Print Archive

We offer a way of thinking about public-investment institutions as creatures of both public law and private markets. Placing public investment—a distinct public function—in the context of constitutional debates on the legitimate reach of the administrative state, we focus the search for legitimate institutional structure on the interaction between the entity’s efficacy as a market actor and the concept of public accountability. This tension, as well as synergy, is where the fundamental hybridity of public-investment institutions is most visible. We argue that only by considering the unique objectives and tools of public investment as a legitimate sovereign activity can we design workable mechanisms of democratic accountability for public-investment institutions. We hope that our observations shed light on the broader debate about the optimal implementation mechanisms for the nation’s reemerging industrial policy.

The pursuit of financial stability goals over the past fifteen years has fueled the perception that a regulatory “expertocracy” governs the field of banking, rather than market forces. This Essay discusses four areas where financial stability or systemic risk mandates—either express or assumed—empowered bank regulators and supervisors to substitute their judgment for that of Congress: (1) the Financial Stability Oversight Council’s power to designate nonbank systemically important financial institutions; (2) the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s power to bail out uninsured bank depositors; (3) the adoption of inter-national standards of bank regulation through Basel; and (4) the Federal Reserve and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s power to deny bank merger applications on financial stability grounds.

The market for Treasury securities, a deep and liquid market for risk-free debt, has anchored an ambitious and creative U.S. dollar economy while also ensuring the safety and soundness of its financial and monetary system. But as the market has grown, a series of disruptions to Treasury market trading have prompted policymakers to explore measures to strengthen the market’s foundations and shore up its resilience. This Essay considers this regulatory response. It focuses on the introduction of mandatory central clearing for most trades in U.S. Treasuries—a proposal seeking to significantly reshape the day-to-day functioning of the Treasury market. Central clearing is a well-established means by which to reduce the risk of loss associated when trading parties default. We analyze this mandate, detailing its likely advantages as well as its potential trade-offs from a public policy perspective.

This Essay compares a judicial revolution that is happening to one that is not. Both the change and the status quo are being managed by the current Supreme Court. That Court has, when it comes to administrative law, shown a capacity to revisit everything. But when it comes to securities regulation, it has resisted change. What is the explanation for this divergent approach between general regulation, which the Court has sought to police, and securities regulation, which the Court has left alone? Some scholars have argued that the Supreme Court is simply uninterested in securities regulation, but the Court now hears proportionately more securities cases than it once did. Others dispute the premise that the Court supports corporate America. And, of course, the Roberts Court could change its approach to securities regulation in time. But I think the divergence suggests that the Court wants to police public rights and rights against the state but is less interested in reformulating the standards for private disputes, such as disputes between shareholders and managers.

Critics of the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence despair that the Court conceives of discrimination as the mere classification of individuals on forbidden grounds, such as race and sex, rather than systemic patterns of subordination. On the Court’s anticlassification theory, affirmative action, which relies on overt racial or gender classifications, is generally forbidden. Such context-insensitive anticlassification rules could, in principle, extend to individuals who are members of groups often regarded with hostility and suspicion, such as transgender people. Indeed, this is how most trial courts have approached recent laws that classify individuals based on sex to exclude transgender people. However, appellate courts have refused to take anticlassification rules seriously. This Article argues that all sex classifications, like all race-based ones, ought to trigger heightened constitutional scrutiny. It draws support from the principles undergirding anticlassification rules announced by the Roberts Court, most recently in its university affirmative action decisions.

Catalyzed by the #MeToo movement, states have adopted a spate of laws restricting secret settlements. In 2018, California led the charge with the Stand Together Against Non-Disclosure (STAND) Act, which targets secrecy in the resolution of sex discrimination, harassment, and abuse cases. Transparency advocates hail these reforms as a major win for victims. Critics, meanwhile, warn that the reforms will hurt those they intend to help.

Nested within this debate sit a raft of confident, conflicting—and eminently testable—claims about what exactly happens in the wake of reform. Will defendants still settle, even if secrecy isn’t on offer? Will case filings disappear? Debate over these questions has raged since the 1980s, and, over these decades, the debate has always centered on fervent predictions regarding each.

Our findings tell a clear and consequential story. Contrary to critics’ fears, the STAND Act did not yield a sharp increase or decrease in case filings. Nor did the Act appear to significantly prolong cases or amplify their intensity. The upshot: cases still settle even when secrecy isn’t on offer. Perhaps most importantly, it appears that positive effects did come to pass.

In the last few years, the Supreme Court has upended its doctrine of religious freedom under the First Amendment. Now, the government must treat religion equally with respect to providing public benefits. But it must also grant special exemptions from regulations that burden religion. We refer to this regime as structural preferentialism. This Article offers an external, political account of changes in Free Exercise and Establishment Clause jurisprudence by analyzing them as if they were the result of political conflicts between competing interest groups. Focusing on the role of religion in political polarization, rapid disaffiliation from denominations, and shifting strategies to fund religious schools, this political perspective has explanatory and predictive power that extends beyond conventional legal arguments about text, history, and precedent. Applying this approach, we predict that structural preferentialism will transform First Amendment doctrine and provide material grounds for its own entrenchment.

