Bursting the Speech Bubble: Toward a More Fitting Perceived-Affiliation Standard
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Thanks to Laura Appleman, Monica Bell, Tan Boston, Curtis Bradley, Emily Buss, Adam Chilton, Justin Driver, Jessica Eaglin, Sheldon Evans, Lee Fennell, James Forman, Cynthia Godsoe, Nyamagaga Gondwe, Bernard Harcourt, Hajin Kim, Brian Leiter, Aaron Littman, Jamelia Morgan, Renagh O’Leary, Farah Peterson, James Gray Pope, Eric Posner, Judith Resnik, Mara Revkin, Anna Roberts, Cristina Rodríguez, Jocelyn Simonson, Kate Skolnick, Fred Smith, Stephen Smith, David Strauss, I. India Thusi, Christopher Williams, and Quinn Yeargain for thoughtful comments and conversations, and the participants of The University of Chicago Faculty Workshop, Northwestern Faculty Workshop, Yale Public Law Workshop, CrimFest, Decarceration Workshop, and Criminal Justice Roundtable for their helpful engagement. Thanks also to the editors at The University of Chicago Law Review for their excellent editorial support. The author thanks the Paul H. Leffmann Fund for research support.
In recent years, many states passed constitutional amendments prohibiting modern day slavery in the form of forced prison labor allowed by the Thirteenth Amendment. However, the state amendments' text alone has not ended prison slavery in those states. This Article examines why. It grounds its discussion in the history of American slavery after the Civil War as well as the various attempts of legislation, litigation, and constitutional amendments to dismantle forced prison labor. Drawing on this discussion, it suggests how organizers might craft these amendments and how judges and lawyers should interpret them. It argues that, ultimately, amending constitutional text alone is not enough. To achieve their goals amendments must work in tandem with litigation, governmental structural reform, and the inevitable political battles that arise over the shape of the criminal legal system.
I would like to thank Professors William Baude and Eugene Volokh, as well as Owen Hoepfner, Hank Minor, Quinten Rimolde, and David Stras, for early readthroughs and helpful conversations. I would also like to thank the editors and staff of The University of Chicago Law Review for their great edits.
In 1977, a company convicted of conspiring with the mob asked President Carter for a pardon. The government speculated that the President could so exercise the pardon power, but ultimately no pardon ever issued. Nearly fifty years later, President Trump has pardoned a company convicted of violating the Bank Secrecy Act. People are again speculating that the pardon power covers companies, but few can offer evidence either way. History shows that the pardon power covers companies. Before the Founding, the King would often pardon corporations. Both the city of London and the Massachusetts Bay Company were pardoned before the Founders were even born. This tradition was the background against which the Pardon Clause and many of its state analogs were drafted. That the President can pardon companies might feel surprising or even unsettling. But the prerogative fits comfortably into the nation's separation of powers. Congress can make exercising the power less attractive by withholding refunded fines or shifting crimes to civil infractions. These checks come with more tradeoffs when exercised int he context of human beings, which might explain why Congress has not exercised them so far.
I would like to thank Professor Geoffrey Stone and many members of The University of Chicago Law Review, including Jack Brake, Zoë Ewing, Katrina Goto, Alex Moreno, Maria Sofia Peña, and others for their thoughtful advice and feedback.
When prisoner officials burden the free exercise rights of prisoners, prisoners can seek recourse under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, due to the specialized and restrictive nature of prisons, courts adjudicate these claims under a reasonableness test set out in the case Turner v. Sadfley instead of a strict scrutiny standard. While circuits agree on using the Turner test for prisoner free exercise claims, there is a deep circuit split on the proper threshold test for these types of claims. While some circuits hold that inmates need to show that their religious practice was substantially burdened, other circuits hold that inmates just need to show that their religious practice was sincere. These threshold tests produce significant differences in how prisoner free exercise claims are litigated in court. After exploring the relevant Supreme Court guidance, this Comment aims to settle the split by examining each threshold test on its respective merits, considering neutral criteria such as screening ability, adherence to judicial capacity, and workability.