, Darrell Miller, Todd Peterson, Jeff Pojanowski, Steve Sachs, Jon Siegel, Ed Swaine, and Ernie Young forinsightful comments and questions. We also thank participants in the conference on Fundamentals and Frontiers of Federalism hosted by Texas A&M Center on the Structural Constitution and the conference on Erie’s Future and General Common Law Revivalism held at the University of Chicago for helpful discussions.
We thank Will Baude, Tricia Bellia, Sam Bray, Christian Burset, Jud Campbell, Bill Dodge, Abbe Gluck, Tara Grove, Randy Kozel, John Manning, Darrell Miller, Todd Peterson, Jeff Pojanowski, Steve Sachs, Jon Siegel, Ed Swaine, and Ernie Young forinsightful comments and questions. We also thank participants in the conference on Fundamentals and Frontiers of Federalism hosted by Texas A&M Center on the Structural Constitution and the conference on Erie’s Future and General Common Law Revivalism held at the University of Chicago for helpful discussions.
The Constitution made the federal government's ability to displace state law contingent on compliance with specific structural and procedural safeguards. Federal courts, therefore, possess no freestanding authority to displace governing state law absent a contrary—and valid—source of supreme law. This structural limitation, however, does not forbid judicial application of general law in all circumstances. From the Founding, federal courts applied traditional branches of the law of nations when state law adopted them, Congress authorized their use, or the Constitution’s structure required their application. Recent calls to revive general common law conflate these traditional, limited uses of general law with broader categories of unwritten law that early federal courts did not apply without proper federal or state authorization. By treating general law as a freestanding source of judicial authority to displace state law, such proposals risk intruding on the residual authority of the states and circumventing the exclusive lawmaking procedures required to adopt all forms of supreme federal law.
For helpful comments and suggestions, I thank Joe Bankman, Kim Clausing, Wei Cui, Michael Devereux, Rocco Femia, Miranda Fleischer, David Gamage, Daniel Hemel, Mindy Herzfeld, Natalie Jacewicz, David Kamin, Mitchell Kane, Rebecca Kysar, Shelly Layser, Brian Lynn, Peter Merrill, Alex Raskolnikov, Blaine Saito, David Schizer, Dan Shaviro, Heydon Wardell-Burrus, and audiences at Stanford, Columbia, Oxford, Missouri, Ohio State, the University of San Diego, and the National Tax Association. I also thank Sasha Nuñez for outstanding research assistance. Disclosure: During 2023 and 2024, I served as a policy advisor in the Office of Tax Policy of the U.S. Department of the Treasury, where I worked on regulations that implement the U.S. corporate alternative minimum tax. This Article relies only on public materials. It also reflects my own views and not those of the U.S. government or any entity within it.
The global minimum tax is often praised for its promise to restrain harmful tax competition. But the effects of the global minimum tax are more nuanced than is commonly understood. This Article shows that the global minimum tax raises a trade-off between two kinds of tax competition: competition for profit and competition for investment. It also provides suggestive evidence that the costs of intensifying competition for investment could be substantial. Specific reforms are proposed that could preserve the benefits of the global minimum tax while mitigating its harms.
For helpful feedback on this project, I am deeply grateful to Mitchell N. Berman, Michael Gilbert, Gary Lawson, Michael McConnell, John McGinnis, Zachary Price, Michael Rappaport, Adam Samaha, Cass Sunstein, the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review, participants in “Constitutional Interpretation in a Polarized Era” (a conference hosted at UC Law San Francisco), and participants in a Constitutional Conversation on this paper hosted by the Stanford Law School Constitutional Law Center.
A sophisticated legal thinker who wishes to work out a fully developed approach to constitutional adjudication must choose two theories, not one. For unless one takes the implausible view that every single case is an evidentiary wipeout under their preferred first-order theory, something more will sometimes be necessary to decide a case. That something is a second-order theory of constitutional adjudication: a theory that does not purport to make any interpretation more (or less) correct, constitutionally speaking, yet still guides a decision-maker after their preferred first-order interpretive theory has run out. This Article’s thesis is that the debate over second-order constitutional theories is both important and generative. Indeed, the dominant, yet unspoken, second-order theory embraced by today’s Supreme Court—the 51–49 rule, under which each Justice votes for the outcome they think is supported by more first-order evidence than any other outcome, no matter how slight the difference—is far from inevitable. Armed with a better second-order theory, judges who disagree vehemently over how to interpret the Constitution might still find their way to consensus in some of the most weighty and difficult cases of the day.