Payments to Not Parent? Noncustodial Parents as the Recipients of Child Support
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We would like to thank the workshop participants at University of Michigan Law School, Northwestern University Law School, Notre Dame Law School, University of Toronto Law School, Stanford Law School, and N.Y.U. School of Law; and conference participants at the 2024 American Law and Economics Association Meeting for many helpful comments and suggestions. We are most grateful to Jonathan Morad Artal (Stanford Class of 2025) and Andrea Lofquist (Michigan Class of 2024) for their valuable research assistance and comments on earlier drafts.
We would like to thank the workshop participants at University of Michigan Law School, Northwestern University Law School, Notre Dame Law School, University of Toronto Law School, Stanford Law School, and N.Y.U. School of Law; and conference participants at the 2024 American Law and Economics Association Meeting for many helpful comments and suggestions. We are most grateful to Jonathan Morad Artal (Stanford Class of 2025) and Andrea Lofquist (Michigan Class of 2024) for their valuable research assistance and comments on earlier drafts.
The flexibility to renegotiate can facilitate long-term contracting and thereby beneficial reliance investments and risk allocation. The prospect of modification can induce contracting parties who expect their bargaining power to improve to enter into contracts earlier and realize the advantages of longer-term relationships. Otherwise, those parties might decline to contract or delay until those opportunities realize, thereby foregoing the benefits of long-term risk allocation or reliance investments. The parties decide not only whether, but also when, to make legally binding commitments to each other. Courts should be more lenient in enforcing contract modifications that, prompted by a shift in bargaining power, may have only a redistributive effect. Parties can design under-compensatory damages that would provide a credible threat of breach ex post to facilitate ex post modification. Requiring good faith in modification (along with damages) can constrain possible holdup and protect reliance investments and risk allocation.
For thoughtful comments, the authors thank Jennifer Arlen, Rick Brooks, Kevin Davis, Brian Galle, Jacob Goldin, and participants in workshops at Columbia Law School, Texas A&M University School of Law, and the American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting. Ji Young Kim provided excellent research assistance.
For thoughtful comments, the authors thank Jennifer Arlen, Rick Brooks, Kevin Davis, Brian Galle, Jacob Goldin, and participants in workshops at Columbia Law School, Texas A&M University School of Law, and the American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting. Ji Young Kim provided excellent research assistance.
For thoughtful comments, the authors thank Jennifer Arlen, Rick Brooks, Kevin Davis, Brian Galle, Jacob Goldin, and participants in workshops at Columbia Law School, Texas A&M University School of Law, and the American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting. Ji Young Kim provided excellent research assistance.
The negative moral emotions of guilt and shame impose real social costs but also create opportunities for policymakers to engender compliance with legal rules in a cost-effective manner. This Essay presents a unified model of guilt and shame that demonstrates how legal policymakers can harness negative moral emotions to increase social welfare. The prospect of guilt and shame can deter individuals from violating moral norms and legal rules, thereby substituting for the expense of state enforcement. But when legal rules and law enforcement fail to induce total compliance, guilt and shame experienced by noncompliers can increase the law’s social costs. The Essay identifies specific circumstances in which rescinding a legal rule will improve social welfare because eliminating the rule reduces the moral costs of noncompliance with the law’s command. It also identifies other instances in which moral costs strengthen the case for enacting legal rules and investing additional resources in enforcement because deterrence reduces the negative emotions experienced by noncompliers.
The author thanks Khalid Albutairi, Elizabeth Brandt, Simone Montgomery, Madeline Reed, and Lauren Yi for their assistance.
Parents are turning to autonomous vehicles (AVs) to shuttle their children around, seeing them as a safe and convenient option. AVs promise increased mobility for children but bring with them unparalleled surveillance risks. As parents embrace in-cabin monitoring and location tracking to enhance safety, they also—often unknowingly—authorize the mass collection, retention, and potential disclosure of their children’s most intimate data.
This Essay presents the first case study of children’s privacy in AVs, serving as a lens to critique the prevailing reliance on parental notice and choice as the cornerstone of children's data protection. Drawing on privacy theory, surveillance studies, and child development literature, the Essay argues that the notice-and-choice framework fails to account for children’s distinct privacy interests, particularly when the data collected may be retained indefinitely, repurposed by law enforcement, or sold to data brokers. The Essay calls for real limits on data collection, meaningful restrictions on sharing, and mandatory deletion rules. These principles extend beyond AVs to the technological ecosystem now shaping childhood in the digital age.