A Historical Approach to Negligent Misrepresentation and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b)
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This Essay explores the future of legal prediction markets. Part I explains how markets work and what makes them hard to beat. Part II then turns to the largest legal prediction market to date: the outcome of Learning Resources. Finally, Part III considers whether markets are well-suited to forecasting legal outcomes, both in principle and in practice.
In 2021, Congress passed the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act (EFAA). Notably, the EFAA assigns courts, rather than an arbitrator, the responsibility for determining the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s allegations. This has led to disagreements between federal district courts over the appropriate pleading standard when determining whether the EFAA applies. This Essay argues that courts should adopt the “nonfrivolous” pleading standard because it better ensures access to justice for victims of sexual misconduct.
Thanks to Laura Appleman, Monica Bell, Tan Boston, Curtis Bradley, Emily Buss, Adam Chilton, Justin Driver, Jessica Eaglin, Sheldon Evans, Lee Fennell, James Forman, Cynthia Godsoe, Nyamagaga Gondwe, Bernard Harcourt, Hajin Kim, Brian Leiter, Aaron Littman, Jamelia Morgan, Renagh O’Leary, Farah Peterson, James Gray Pope, Eric Posner, Judith Resnik, Mara Revkin, Anna Roberts, Cristina Rodríguez, Jocelyn Simonson, Kate Skolnick, Fred Smith, Stephen Smith, David Strauss, I. India Thusi, Christopher Williams, and Quinn Yeargain for thoughtful comments and conversations, and the participants of The University of Chicago Faculty Workshop, Northwestern Faculty Workshop, Yale Public Law Workshop, CrimFest, Decarceration Workshop, and Criminal Justice Roundtable for their helpful engagement. Thanks also to the editors at The University of Chicago Law Review for their excellent editorial support. The author thanks the Paul H. Leffmann Fund for research support.
In recent years, many states passed constitutional amendments prohibiting modern day slavery in the form of forced prison labor allowed by the Thirteenth Amendment. However, the state amendments' text alone has not ended prison slavery in those states. This Article examines why. It grounds its discussion in the history of American slavery after the Civil War as well as the various attempts of legislation, litigation, and constitutional amendments to dismantle forced prison labor. Drawing on this discussion, it suggests how organizers might craft these amendments and how judges and lawyers should interpret them. It argues that, ultimately, amending constitutional text alone is not enough. To achieve their goals amendments must work in tandem with litigation, governmental structural reform, and the inevitable political battles that arise over the shape of the criminal legal system.