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Article
86.4
Religious Accommodation, the Establishment Clause, and Third-Party Harm
Mark Storslee
Executive Director, Stanford Constitutional Law Center.

Thanks to Stephanie Barclay, William Baude, Thomas Berg, Samuel Bray, Jud Campbell, Nathan Chapman, Nora Freeman Engstrom, Carl Esbeck, Richard Garnett, Stephanie Inks, Mark Kelman, Andrew Koppelman, Douglas Laycock, Christopher Lund, Ira Lupu, William Marshall, Michael McConnell, Chloe Moon, Douglas NeJaime, Jane Schacter, Geoffrey Sigalet, Lance Sorenson, Charles Tyler, Robin Fretwell Wilson, and participants in the Stanford Law School Fellows Workshop and the Annual Law and Religion Roundtable for helpful conversations and feedback on earlier drafts. Special thanks are also due to Frederick Mark Gedicks, Micah Schwartzman, and Nelson Tebbe for their generosity and for helpful conversations about this topic and others. All errors, of course, are my own.

We occupy a unique moment in the story of American religious liberty. During the Founding period and for much of the twentieth century, it was widely accepted that religious accommodation—the practice of sometimes exempting religious individuals or groups from burdensome laws—was a desirable means of protecting free exercise. But as a matter of cultural consensus, that agreement seems to be quickly unraveling or at least entering a new period of uncertainty.

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Article
86.4
The Logic and Limits of Municipal Bankruptcy Law
Vincent S.J. Buccola
Assistant Professor, The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.

Thanks to Douglas Baird, Allison Buccola, Steve Buccola, Laura Coordes, Brian Hathaway, Rich Hynes, Juliet Moringiello, Eric Rasmusen, David Schleicher, and David Skeel for extensive comments on earlier drafts; and to Joe Gyourko and Bob Inman for generative conversations. Thanks also to participants in workshops at Wharton and the Indiana University Kelley School of Business. Dorinda and Mark Winkelman provided valuable research support.

Cities and towns across the country face debt burdens of a magnitude not seen since the Great Depression. Four of the five largest municipal bankruptcies in history have been filed in the last decade, and more are bound to come.

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Article
86.3
The Failure of Mixed-Motives Jurisprudence
Andrew Verstein
Associate Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law.

For helpful comments, I am grateful to Jessica Clarke, Brandon Garrett, Mike Green, Aziz Huq, Martha Nussbaum, Eric Posner, Sean P. Sullivan, David Super, Matthew C. Stephenson, Gabriel Rauterberg, Ron Wright, the participants in the Brooklyn Law School Faculty Workshop, the George Mason Faculty Workshop, and the Yale/Stanford/Harvard Junior Faculty Forum. Andrew Homer and Abby Jacobs provided helpful research assistance.

How should we judge people who act for both good and bad motives?

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Article
86.3
Enacted Legislative Findings and Purposes
Jarrod Shobe
Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.

Thanks to Michael Herz, Ethan Leib, Victoria Nourse, Bill Eskridge, Rachel Barkow, Jim Brudney, Peter Strauss, Abbe Gluck, Jesse Cross, Maggie Lemos, Evan Zoldan, Bill Buzbee, Josh Chafetz, Daphna Renan, Paul Stancil, Aaron Nielson, participants at the Legislation Roundtable at Fordham University, the J. Reuben Clark Law Society Workshop, and BYU law faculty workshop for helpful comments on earlier drafts. For excellent research assistance I am grateful to Trevor Nielson, Bonnie Stohel, Eric Abram, Katie Ellis, and Laura Hunt. I am especially grateful for the assistance of Shawn Nevers for help with many of the empirical aspects of this project.

Whether judges should consider legislative history is the most hotly debated issue in statutory interpretation.

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Essay
86.3
Inversion Aversion
Lee Anne Fennell
Max Pam Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful for research support from the Harold J. Green Faculty Fund and the SNR Denton Fund.

For conversations about this Essay, we thank Anupam Chander, Victor Fleischer, Jerry Frug, Calvin Johnson, Michael Knoll, Steven Medema, Richard Schragger,Sloan Speck, Andrew Verstein, and participants in the Harvard Law School conference Celebrating Jerry Frug’s Work on Cities. We also thank Reeves Jordan for excellent research assistance. An earlier, longer draft of this Essay circulated under the title Inverted Theoriesand remains available on Chicago Unbound at http://perma.cc/XB7Q-TXYE.

Richard H. McAdams
Deputy Dean and Bernard D. Meltzer Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.

Some objects, like Weebles and lawn darts, resist inversion. The same is true of certain popular legal theories—or so we argue.

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Article
86.3
Testing for Trademark Dilution in Court and the Lab
Barton Beebe
John M. Desmarais Professor of Intellectual Property Law, New York University School of Law.

