Print Archive

This Comment uses the case study of guns-at-work laws to understand Cedar Point v. Hassid’s per se takings rule as well as its exceptions. Enacted by about half of the States, guns-at-work laws protect the right of a business’s employees, customers, and invitees to store firearms in private vehicles even if those private vehicles are on company property (i.e. parking lots/parking structures). While these laws have long survived Takings Clause challenges, Cedar Point revived the viability of such challenges. Using the example of guns-at-work laws, the Comment seeks both to understand the scope of Cedar Point’s per se takings rule and to clarify and develop the open-to-the-public and long-standing restrictions on property rights exceptions to it.

For data, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. There may be millions of people with the same birthday. But how many also have a dog, a red car, and two kids? The more data is aggregated, the more identifying it becomes. Accordingly, the law has developed safe harbors for firms that take steps to prevent aggregation of the data they sell. A firm might, for instance, anonymize data by removing identifying information. But as computer scientists have shown, clever de-anonymization techniques enable motivated actors to unmask identities even if the data is anonymized. Data brokers collect, process, and sell data. Courts have traditionally calculated data brokering harms without considering the larger data ecosystem. This Comment suggests a broader conception is needed because the harm caused by one broker’s conduct depends on how other brokers behave. De-anonymization techniques, for instance, often cross-reference datasets to make guesses about missing data. A motivated actor can also buy datasets from multiple brokers to combine them. This Comment then offers a framework for courts to consider these “network harms” in the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) recent lawsuits against data brokers under its Section 5 authority to prevent unfair acts and practices.

Associational standing is a widely used doctrine that has never been subject to serious academic scrutiny. This Article calls for the abandonment, or at least serious modification, of associational standing. Even without associational standing, groups may still sue to enforce their own rights. And they could continue to help vindicate their members’ rights by providing legal representation for member plaintiffs in individual or class action suits (filed anonymously, if necessary), covering members’ litigation costs, and providing expert witnesses and other guidance. In short, associational standing is a largely unnecessary deviation from both Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement and the fundamental principles underlying our justice system. Eliminating associational standing would not limit public law and other important collective litigation, but rather ensure that such cases proceed through the proper channels (i.e., Rule 23) while preventing a range of unnecessary procedural, preclusive, remedial, and other complications.

Much of the scholarship on immigration enforcement and environmental justice assumes that agencies negatively impact vulnerable and marginalized people as a result of individualized bias or arbitrariness. This Article argues that, beyond idiosyncrasies or flaws in administrators themselves, the poor impact of administration on minorities emanates from institutional systems. In doing so, this Article introduces a framework of institutional oppression into the study of administration. This Article’s prescription is for institutional redesign. First, from the top down, Congress could utilize appropriations and pointed procedural interventions to influence how agencies exercise discretion. Second, from the bottom up, the President or agencies themselves could instigate efforts to use more accurate information and more meaningful process. Third, a focus on reviving a government of small, discrete agencies could constrain administrative discretion in ways that encourage agencies to rebalance their priorities.

Vacancy taxes are an increasingly popular solution to the paradoxical problem of high housing demand coupled with high vacancy. Soon after San Francisco adopted a vacancy tax with one of the broadest definitions of vacancy, property owners lobbed a constitutional challenge under the Takings Clause, taking advantage of a moment of doctrinal instability. This Comment seeks to make sense of how this and similar potential challenges would fare. Using the San Francisco vacancy tax as a concrete example, this Comment evaluates possible arguments that the tax effects a regulatory or physical taking. It contends that even this stringent vacancy tax would not be a taking, and highlights elements of a different vacancy tax or regulation that may tip the scales of this analysis. It explores original understandings of land use (and nonuse) regulations to argue that fines levied on the nonproductive use of property are a background principle of property law that generally precludes the conclusion that vacancy taxes are takings.

