Who Chooses Open-Source Software?
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Economists and legal scholars have debated the reasons people adopt opensource software, and accordingly whether and to what extent the open-source model can scale, replacing proprietary rights as a primary means of production. In this Article, we use the release by a biotechnology company of similar software under both proprietary and open-source licenses to investigate who uses open-source software and why. We find that academic users are somewhat more likely to adopt open-source software than private firms. We find only modest differences in the willingness of open-source users to modify or improve existing programs. And we find that users of open-source software often make business decisions that seem indifferent to the norms of opensource distribution. Our findings cast some doubt on the penetration of the open-source ethos beyond traditional software markets.
We thank Mike Livermore, Mike Gilbert, Greg Mitchell, Pierre Verdier, Bobbie Spellman, Michal Barzuza, Rip Verkerke, and John Harrison for helpful comments and suggestions.
We thank Mike Livermore, Mike Gilbert, Greg Mitchell, Pierre Verdier, Bobbie Spellman, Michal Barzuza, Rip Verkerke, and John Harrison for helpful comments and suggestions.
This Essay was written for the L&E vs. LPE Symposium organized by The University of Chicago Law Review. We thank Mike Livermore, Mike Gilbert, Greg Mitchell, Pierre Verdier, Bobbie Spellman, Michal Barzuza, Rip Verkerke, and John Harrison for helpful comments and suggestions.
Law and economics (L&E) emerged as a field in the middle of the twentieth century, it focused on using economic theory to study the common law. During this period, L&E offered insights so novel that it not only profoundly influenced legal doctrine, but the movement’s key figures also became some of the most cited and acclaimed scholars in the American academy. The field of law and economics has since continued to grow and become more technically sophisticated, but it is also a less cohesive movement. Moreover, L&E has been misunderstood and misrepresented by the emerging law and political economy (LPE) movement. This Essay starts the process of reclaiming L&E by offering a definition of the current field: Contemporary law and economics is an academic field that (1) has a commitment to using the social scientific method of inquiry to (2) study questions about the law and legal institutions (3) in a way that is typically informed by economic insights. It then describes L&E’s comparative advantages, explains its relationship to the LPE movement, and suggests a roadmap for its renewed relevance.
For helpful comments, we are grateful to Kiran Chawla, Lee Fennell, Louis Kaplow, Adi Leibovitch, Richard McAdams, David Weisbach, workshop participants at the University of Chicago, and the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review. We thank Hannah Lu and Safia Sayed for excellent research assistance.
For helpful comments, we are grateful to Kiran Chawla, Lee Fennell, Louis Kaplow, Adi Leibovitch, Richard McAdams, David Weisbach, workshop participants at the University of Chicago, and the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review. We thank Hannah Lu and Safia Sayed for excellent research assistance.
Should legal rules be designed exclusively based on efficiency considerations, or should they also attempt to promote an equitable distribution of social resources? The answer traditionally associated with scholarship in law and economics is that they should focus only on efficiency. Even for a society that cares about achieving an equitable distribution of resources by income, the argument goes, it is generally better to adopt legal rules based exclusively on efficiency considerations while relying on the income tax and transfer system to promote distributional goals. However, even proponents of the claim that social welfare is best promoted through the adoption of efficient legal rules agree that there are certain conditions under which it does not apply. This Essay considers when legal rules should be efficient and when they should not. It focuses on conditions that can cause the socially optimal legal rule to diverge from the efficient legal rule—i.e., the legal rule that would be optimal absent distributional considerations. Its goal is to translate these arguments to settings where the question of interest relates to the design of a legal rule rather than, say, the design of a commodity tax. In particular, it seeks to clarify the types of arguments that can support the adoption of inefficient legal rules when income taxation is available as a policy tool.
Mainstream antitrust policy is grounded in economics and views the protection of competition as antitrust’s singular goal. But the populist “antimonopoly movement” believes that antitrust should focus less on economic issues and more on the political influence of large firms. While the courts have long embraced the economic approach to antitrust, antimonopolists have recently gained some support in politics. This battle of ideas is therefore poised to determine the future of antitrust. Antitrust law currently suffers from a number of problems, but the antimonopoly movement does not offer serious solutions. On the contrary, by deemphasizing tangible economic harms in favor of abstract political concerns, it would cause immense economic damage. Antitrust populism is grounded in the moralistic belief that large companies are inherently detrimental to society, overlooking the fact that most big firms attained their success by providing significant economic benefits to the public, such as better products or lower prices. This Essay argues that rather than punishing bigness for its own sake, antitrust should focus on proscribing anticompetitive behavior and ensuring that all firms can compete on a level playing field.