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Article
86 Special
Posner and Class Actions
Daniel Klerman
Edward G. Lewis Professor of Law and History, USC Gould School of Law. dklerman@law.usc.edu.

The author thanks Saul Levmore for helpful comments; Haley Tuchman and P.J. Novack for excellent research assistance; Paul Moorman for outstanding library reference support; and Robert Klonoff, John Coffee, and Brian Dean Morales for sharing video of the important “Posner on Class Actions” conference that Columbia Law School hosted on March 2, 2018.

The hallmark of Judge Posner’s class action decisions is rigorous review to ensure that aggregate litigation serves the best interests of class members and does not unduly pressure defendants to settle.

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Essay
86 Special
Judges and Judgment: In Praise of Instigators
Kathryn Judge
Professor of Law, Columbia Law School; Research Member, European Corporate Governance Institute.

The author would like to thank John Coates, John Morley, and Quinn Curtis for helpful comments; Christian Ronald for excellent research assistance; and Lawrence Lessig and Jesse Eisinger for inspiration. Mistakes are mine alone.

This Essay is about mutual funds.

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Essay
86 Special
Posner on Vertical Restraints
C. Scott Hemphill
Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.

I thank Harry First, Eleanor Fox, Bert Huang, Jon Jacobson, Saul Levmore, and Tim Wu for helpful comments. Alex Gelb, Tim Keegan, Alison Perry, and Phantila Phataraprasit provided outstanding research assistance.

This Essay considers the influence of Richard Posner’s judicial opinions about antitrust law.

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86 Special
Unlikely Resurrection: Richard Posner, Promissory Estoppel, and The Death of Contract
Douglas G. Baird
Harry A. Bigelow Distinguished Service Professor, The University of Chicago Law School

I thank Saul Levmore for his thoughtful comments. The Frank Greenberg Fund provided generous research support for this Essay.

Many of Richard Posner’s opinions boldly confront great questions. But equally important are those that, in the aggregate, illuminate discrete areas of the law and make them easier to understand.

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86 Special
Foreword
Lawrence Lessig
Roy L. Furman Professor of Law and Leadership, Harvard Law School

Richard Posner is the most prolific federal judge and academic in the history of American law.

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Comment
86.4
The Underlying Underwriter: An Analysis of the Spotify Direct Listing
Benjamin J. Nickerson
AB 2015, The University of Chicago; JD Candidate 2020, The University ofChicago Law School.

I wish to thank Nicholas B. Aeppel, Douglas G. Baird, William A. Birdthistle, Anthony J. Casey, Ryan D. Doerfler, Thomas J. Miles, and the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review for their thoughtful guidance and advice.

On April 3, 2018, global music streaming company Spotify Technology S.A. (Spotify) went public through a direct listing of its ordinary shares on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Rather than raise money by issuing new shares to the public through a traditional initial public offering (IPO), Spotify made its existing shares available for purchase on the public exchange through the seldom-utilized direct listing process.

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Comment
86.4
Partially Tribal Land: The Case for Limiting State Eminent Domain Power under 25 USC § 357
Addison W. Bennett
BA 2016, Skidmore College; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School.

When a state government pursues a utility project, utility lines must often cross land owned by private individuals. Though the state’s power to condemn property is ordinarily sufficient to allow the government to construct such a line through the property, special difficulty emerges when the utility lines are to cross tribal lands.

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86.4
Religious Accommodation, the Establishment Clause, and Third-Party Harm
Mark Storslee
Executive Director, Stanford Constitutional Law Center.

Thanks to Stephanie Barclay, William Baude, Thomas Berg, Samuel Bray, Jud Campbell, Nathan Chapman, Nora Freeman Engstrom, Carl Esbeck, Richard Garnett, Stephanie Inks, Mark Kelman, Andrew Koppelman, Douglas Laycock, Christopher Lund, Ira Lupu, William Marshall, Michael McConnell, Chloe Moon, Douglas NeJaime, Jane Schacter, Geoffrey Sigalet, Lance Sorenson, Charles Tyler, Robin Fretwell Wilson, and participants in the Stanford Law School Fellows Workshop and the Annual Law and Religion Roundtable for helpful conversations and feedback on earlier drafts. Special thanks are also due to Frederick Mark Gedicks, Micah Schwartzman, and Nelson Tebbe for their generosity and for helpful conversations about this topic and others. All errors, of course, are my own.

