Commons and Growth: The Essential Role of Open Commons in Market Economies
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I would like to thank Professor Jonathan Masur and the editors and staff of The University of Chicago Law Review, including Andy Wang, Zoë Ewing, Jonah Klausner, Karan Lala, Eric Haupt, Eugene DeCosse, and Helen Chamberlin, for their thoughtful advice and insights.
Holders of patents covering technology standards, known as standard-essential patents (SEP), control the rights to an invention with no commercially-viable alternative or that cannot be designed around while still complying with a standard. This gives SEP holders significant leverage in licensing negotiations. Standards development organizations (SDOs) play an important role in curbing opportunistic behavior by patent holders. SDOs require SEP holders to license their patents on fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) terms. However, courts have mischaracterized FRAND commitments, concluding that these disputes carry a Seventh Amendment guarantee to a jury trial. This mischaracterization undermines the fair resolution of FRAND disputes, and a different approach is necessary. In this Comment, Marta Krason proposes an alternative analytical framework that more accurately characterizes FRAND disputes by drawing on principles from contract and property law, concluding that the constitutionally proper adjudicator is a judge, not a jury.
I would like to thank Professor Sarah Konsky and the editors and staff of The University of Chicago Law Review for their invaluable input.
The internet plays a crucial role in modern life; however, equal access to it is not guaranteed. Drawing on existing tribal spectrum sovereignty arguments, Morgan Schaack writes that the control exercised by the FCC’s licensing of the electromagnetic spectrum and language common in many tribal treaties create a tribal access right to spectrum under the trust responsibility. Framing this access to spectrum as a trust-protected resource, the Comment situates allowing tiered internet service in the absence of net neutrality as a violation of the government's obligations under the trust responsibility.
Search costs matter and are reflected in many areas of law. For example, most disclosure requirements economize on search costs. A homeowner who must disclose the presence of termites saves a potential buyer, and perhaps many such buyers, from spending money to search, or inspect, the property. Similarly, requirements to reveal expected miles per gallon, or risks posed by a drug, economize on search costs. But these examples point to simple strategies and costs that can be minimized or entirely avoided with some legal intervention. Law can do better and take account of more subtle things once sophisticated search strategies are understood. This Essay introduces such search strategies and their implications for law.