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I.  Patents, Antitrust, and Competition

I. The Source of the Difference between Early and Late Adopters

A long time ago—roughly between the 2014–2015 academic year and the spring of 2016, when Donald Trump’s presidential candidacy monopolized the public conversational agenda—there was a heated debate about whether our culture was experiencing a reprise of the 1990s and its struggles over “political correctness.”

At the end of the October 2014 term, the Supreme Court decided a seemingly mundane case involving municipal sign ordinances.

Magistrate judges are “nothing less than indispensable” to the modern judicial system.

There is a popular belief among statutory interpretation scholars that substantive canons of statutory construction—that is, policy-based background norms or presumptions such as the rule of lenity and the canon of constitutional avoidance—act as an “escape valve” that helps textualist judges eschew, or “mitigate,” the rigors of textualism.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc v Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc has created a cottage industry in choreography.

Can the US Constitution, as currently written, handle the problem of excessive partisanship? Or, instead, does the Constitution need to be amended to address this problem?

Interpretation requires an object: a text, an act, a concept, a something to be interpreted. An interpreter must pick out that object.

Many tenets of statutory interpretation take a peculiar form. They allow consideration of outside information—legislative history, practical consequences, the statute’s title, etc.—but only if the statute’s text is unclear or ambiguous.