We occupy a unique moment in the story of American religious liberty. During the Founding period and for much of the twentieth century, it was widely accepted that religious accommodation—the practice of sometimes exempting religious individuals or groups from burdensome laws—was a desirable means of protecting free exercise. But as a matter of cultural consensus, that agreement seems to be quickly unraveling or at least entering a new period of uncertainty.

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86.4
The Logic and Limits of Municipal Bankruptcy Law
Vincent S.J. Buccola
Assistant Professor, The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.

Thanks to Douglas Baird, Allison Buccola, Steve Buccola, Laura Coordes, Brian Hathaway, Rich Hynes, Juliet Moringiello, Eric Rasmusen, David Schleicher, and David Skeel for extensive comments on earlier drafts; and to Joe Gyourko and Bob Inman for generative conversations. Thanks also to participants in workshops at Wharton and the Indiana University Kelley School of Business. Dorinda and Mark Winkelman provided valuable research support.

Cities and towns across the country face debt burdens of a magnitude not seen since the Great Depression. Four of the five largest municipal bankruptcies in history have been filed in the last decade, and more are bound to come.

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Article
86.3
The Failure of Mixed-Motives Jurisprudence
Andrew Verstein
Associate Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law.

For helpful comments, I am grateful to Jessica Clarke, Brandon Garrett, Mike Green, Aziz Huq, Martha Nussbaum, Eric Posner, Sean P. Sullivan, David Super, Matthew C. Stephenson, Gabriel Rauterberg, Ron Wright, the participants in the Brooklyn Law School Faculty Workshop, the George Mason Faculty Workshop, and the Yale/Stanford/Harvard Junior Faculty Forum. Andrew Homer and Abby Jacobs provided helpful research assistance.

How should we judge people who act for both good and bad motives?

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Article
86.3
Enacted Legislative Findings and Purposes
Jarrod Shobe
Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.

Thanks to Michael Herz, Ethan Leib, Victoria Nourse, Bill Eskridge, Rachel Barkow, Jim Brudney, Peter Strauss, Abbe Gluck, Jesse Cross, Maggie Lemos, Evan Zoldan, Bill Buzbee, Josh Chafetz, Daphna Renan, Paul Stancil, Aaron Nielson, participants at the Legislation Roundtable at Fordham University, the J. Reuben Clark Law Society Workshop, and BYU law faculty workshop for helpful comments on earlier drafts. For excellent research assistance I am grateful to Trevor Nielson, Bonnie Stohel, Eric Abram, Katie Ellis, and Laura Hunt. I am especially grateful for the assistance of Shawn Nevers for help with many of the empirical aspects of this project.

Whether judges should consider legislative history is the most hotly debated issue in statutory interpretation.

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Essay
86.3
Inversion Aversion
Lee Anne Fennell
Max Pam Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful for research support from the Harold J. Green Faculty Fund and the SNR Denton Fund.

For conversations about this Essay, we thank Anupam Chander, Victor Fleischer, Jerry Frug, Calvin Johnson, Michael Knoll, Steven Medema, Richard Schragger,Sloan Speck, Andrew Verstein, and participants in the Harvard Law School conference Celebrating Jerry Frug’s Work on Cities. We also thank Reeves Jordan for excellent research assistance. An earlier, longer draft of this Essay circulated under the title Inverted Theoriesand remains available on Chicago Unbound at http://perma.cc/XB7Q-TXYE.

Richard H. McAdams
Deputy Dean and Bernard D. Meltzer Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.

Some objects, like Weebles and lawn darts, resist inversion. The same is true of certain popular legal theories—or so we argue.