This Comment reviews Section 230 jurisprudence to develop a novel taxonomy for claims against social media platforms. It divides claims against platforms into three categories—content specific, content dependent, and content agnostic—based on the proximity of the alleged injury to user-generated content and the degree of the platform’s participation. This Comment also formalizes a remedies test that courts can use to distinguish legitimate content-agnostic claims from those in name only. Armed with this vocabulary, this Comment turns its attention to a number of cases pending against social platforms. Applying the remedies test, it determines that a handful of pending allegations give rise to legitimate content-agnostic claims. Noting that content-agnostic injuries are material but not yet fully understood, this Comment ultimately argues that an ex ante regulatory regime operationalized by an expert agency is better suited to address social-platform externalities than an ex post liability regime.

AI inventions have taken the world by storm. Many of these inventions are protected by patents. Yet a large number of AI patents are flawed, prone to invalidation in court. This Comment asks which AI inventions ought to receive patents. It concludes that AI methods and models should be patent eligible because they are likely to be incentivized by patents and unlikely to chill follow-on innovation. This Comment further argues that both the USPTO’s guidance and much of the Federal Circuit’s recent eligibility case law are inconsistent with finding these inventions patent eligible. However, the Federal Circuit demonstrated an understanding of eligibility that would allow patents for many AI methods and models in its 2016 McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc. decision. This Comment concludes by advocating that the Federal Circuit explicitly apply the holding of this case to hold that an AI invention is patent eligible at the first opportunity.

A basic principle of virtually every regulation to improve grid reliability and reduce power sector emissions is that market participants change their behavior when regulations make it more expensive to engage in socially harmful activities. But this assumption does not apply to large parts of the electricity industry, where investor-owned utilities are often able to pass the costs of climate and reliability rules on to captive ratepayers. The underlying problem, I argue, is that the U.S. legal system outsources investment and market design decisions to private firms that will be financially harmed if state and federal regulators pursue deep decarbonization or take ambitious steps to improve grid reliability. Structural changes such as full corporate unbundling, market liberalization, and aggressive governance reforms are needed to make climate and reliability policies more effective and easier to administer.

There are two conventional methods for resolving separation of powers disputes: formalism and functionalism. Although both approaches have been around for decades, neither has proven capable of resolving the difficult separation of powers disputes that actually arise today. This Article proposes a method built to resolve precisely such cases: interest balancing. Accepting that both branches might have power to act over a matter, interest balancing asks whether one branch’s exercise of power has infringed upon the other’s and, if so, whether such infringement is justified by a sufficiently strong interest. Despite the long history of interest balancing in individual rights cases, scholars have failed to appreciate its utility in resolving separation of powers disputes. This Article identifies interest balancing as a coherent method of separation of powers analysis that is both conceptually and practically well suited to address the separation of powers disputes that actually arise today.

Telemedicine abortions allow women to meet virtually with abortion providers and receive abortion medication through the mail, all without ever leaving their homes. This development could be instrumental in facilitating access to abortion care for women living in abortion-restrictive states after the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization. However, many abortion-restrictive states have moved to restrict remote abortion care and impose legal liability on out-of-state telemedicine abortion providers. This Comment outlines a novel argument that these state restrictions on telemedicine abortions violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, which prohibits state regulation that discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce.

Partisan gerrymandering distorts voter preferences and undermines electoral competitiveness. Single-state redistricting reform has stalled because legislators and voters alike face diminishing incentives to reallocate power to their state’s minority party as partisan polarization increases. In the congressional redistricting context, however, interstate compacts could replace those incentives to compete with incentives to cooperate. The Constitution’s Compact Clause permits states to collaborate with each other but requires congressional consent. Yet the Constitution remains silent about which interstate agreements trigger this requirement, how Congress may provide consent, and how the Compact Clause interacts with the Elections Clause. This Comment explains how states could form redistricting compacts even without affirmative congressional approval.

Contributing to the literature on “super statutes,” I suggest that an analogy to the philosophical concept of weakness of will can illuminate circumstances under which some statutes ought to stand above others. Analogizing to philosopher Richard Holton’s account of weak will, I develop an account in which some statutes express long-term commitments, are intended to foreclose future deliberation, and enact reasons into the law. Such statutes have the status of what Holton calls “resolutions.” Congress can be weak willed when it violates such statutes, and this weak-willed action jeopardizes the advantages of enacting such statutes in the first place. I propose that courts may apply familiar canons of statutory interpretation to hold Congress accountable to its commitments.