Chapter 11 was widely viewed as a failure in the first decade of the Bankruptcy Code’s operation, the 1980s. While basic bankruptcy still has its critics and few would say it works perfectly, the contrast with bankruptcy today is stark: bankruptcies that took years in the 1980s take months in the 2020s.

Multiple changes explain bankruptcy’s success and we do not challenge their relevance. But in our analysis, one major change is missing from the current understanding of bankruptcy’s success: bankruptcy courts and practice in the 1980s rejected market value; today bankruptcy courts and practice accept and use market value. This shift is a major explanation for bankruptcy’s success.

We argue that valuation improvements explain much of the increased speed and efficiency of Chapter 11 practice over the decades. We provide evidence that valuation conflicts narrowed and that the corporate reorganization process accelerated. The switch to market thinking across the bankruptcy spectrum—in bankruptcy transactions, in judging, and in lawyering—goes far in explaining why.

The Roberts Court has made protecting “the privacies of life” a catchphrase of Fourth Amendment law in the digital era. The time is thus ripe for revisiting the doctrinal and political roots of this newly influential quote from the Court’s 1886 decision Boyd v. United States. This Article makes a novel argument that Boyd and its elevation of protecting the “privacies of life” to an animating principle of the Fourth Amendment was instead a product of Reconstruction and its dismantlement. Fourth Amendment privacy was produced by and helped secure Reconciliation—the process through which White Americans North and South, Democrat and Republican came together to limit Reconstruction, preserve White supremacy, and pave the way for the violent disenfranchisement of newly freed Black men. The Article concludes by considering the divergent doctrinal implications of resituating Boyd and Fourth Amendment privacy in the politics of Reconciliation.

States increasingly deploy aggressive preemption measures against disfavored localities. Scholars have raised the alarm, but cities’ subordinate legal status leaves them disempowered. To push back, municipal advocates need to thoroughly understand the complex bilateral relationship between cities and their states.

That is where I come in. As Mayor of a progressive city in a conservative state, I swim in the hostile symbiosis that characterizes city-state relations. By drawing on real-life examples, closed-door conversations, and previously private documents, my coauthor and I demonstrate the potence of multi-pronged city power. We synthesize our stories into a thicker account of state motivation, and then showcase the city’s “toolbox” for limiting state preemption.

That process unearths preemption’s next frontier. Post-enactment state preemption, or “post-emption,” occurs when a state retroactively nullifies a specific, already-passed municipal law. It has been widely acknowledged but not individually distinguished. Analyzing it independently reveals that it is already ubiquitous and likely to proliferate. Post-emption thus warrants individualized normative assessment, and this Essay begins that surprisingly nuanced discussion.

Everyone owes each other a duty of ordinary care—but what is “ordinary”? How does one act reasonably to meet this burden? This Comment analyzes the current reasonable person standard for disabled plaintiffs and the corresponding duty of “ordinary care” provided by defendants through a critical disability studies lens. The current system of tort law burdens disabled plaintiffs with accommodating themselves, rather than requiring defendants to include accessible care in meeting their duty of ordinary care. To make the distribution of accommodative labor more equitable, this Comment proposes three stackable changes: (1) courts should reinterpret defendants’ duty of ordinary care to include care of individuals with disabilities by eliminating the doctrine that tortfeasors owe accommodations to people with disabilities only if they are on notice of their disabilities; (2) courts could further shift the balance of accommodative labor by factoring the mental and physical cost of accommodating oneself into the reasonable care inquiry when the plaintiff is disabled; and (3) courts could eliminate comparative negligence for plaintiffs with disabilities to address the problematic “reasonable person with a disability” standard. This Comment also explores theoretical, doctrinal, and normative justifications while creating space for a more robust dialogue on how the law treats disability as “extra”—but not ordinary.

Anti-fat bias has been described as the last socially acceptable form of prejudice. Despite the discrimination that fat people face, there is no federal protection against weight discrimination. One potential solution to the lack of existing legal protections is the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Claims challenging weight discrimination under the ADA argue that weight discrimination is a form of disability discrimination that is based on the medical condition of obesity. Yet, courts have resisted granting the ADA’s protections to obese plaintiffs.

This Comment argues that courts should recognize obesity as an ADA-protected disability, even in circuits that have restricted obesity-as-a-disability ADA claims to cases where a plaintiff can show that their obesity is related to a physiological disorder. The author draws parallels between obesity and gender dysphoria to highlight courts’ recent willingness to extend the ADA’s protection to highly stigmatized clinical conditions when a diagnosis has gained credibility in the medical community and evidence suggests that the condition has a physiological cause.