Volume 92.7

November

2025

The constitutional text seems to be missing a host of governmental powers that we take for granted. The Supreme Court has suggested the United States automatically acquired powers “equal to the right and power of the other members of the international family”—powers that inhered in the government “as necessary concomitants of nationality.” Although the Curtiss-Wright decision has been heavily criticized, this Article shows that the “concomitants of nationality” idea reflects an important and longstanding feature of U.S. constitutional law: a presumption that the nation acquired the full complement of sovereign powers allocated to nations under international law.

In this Article, Yaron Covo argues that disability rights law in the United States is shaped not only by civil rights statutes but also by contract law doctrines. Contract law surfaces in the disability rights context through judicial determinations of accommodations negotiations and spending clause language in disability rights statutes. The Article argues that this intertwining has eroded rights under statutes meant to promote equality and protect vulnerable classes. The Article concludes with two recommendations: replacing the “individualized” negotiation model with a uniform model and adding certain mandatory rules and defaults in the disability rights context.

The widely understood alignment between political ideology and legal methodology—conservativism and constraint versus liberalism and discretion—explains judicial behavior with diminishing accuracy. In this Essay, Richard M. Re describes a "legal realignment" comprising moves toward conservative discretion and liberal constraint at the U.S. Supreme Court. The Essay develops a model of ideological change at the Court by describing the tendency for governing coalitions and opposition parties to embrace discretion and constraint, respectively. The Essay continues by detailing the mechanisms through which individuals and generations of legal thinkers undergo ideological shifts before concluding with what the model portends for the U.S. judiciary.

The Free Exercise Clause is a broadly worded constitutional prohibition against government intrusion on religious exercise. To construct limits, courts have consistently required government officials to demonstrate the necessity of state action burdening religion. Yet government officials regularly fail to produce evidence of necessity, leaving judges to intuit or assume whether necessity exists. In this Comment, Brady Earley offers a better way. Using a method known as difference-in-differences (DiD), lawmakers can draw upon the experience of existing state laws to enact laws justified with evidence. The Comment demonstrates the value of DiD with a current free exercise controversy involving the Old Order Amish and their objection to Ohio’s flashing light requirement for buggies. Applying DiD to this conflict reveals that Ohio’s buggy light law led to an estimated 23% reduction in buggy-related crashes compared to Michigan and Kentucky—states with less restrictive buggy requirements. Beyond this case study, the Comment also discusses how DiD can help address recent Supreme Court conflicts over tax exemptions for religious organizations, LGBTQ-themed books in schools, and religious charter schools. These examples grapple with the problems and the showcase the possibilities of a data-driven method to address necessity in free exercise.

Complete preemption is a jurisdictional doctrine in which a federal statute so wholly envelops certain state law claims that those claims effectively cease to exist. Aside from an explicit complete preemption hook, the Supreme Court has recognized just one way for a federal statute to completely preempt state law claims: it must provide an exclusive federal remedy and also have a special nature that makes it extra federal. In this Comment, Ryan Jain-Liu tracks the historical evolution of U.S. bankruptcy to make this second showing. In doing so, this Comment observes two entwined trends in the history of U.S. bankruptcy: bankruptcy simultaneously became more remedial—and thus more voluntary—as the federal government asserted increased control over bankruptcy law. The dual developments toward bankruptcy-as-remedy and bankruptcy-as-federal combine to provide involuntary debtors special protection and to give involuntary bankruptcy a special federal nature. Finally, this Comment expands on the case study of involuntary bankruptcy to argue that historical evolution can form the basis for recognizing an area of law’s special federal nature and support application of the complete preemption doctrine to novel contexts.