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86.8
Legal Fictions and Foreign Frictions: An Argument for a Functional Interpretation of Jesner v Arab Bank for Transnational Corporations
Kelly Geddes
AB 2017, University of Chicago; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School

I would like to thank Professor Tom Ginsburg, Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell, Michael Ortiz-Benz, and the editors and staff of The University of Chicago Law Review for their assistance and insightful feedback throughout the process of writing this Comment.

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86.8
Federal Expansion and the Decay of State Courts
Diego A. Zambrano
Assistant Professor of Law, Stanford Law School

For thoughtful comments and conversations, I thank Greg Ablavsky, Robert Bone, Adam Chilton, Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, David Freeman Engstrom, Richard Epstein, Eric Fish, Nora Freeman Engstrom, Jacob Goldin, Alexandra Lahav, Hiba Hafiz, Deborah Hensler, Daniel E. Ho, David Hoffman, William Hubbard, Samuel Issacharoff, Emma Kaufman, Amalia Kessler, Dan Klerman, Jonathan Masur, Michael McConnell, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Saul Levmore, Jim Pfander, Bill Rubenstein, Joanna Schwartz, Catherine M. Sharkey, Shirin Sinnar, Norm Spaulding, Alan Trammell, Adam Zimmerman, and the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review. I also thank participants at the Annual Civil Procedure Workshop and the Clifford Symposium.

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86.7
Settlement Malpractice
Michael Moffitt
Roger D. Fisher Visiting Professor in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, Harvard Law School. Philip H. Knight Chair in Law, Professor, and former Dean at the University of Oregon School of Law.

For their feedback, I thank Professors Ian Ayres, Rishi Batra, Glenn Cohen, Noam Ebner, Deborah Eisenberg, John Goldberg, David Hoffman, Louis Kaplow, Andy Kaufman, Andrew Mamo, John Manning, Martha Minow, Bob Mnookin, Scott Peppet, Jeff Seul, Jean Sternlight, Andrea Schneider, Guhan Subramanian, Cass Sunstein, and Rachel Viscomi. I benefited enormously from feedback at faculty colloquia at Harvard, Maryland, and UNLV. And I thank my research assistants Haley Banks, Christopher Dotson, Juhi Gupta, Ayoung Kim, Ben Pincus, Jordan Shapiro, Austin Smith, and Elise Williard, without whose careful work this research would have been impossible.

Most clients likely believe that their lawyers have provided outstanding service in such contexts—and most clients are likely correct in that assessment. Given that most lawsuits settle3 and that lawyers play a central role in settlement negotiations and decision-making, however, we must assume that at least some lawyers sometimes fall short of the profession’s standards of care in the settlement context.
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86.7
High-Value, Low-Value, and No-Value Guns: Applying Free Speech Law to the Second Amendment
Joseph E. Sitzmann
BA 2017, The George Washington University; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School.

The Supreme Court ushered in a dramatic shift in Second Amendment jurisprudence in District of Columbia v Heller, holding that the Second Amendment protects the right to bear arms for “the core lawful purpose of self-defense.” This decision made clear that possession of a firearm need not be tethered to service in a militia. But the Court left open significant questions regarding what exactly that newly defined right entails.

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86.7
Reviewing Presidential Orders
Lisa Manheim
Charles I. Stone Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law

Many thanks to Alex Arkfeld, Ben Crozier, and the librarians at the UW School of Law for their excellent research assistance. Thank you also to those who provided helpful comments on earlier drafts, including Jeff Feldman, David Marcus, and Kevin Stack, as well as to those who shared their thoughts at workshops in which prior versions of this project were presented, including at Emory University School of Law’s Faculty Colloquium, the presidential power lecture series at the University of Arizona, and the Rehnquist Center’s National Conference of Constitutional Law Scholars.

Kathryn A. Watts
Jack R. MacDonald Endowed Chair, University of Washington School of Law.

