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AI applications will put an end to negotiation processes as we know them. The typical back-and-forth communication and haggling in a state of information insecurity could soon be a thing of the past. AI applications will increase the information level of the parties and drastically reduce transaction costs. A quick and predictable agreement in the middle of a visible bargaining range could become the new normal. But, sophisticated negotiators will shift this bargaining range to their advantage. They will automate negotiation moves and execute value-claiming strategies with precision, exploiting remaining information asymmetries to their advantage. Negotiations will no longer be open-ended communication processes. They will become machine-driven chess endgames. Large businesses will have the upper hand in these endgames.

This paper examines the distinct features of artificial intelligence (AI) and reaches a broader conclusion as to the availability and applicability of first-order tort rules. It evaluates the accuracy of the argument that AI is similar in essence to other emerging technologies that have entered our lives since the First Industrial Revolution and, therefore, does not require special legal treatment. The paper will explore whether our current tort doctrines can serve us well even when addressing AI liability.

Changing technologies render tax law’s intricacy legible in new ways. Advances in large language models, natural language processing, and programming languages designed for the domain of tax law make formalizations, or “representation[s] of [ ] legislation in symbols[ ] using logical connectives,” of tax law that capture much of its substance and structure both possible and realistic. These new formalizations can be used for many different purposes—what one might call flexible formalizations. Flexible formalizations will make law subject to computational analysis, including creating automated explanations of the analysis and testing statutes for consistency and unintended outcomes. This Essay builds upon existing work in computational law and digitalizing legislation.

This Article examines over 500 nationwide-injunction cases and shows that a surprising participant is influencing the result: an outsider who has joined as an intervenor. Judicial discretion over intervention functionally gives courts control over how nationwide-injunction cases proceed, or whether they proceed at all. With few principles guiding that discretion, procedural rulings can appear to be influenced by the court’s own political leanings, undermining public confidence in the court’s decision on the merits. This Article represents the first scholarly examination of the significant role that intervention plays in nationwide-injunction suits. More broadly, this Article uses intervention to explore the function of procedural rules and the federal courts in a democratic system. Finally, this Article offers two reforms that would promote procedural values and cabin the role of the federal courts in ideological litigation.

Judicial reform aimed at rectifying historical inequalities understandably focus on increasing the number of women and people of color on the bench. This Article sheds light on another aspect of the representation problem, which will not necessarily be resolved through greater diversity in judicial appointments: the understudied and opaque practices of judicial administration. Through an empirical study of federal appellate decisions, we find systematic gender and racial imbalances across decision panels. These imbalances are most likely a product of disparities in decision reporting; some decisions, which we call judicial dark matter, go unreported, distorting the representation of judges in reported cases. Our findings suggest that assessing the distribution of legal power across gender and racial groups based on the numbers of judges from these groups may create an inflated sense of the influence of judges from underrepresented groups. We propose reforms to protect against the demographic biases that we uncover.

This Essay concerns the evolving relationship between the economy and the methods society deployed to legitimate, control, and channel economic behavior, especially religion and law. Using the recently published work of three eminent academics—Benjamin Friedman, Jonathan Levy, and William Novak—it addresses first the changes in thought necessary to legitimate acquisitive economic behavior and the consequent centering of law as the secular replacement for religion. As capitalism fostered wider markets, as its evolution embodied industrialism and commercialism, it created problems that the regulatory state could not handle. In America, the transition from regulatory to administrative state was complicated by its federal structure and background democratic egalitarian yearnings. Friedman, Levy, and Novak illustrate and elucidate aspects of that evolution. This Essay suggests that reading them together explains more than each separately, and ends by noting how the tensions they explain usefully add to our understanding of American law, and, coincidentally, the potentially transformational administrative law decisions of the Supreme Court in the 2023–2024 term.

This Comment uses the case study of guns-at-work laws to understand Cedar Point v. Hassid’s per se takings rule as well as its exceptions. Enacted by about half of the States, guns-at-work laws protect the right of a business’s employees, customers, and invitees to store firearms in private vehicles even if those private vehicles are on company property (i.e. parking lots/parking structures). While these laws have long survived Takings Clause challenges, Cedar Point revived the viability of such challenges. Using the example of guns-at-work laws, the Comment seeks both to understand the scope of Cedar Point’s per se takings rule and to clarify and develop the open-to-the-public and long-standing restrictions on property rights exceptions to it.

For data, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. There may be millions of people with the same birthday. But how many also have a dog, a red car, and two kids? The more data is aggregated, the more identifying it becomes. Accordingly, the law has developed safe harbors for firms that take steps to prevent aggregation of the data they sell. A firm might, for instance, anonymize data by removing identifying information. But as computer scientists have shown, clever de-anonymization techniques enable motivated actors to unmask identities even if the data is anonymized. Data brokers collect, process, and sell data. Courts have traditionally calculated data brokering harms without considering the larger data ecosystem. This Comment suggests a broader conception is needed because the harm caused by one broker’s conduct depends on how other brokers behave. De-anonymization techniques, for instance, often cross-reference datasets to make guesses about missing data. A motivated actor can also buy datasets from multiple brokers to combine them. This Comment then offers a framework for courts to consider these “network harms” in the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) recent lawsuits against data brokers under its Section 5 authority to prevent unfair acts and practices.

Associational standing is a widely used doctrine that has never been subject to serious academic scrutiny. This Article calls for the abandonment, or at least serious modification, of associational standing. Even without associational standing, groups may still sue to enforce their own rights. And they could continue to help vindicate their members’ rights by providing legal representation for member plaintiffs in individual or class action suits (filed anonymously, if necessary), covering members’ litigation costs, and providing expert witnesses and other guidance. In short, associational standing is a largely unnecessary deviation from both Article III’s injury-in-fact requirement and the fundamental principles underlying our justice system. Eliminating associational standing would not limit public law and other important collective litigation, but rather ensure that such cases proceed through the proper channels (i.e., Rule 23) while preventing a range of unnecessary procedural, preclusive, remedial, and other complications.

Much of the scholarship on immigration enforcement and environmental justice assumes that agencies negatively impact vulnerable and marginalized people as a result of individualized bias or arbitrariness. This Article argues that, beyond idiosyncrasies or flaws in administrators themselves, the poor impact of administration on minorities emanates from institutional systems. In doing so, this Article introduces a framework of institutional oppression into the study of administration. This Article’s prescription is for institutional redesign. First, from the top down, Congress could utilize appropriations and pointed procedural interventions to influence how agencies exercise discretion. Second, from the bottom up, the President or agencies themselves could instigate efforts to use more accurate information and more meaningful process. Third, a focus on reviving a government of small, discrete agencies could constrain administrative discretion in ways that encourage agencies to rebalance their priorities.