The Legality of Prolonged Traffic Stops after Herring: Brief Delays as Isolated Negligence
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The potential for a traffic stop by law enforcement is present every time a driver in the United States gets behind the wheel of a car. Traffic stops are a part of American culture as well as an ever-present reality. They are also a continuing focus of legal scholarship, with numerous legal experts writing about various facets of the traffic stop and their validity under the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against “unreasonable searches and seizures.”
This Comment explores a small niche of the larger traffic stop universe, namely the constitutional validity of traffic stops where police (1) extend the length of the traffic stop beyond what is exclusively necessary for the original purpose of the stop and (2) lack any reasonable suspicion of further illegal activity. In addition, this Comment examines the admissibility of evidence gleaned from these traffic stops.
We thank Bruce Ackerman, Lucian Bebchuk, Robert Ellickson, Daniel Epps, Edward Fox, Jens Frankenreiter, Clayton Gillette, Brian Highsmith, Noah Kazis, Reinier Kraakman, Zachary Liscow, Jon Michaels, Mariana Pargendler, and David Schleicher, as well as those who provided feedback from presentations at Yale Law School and the annual meeting of the American Law and Economics Association. We also thank Josh Kaufman, Daniella Apodaca, Jonah Klausner, and the other editors of the University of Chicago Law Review for their excellent feedback on both substance and style.
We thank Bruce Ackerman, Lucian Bebchuk, Robert Ellickson, Daniel Epps, Edward Fox, Jens Frankenreiter, Clayton Gillette, Brian Highsmith, Noah Kazis, Reinier Kraakman, Zachary Liscow, Jon Michaels, Mariana Pargendler, and David Schleicher, as well as those who provided feedback from presentations at Yale Law School and the annual meeting of the American Law and Economics Association. We also thank Josh Kaufman, Daniella Apodaca, Jonah Klausner, and the other editors of the University of Chicago Law Review for their excellent feedback on both substance and style.
When one thinks of government, what comes to mind are familiar general-purpose entities like states, counties, cities, and townships. But more than half of the 90,000 governments in the United States are strikingly different: They are “special-purpose” governments that do one thing, such as supply water, fight fire, or pick up the trash. These entities remain understudied, and they present at least two puzzles. First, special-purpose governments are difficult to distinguish from entities that are typically regarded as business organizations—such as consumer cooperatives—and thus underscore the nebulous border between “public” and “private” enterprise. Where does that border lie? Second, special-purpose governments typically provide only one service, in sharp contrast to general-purpose governments. There is little in between the two poles—such as two-, three-, or four-purpose governments. Why? This Article answers those questions—and, in so doing, offers a new framework for thinking about special-purpose government.
The authors share credit and responsibility for this Article equally. The authors are grateful to Maureen Brady, Morgan Cloud, Mailyn Fidler, Barry Friedman, Ben Grunwald, Alma Magaña, and Stewart Sterk, along with participants in the Cardozo Junior Faculty Workshop for helpful conversations, suggestions, comments, and critiques. Michael Pollack thanks the Stephen B. Siegel Program in Real Estate Law for research support.
The authors share credit and responsibility for this Article equally. The authors are grateful to Maureen Brady, Morgan Cloud, Mailyn Fidler, Barry Friedman, Ben Grunwald, Alma Magaña, and Stewart Sterk, along with participants in the Cardozo Junior Faculty Workshop for helpful conversations, suggestions, comments, and critiques. Michael Pollack thanks the Stephen B. Siegel Program in Real Estate Law for research support.
The canonical test for Fourth Amendment searches looks to whether the government has violated a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. Yet the Supreme Court has recently added a property-based test to address cases involving physical intrusions. Further, influential judges and scholars have proposed relying primarily on property in determining the Fourth Amendment’s scope. This Article exposes the overlooked flaws of a property-centered Fourth Amendment. It examines the complications of property law, explores the malleability of property rights, and reveals how governments can manipulate them. Normatively, Fourth Amendment regimes based on property are likely to be underinclusive and grounded in trivial physical contact while ignoring greater intrusions. Finally, because property is unequally distributed, its use as a determinant of Fourth Amendment protections risks leaving disadvantaged members of society with the least protection. While property concepts will sometimes be relevant, they should be used very carefully, and very little, in Fourth Amendment law.