In early 2017, a newly inaugurated President Donald J. Trump tried to force policy change through a flurry of written orders. While some opponents took to the streets to protest, others identified a different forum for resistance: the federal courts. Lawyers, mobilizing at a breakneck pace, sued the President in name to enjoin the implementation of several of his signature orders, including his first travel ban and an executive order involving sanctuary cities.

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86.7
“Unfair or Unconscionable”: A New Approach to Time-Barred Debt Collection under the FDCPA
Jon D. Fish
BA 2016, University of Kentucky; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School.

In search of an accessible epithet, newspapers across the country have christened debt that is barred by the statute of limitations “zombie debt.” This “funny term” for time-barred debt reflects its tendency to come back to life and attack when, like the first victims in a horror movie, consumers “seal their [ ] fate” by their own heedless approaches to debt collectors.

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86.7
Liability for Data Scraping Prohibitions under the Refusal to Deal Doctrine: An Incremental Step toward More Robust Sherman Act Enforcement
Ioannis Drivas
BA 2015, Amherst College; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School.

Internet giants like Google, Facebook, Microsoft, and Amazon have attracted controversy for their growing influence on our social, political, and commercial activities. Some commentators worry that these companies’ ability to gather data and control who accesses it threatens the competitive health of the digital economy. This trend could harm consumers by stifling innovation in online products and by producing a digital economy with fewer choices and fewer competitors determined to win consumers’ business.

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86.6
Standing for Statues, but Not for Statutes? An Argument for Purely Stigmatic Harm Standing under the Establishment Clause
Merav Bennett
BA 2013, Yale University; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School

In 2016, Mississippi passed the Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination Act, a law exempting Mississippians with “sincerely held religious beliefs or moral convictions” that marriage should be restricted to heterosexual couples from the state’s antidiscrimination laws.

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86.6
Tangled Arms: Modernizing and Unifying the Arm-of-the-State Doctrine
Kelsey Joyce Dayton
BA 2015, Stanford University; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School.

I would like to thank Professors Aziz Huq and William Baude for helping me turn my life interests and experiences into a legal question, as well as Parker Eudy, Parag Dharmavarapu, Peter Trombly, Jordan Golds, Kathy Bruce, and Will Admussen for their insights and persistent help. Special thanks to my grandma, Brenda Joyce Dayton, who edited my first childhood ramblings and inspired me to write more.

A police officer suspects someone of being an undocumented immigrant and detains them. Later, that individual sues the local police department in federal court for establishing a policy of hardline immigration enforcement that violated their Fourth Amendment rights.

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86.6
Clarity Doctrines
Richard M. Re
Professor, UCLA School of Law.

Many thanks to Will Baude, Pamela Bookman, Dan Epps, Barry Friedman, Mark Greenberg, Josia Klein, Anita Krishnakumar, Maggie Lemos, Marin Levy, Leah Litman, Michael Morley, Anne Joseph O’Connell, Larry Rosenthal, Steve Sachs, Joanna Schwartz, Dan Schweitzer, Mila Sohoni, and participants in the St. John’s Faculty Workshop and the Duke Law School Judicial Administration/Judicial Process Roundtable. I am also grateful to Caleb Peiffer and Taylor Pitz for excellent research assistance, and to the superb editors of The University of Chicago Law Review.

Legal practice is riddled with claims about when the law is or isn’t “clear.” If a statute is unclear or ambiguous, a court might defer to an agency, side in favor of lenity, or avoid interpretations that would render the statute unconstitutional.

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86.6
In Defense of the Hare: Primary Jurisdiction Doctrine and Scientific Uncertainty in State-Court Opioid Litigation
Anna Stapleton
AB 2014, The University of Chicago; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School.

The author wishes to thank Professor Jennifer Nou, Professor John Rappaport,Derek Carr, Braden Lang, and the Board and Staff of The University of Chicago Law Review for their insightful comments and guidance throughout this Comment’s life cycle.

From 2000 to 2017, more than three hundred thousand people died of overdoses involving opioids in the United States.