The authors thank Jamie Boyle, Chris Buccafusco, Alex Cadmus, Shari Diamond, Michael Frakes, Jeanne Fromer, John Golden, Scott Hemphill, Marco Kleine, Stephan Tontrup, and Deepa Varadarajan; and participants in workshops at the New York UniversitySchool of Law, the Duke University School of Law, the St. John’s University School of Law, the 2017 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference hosted by the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, the 2018 Munich Summer Institute hosted at the Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Georgia State University’s J. Mack Robinson College of Business, and the Intellectual Property, Science, and Technology Workshop hosted by the University of Texas at Austin School of Law for helpful comments and conversations. Thanks also to the Filomen D’Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund for grants that supported this work, and to Ari Lipsitz for excellent research assistance.

Roy Germano
Senior Research Scholar, New York University School of Law.
Christopher Jon Sprigman
Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
Joel H. Steckel
Professor of Marketing and Vice Dean for Doctoral Education, New York University Stern School of Business.
Trademark dilution is among the most elusive concepts in intellectual property law.
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Essay
86.2
Down by Algorithms? Siphoning Rents, Exploiting Biases, and Shaping Preferences: Regulating the Dark Side of Personalized Transactions
Gerhard Wagner
Chair for Private Law, Business Law, and Law and Economics at the Humboldt University in Berlin and Academic Director of Humboldt’s LLM program on International Dispute Resolution
Horst Eidenmüller
Freshfields Professor of Commercial Law at the University of Oxford and Professorial Fellow of St. Hugh’s College, Oxford.

The rise of big data and artificial intelligence creates novel and unique opportunities for business to consumer (B2C) transactions. Businesses assemble or otherwise gain access to comprehensive sets of data on consumer preferences, behavior, and resources.

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Essay
86.2
Privatizing Personalized Law
Andrew Verstein
Associate Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. JD, Yale Law School.

I am grateful to all participants in The University of Chicago Law Review Symposium on Personalized Law for comments, but especially to Omri Ben-Shahar for insightful conversations.

In recent years, scholars have devoted increasing attention to the prospect of personalized law. The bulk of the literature has so far concerned whether to personalize any law and, if so, what substantive changes should be instantiated through personalization.

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Essay
86.2
Toward the Personalization of Copyright Law
Adi Libson
Assistant Professor, Bar-Ilan University School of Law
Gideon Parchomovsky
Robert G. Fuller Jr Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School
The dominant justification for copyright protection is that it is necessary to remedy an underproduction problem that arises from the public-good nature of expressive works.
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Essay
86.2
Assessing the Empirical Upside of Personalized Criminal Procedure
Matthew B. Kugler
Assistant Professor, Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law.

The authors thank Kiel Brennan-Marquez, Lee Fennell, Woodrow Hartzog, William Hubbard, Aziz Huq, Orin Kerr, Richard McAdams, Michael Pollack, John Rappaport, RichardRe, Victoria Schwartz, Christopher Slobogin, Rebecca Stone, and Alexander Stremitzer, along with workshop participants at UCLA Law School and The University of Chicago Law School, and attendees at the Privacy Law Scholars Conference, and The University of Chicago Law Review Symposium on Personalized Law for helpful conversations and comments on earlier drafts. The authors also thank Liz Sharkey for helpful research assistance. Finally, the authors thank the Carl S. Lloyd Faculty Fund for research support.

Lior Jacob Strahilevitz
Sidley Austin Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.
Imagine a person is being questioned by the police. If this is a mere friendly chat, then the police need not advise that person of her rights. If, however, this is a “custodial interrogation,” then the person—the suspect—must generally be given a Miranda warning for any incriminating statements she makes to be admissible in court.
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Essay
86.2
Big Data and Discrimination
Talia B. Gillis
Doctoral Student, Harvard Business School; John M. Olin Fellow in Empirical Law and Economics, Harvard Law School.

For helpful feedback, we thank Oren Bar-Gill, Netta Barak-Corren, Yochai Benkler, John Beshears, Alexandra Chouldechova, Ellora Derenoncourt, Noah Feldman, Deborah Hellman, Howell Jackson, Cass Sunstein, Justin Wolfers, the editors and the participants of The University of Chicago Law Review Symposium on Personalized Law, and participants of the Law and Economics Colloquium at the University of Toronto and the Business Law Workshop at Oxford University. Talia Gillis acknowledges support provided by the John M. Olin Center for Law, Economics, and Business at Harvard Law School.

Jann L. Spiess
Post-doctoral Researcher, Microsoft Research New England.

For many financial products, such as loans and insurance policies, companies distinguish between people based on their different risks and returns. However, the ability to distinguish between people by trying to predict future behavior or profitability of a contract is often restrained by legal rules that aim to prevent certain types of discrimination.

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Essay
86.2
Personalizing Precommitment
Lee Anne Fennell
Max Pam Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.

I thank Ellen Aprill, Adam Hirsch, and participants in The University of Chicago Law Review Symposium on Personalized Law and in the 2018 Annual Meeting of the American Law and Economics Association for helpful comments and questions. Research support from the Harold J. Green Faculty Fund and the SNR Denton Fund is also gratefully acknowledged. Some of the analysis contained here will appear in Lee Anne Fennell, Slices and Lumps: Division and Aggregation in Law and Life (Chicago, forthcoming 2019).

Many people experience self-control problems in domains from saving money to losing weight.