We thank Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Ryan Bubb, Ed Cheng, Quinn Curtis, Elisabeth de Fontenay, Jared Ellias, Jill Fisch, Joe Grundfest, Cam Harvey, Scott Hirst, Colleen Honigsberg, Marcel Kahan, Louis Kaplow, Jonathan Klick, Brian Leiter, Saul Levmore, Dorothy Lund, John Morley, Mariana Pargendler, Elizabeth Pollman, Roberta Romano, Paolo Saguato, Holger Spamann, George Vojta, and Michael Weber for valuable suggestions and discussions. This Article has benefited from comments by workshop participants at Columbia Law School, George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School, Georgetown University Law Center, Harvard Law School, Stanford Law School, UC Berkeley School of Law, the University of Chicago Law School, the University of Oxford Faculty of Law, the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, the University of Toronto Faculty of Law, the University of Virginia School of Law, and the Washington University School of Law, as well as at the American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting, the Corporate & Securities Litigation Workshop, the Labex ReFi-NYU-SAFE/LawFin Law & Banking/Finance Conference, and the Utah Winter Deals Conference. Robertson gratefully acknowledges the support of the Douglas Clark and Ruth Ann McNeese Faculty Research Fund. Katy Beeson and Levi Haas provided exceptional research assistance. All errors are our own.
We thank Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Ryan Bubb, Ed Cheng, Quinn Curtis, Elisabeth de Fontenay, Jared Ellias, Jill Fisch, Joe Grundfest, Cam Harvey, Scott Hirst, Colleen Honigsberg, Marcel Kahan, Louis Kaplow, Jonathan Klick, Brian Leiter, Saul Levmore, Dorothy Lund, John Morley, Mariana Pargendler, Elizabeth Pollman, Roberta Romano, Paolo Saguato, Holger Spamann, George Vojta, and Michael Weber for valuable suggestions and discussions. This Article has benefited from comments by workshop participants at Columbia Law School, George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School, Georgetown University Law Center, Harvard Law School, Stanford Law School, UC Berkeley School of Law, the University of Chicago Law School, the University of Oxford Faculty of Law, the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, the University of Toronto Faculty of Law, the University of Virginia School of Law, and the Washington University School of Law, as well as at the American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting, the Corporate & Securities Litigation Workshop, the Labex ReFi-NYU-SAFE/LawFin Law & Banking/Finance Conference, and the Utah Winter Deals Conference. Robertson gratefully acknowledges the support of the Douglas Clark and Ruth Ann McNeese Faculty Research Fund. Katy Beeson and Levi Haas provided exceptional research assistance. All errors are our own.
We thank Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Ryan Bubb, Ed Cheng, Quinn Curtis, Elisabeth de Fontenay, Jared Ellias, Jill Fisch, Joe Grundfest, Cam Harvey, Scott Hirst, Colleen Honigsberg, Marcel Kahan, Louis Kaplow, Jonathan Klick, Brian Leiter, Saul Levmore, Dorothy Lund, John Morley, Mariana Pargendler, Elizabeth Pollman, Roberta Romano, Paolo Saguato, Holger Spamann, George Vojta, and Michael Weber for valuable suggestions and discussions. This Article has benefited from comments by workshop participants at Columbia Law School, George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School, Georgetown University Law Center, Harvard Law School, Stanford Law School, UC Berkeley School of Law, the University of Chicago Law School, the University of Oxford Faculty of Law, the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, the University of Toronto Faculty of Law, the University of Virginia School of Law, and the Washington University School of Law, as well as at the American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting, the Corporate & Securities Litigation Workshop, the Labex ReFi-NYU-SAFE/LawFin Law & Banking/Finance Conference, and the Utah Winter Deals Conference. Robertson gratefully acknowledges the support of the Douglas Clark and Ruth Ann McNeese Faculty Research Fund. Katy Beeson and Levi Haas provided exceptional research assistance. All errors are our own.
For years, academic experts have championed the widespread adoption of the “Fama-French” factors in legal settings. Factor models are commonly used to perform valuations, performance evaluation and event studies across a wide variety of contexts, many of which rely on data provided by Professor Kenneth French. Yet these data are beset by a problem that the experts themselves did not understand: In a companion article, we document widespread retroactive changes to French’s factor data. These changes are the result of discretionary changes to the construction of the factors and materially affect a broad range of estimates. In this Article, we show how these retroactive changes can have enormous impacts in precisely the settings in which experts have pressed for their use. We provide examples of valuations, performance analysis, and event studies in which the retroactive changes have a large—and even dispositive—effect on an expert’s conclusions.