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Displaying 531 - 540 of 1304

The Chicago Obsession in the Interpretation of US Antitrust History

https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/print-archive/chicago-obsession-interpretation-us-antitrust-history

The Chicago School and the Forgotten Political Dimension of Antitrust Law

https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/print-archive/chicago-school-and-forgotten-political-dimension-antitrust-law
The Chicago School, said to have influenced antitrust analysis inescapably, is associated today with a set of ideas and arguments about the goal of antitrust law. In particular, the Chicago School is known for asserting that economic efficiency is and should be the only purpose of antitrust law and that the neoclassical price theory model offers the best policy tool for maximizing economic efficiency in the real world; that corporate actions, including various vertical restraints, are efficient and welfare-increasing; that markets are self-correcting and monopoly is merely an occasional, unstable, and transitory outcome of the competitive process; and that governmental cures for the rare cases where markets fail to self-correct tend to be “worse than the disease.”

Labor Antitrust’s Paradox

https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/print-archive/labor-antitrusts-paradox

The Case for “Unfair Methods of Competition” Rulemaking

https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/print-archive/case-unfair-methods-competition-rulemaking
Open, competitive markets are a foundation of economic liberty. A lack of competition, meanwhile, can enable dominant firms to exercise their market power in harmful ways.

Startup Acquisitions, Error Costs, and Antitrust Policy

https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/print-archive/startup-acquisitions-error-costs-and-antitrust-policy
High tech industries are not only lucrative, but also highly innovative and dynamic. Large firms are not their sole source of innovation, however.

The Chicago School’s Limited Influence on International Antitrust

https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/print-archive/chicago-schools-limited-influence-international-antitrust

The Common Ownership Trilemma

https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/print-archive/common-ownership-trilemma
Overlapping ownership of large publicly traded companies in the United States has grown dramatically in recent decades. The list of largest shareholders of almost any publicly traded company has a similar set of shareholders, namely the largest asset managers.

Experimental Jurisprudence

https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/uclr-online/briefly-podcast/experimental-jurisprudence
This is Briefly, a production of the University of Chicago Law Review. Today we’re discussing Experimental Jurisprudence, which is an emerging field that uses empirical methods, particularly from the cognitive sciences, to clarify important concepts in the law.

Volume 87.2 (March 2020) 263-623

https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/volume-872-march-2020-263-623
Essays The Common Ownership Trilemma

Social Media and Market Manipulation

https://lawreview.uchicago.edu/uclr-online/briefly-podcast/social-media-and-market-manipulation
This is Briefly, a production of the University of Chicago Law Review. Today we are discussing social media influencers and their ability to manipulate markets.

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