The Article III Problem in Bankruptcy
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This Article reconsiders the implementation of Article III in the bankruptcy context. Recent rulings that limit the delegation of adjudicative power to non–Article III tribunals have generated uncertainty and profuse litigation. The Supreme Court’s Article III cases in this domain lack any foundational account of why the power granted to bankruptcy judges implicates a constitutional problem. This Article identifies more precisely the Article III stakes in bankruptcy. Drawing on the well-tested creditors’-bargain theory of bankruptcy, this Article proposes a tractable, economically sophisticated constraint on congressional delegations. Our proposed account of bankruptcy courts’ permissible domain minimizes Article III and federalism harms—the normative desiderata identified by the Court—while also enabling bankruptcy’s core operations to continue unhindered. To illustrate its utility, the Article applies this account to a range of common bankruptcy disputes, demonstrating that most (but not all) of the Court’s existing jurisprudence is sound in result, if not in reasoning.
This Case Note offers some direction for handling competing interests in this developing body of law and other complex cases weighing intersecting constitutional rights against governmental interests. Parts I and II provide background information, describing the Sell test and the current state of constitutional and statutory religious protections. Part III critically analyzes how courts, including the Fifth Circuit, have considered religious objections in Sell determinations so far. Because such analysis remains underdeveloped in the courts, Part IV suggests frameworks for coherently integrating Free Exercise doctrine into Sell inquiries based on the “hybrid theory” of constitutional rights.
She thanks Henry Gilchrist, Timothy Burke, Kimberly Burke, and Alexis Berg for their support, and the University of Chicago Law Review Online team for all their hard work.
This Case Note explores the possibility that, in a world where TikTok is banned or heavily regulated, individual TikTok users could sue states under a Takings Clause theory. Any such cases would have to wrestle with two core questions (1) whether the account holders hold an actionable property interest in their accounts; and (2) if so, whether permanently and totally depriving users of access to their accounts constitutes a taking.
We thank Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Ryan Bubb, Ed Cheng, Quinn Curtis, Elisabeth de Fontenay, Jared Ellias, Jill Fisch, Joe Grundfest, Cam Harvey, Scott Hirst, Colleen Honigsberg, Marcel Kahan, Louis Kaplow, Jonathan Klick, Brian Leiter, Saul Levmore, Dorothy Lund, John Morley, Mariana Pargendler, Elizabeth Pollman, Roberta Romano, Paolo Saguato, Holger Spamann, George Vojta, and Michael Weber for valuable suggestions and discussions. This Article has benefited from comments by workshop participants at Columbia Law School, George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School, Georgetown University Law Center, Harvard Law School, Stanford Law School, UC Berkeley School of Law, the University of Chicago Law School, the University of Oxford Faculty of Law, the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, the University of Toronto Faculty of Law, the University of Virginia School of Law, and the Washington University School of Law, as well as at the American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting, the Corporate & Securities Litigation Workshop, the Labex ReFi-NYU-SAFE/LawFin Law & Banking/Finance Conference, and the Utah Winter Deals Conference. Robertson gratefully acknowledges the support of the Douglas Clark and Ruth Ann McNeese Faculty Research Fund. Katy Beeson and Levi Haas provided exceptional research assistance. All errors are our own.
We thank Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Ryan Bubb, Ed Cheng, Quinn Curtis, Elisabeth de Fontenay, Jared Ellias, Jill Fisch, Joe Grundfest, Cam Harvey, Scott Hirst, Colleen Honigsberg, Marcel Kahan, Louis Kaplow, Jonathan Klick, Brian Leiter, Saul Levmore, Dorothy Lund, John Morley, Mariana Pargendler, Elizabeth Pollman, Roberta Romano, Paolo Saguato, Holger Spamann, George Vojta, and Michael Weber for valuable suggestions and discussions. This Article has benefited from comments by workshop participants at Columbia Law School, George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School, Georgetown University Law Center, Harvard Law School, Stanford Law School, UC Berkeley School of Law, the University of Chicago Law School, the University of Oxford Faculty of Law, the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, the University of Toronto Faculty of Law, the University of Virginia School of Law, and the Washington University School of Law, as well as at the American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting, the Corporate & Securities Litigation Workshop, the Labex ReFi-NYU-SAFE/LawFin Law & Banking/Finance Conference, and the Utah Winter Deals Conference. Robertson gratefully acknowledges the support of the Douglas Clark and Ruth Ann McNeese Faculty Research Fund. Katy Beeson and Levi Haas provided exceptional research assistance. All errors are our own.
We thank Lucian Bebchuk, Alon Brav, Ryan Bubb, Ed Cheng, Quinn Curtis, Elisabeth de Fontenay, Jared Ellias, Jill Fisch, Joe Grundfest, Cam Harvey, Scott Hirst, Colleen Honigsberg, Marcel Kahan, Louis Kaplow, Jonathan Klick, Brian Leiter, Saul Levmore, Dorothy Lund, John Morley, Mariana Pargendler, Elizabeth Pollman, Roberta Romano, Paolo Saguato, Holger Spamann, George Vojta, and Michael Weber for valuable suggestions and discussions. This Article has benefited from comments by workshop participants at Columbia Law School, George Mason University Antonin Scalia Law School, Georgetown University Law Center, Harvard Law School, Stanford Law School, UC Berkeley School of Law, the University of Chicago Law School, the University of Oxford Faculty of Law, the University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School, the University of Toronto Faculty of Law, the University of Virginia School of Law, and the Washington University School of Law, as well as at the American Law and Economics Association Annual Meeting, the Corporate & Securities Litigation Workshop, the Labex ReFi-NYU-SAFE/LawFin Law & Banking/Finance Conference, and the Utah Winter Deals Conference. Robertson gratefully acknowledges the support of the Douglas Clark and Ruth Ann McNeese Faculty Research Fund. Katy Beeson and Levi Haas provided exceptional research assistance. All errors are our own.
For years, academic experts have championed the widespread adoption of the “Fama-French” factors in legal settings. Factor models are commonly used to perform valuations, performance evaluation and event studies across a wide variety of contexts, many of which rely on data provided by Professor Kenneth French. Yet these data are beset by a problem that the experts themselves did not understand: In a companion article, we document widespread retroactive changes to French’s factor data. These changes are the result of discretionary changes to the construction of the factors and materially affect a broad range of estimates. In this Article, we show how these retroactive changes can have enormous impacts in precisely the settings in which experts have pressed for their use. We provide examples of valuations, performance analysis, and event studies in which the retroactive changes have a large—and even dispositive—effect on an expert’s conclusions.