Administrative Law
Much appreciation to Colin Bennett, Malcolm Crompton, Peter Cullen, Lauren Edelman, Robert Gellman, Chris Hoofnagle, Robert Kagan, Jennifer King, Anne Joseph O’Connell, Fred B. Schneider, Ari Schwartz, Paul Schwartz, and the participants at The University of Chicago Law School’s Surveillance Symposium for insight, comment, and discussion; Nuala O’Connor Kelly and Peter Swire for consenting to be interviewed about their experience in privacy leadership roles within the United States government; Sara Terheggen, Marta Porwit Czajkowska, Rebecca Henshaw, and Andrew McDiarmid for their able research.
We are grateful to Susan Bandes, Elizabeth Foote, Jacob Gersen, Brian Leiter, Anup Malani, Richard McAdams, Elizabeth Mertz, Jonathan Nash, Eric Posner, Adam Samaha, Larry Solum, David Strauss, Noah Zatz, and participants in a work-inprogress lunch at The University of Chicago Law School for valuable comments. We are also grateful to the Chicago Judges Project, and in particular to Dean Saul Levmore, for relevant support.
Deep thanks to Professors Miles and Sunstein for sharing their draft with me in time to permit this response, and to the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review for agreeing to print it in the same issue.
We thank Eric Posner, Richard Posner, Peter Strauss, and Adrian Vermeule for helpful comments. We are also grateful to Rachael Dizard, Casey Fronk, Darius Horton, Matthew Johnson, Bryan Mulder, Brett Reynolds, Matthew Tokson, and Adam Wells for superb research assistance.
I wish to acknowledge a general debt of inspiration to Mark Tushnet’s studies of political controls on emergency powers, although my views differ from Tushnet’s. See generally, for example, Mark Tushnet, The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: Some Lessons from Hamdan, 91 Minn L Rev 1451 (2007); Mark Tushnet, The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: Parliamentary and Separation-of-Powers Regulation, 3 Intl J L in Context 275 (2008). For helpful comments, thanks to Jack Goldsmith, Eric Posner, Philip Rumney, Matthew Stephenson, Cass Sunstein, Mark Tushnet, workshop participants at Harvard Law School, and participants at a conference held at Harvard Law School to discuss Cass R. Sunstein, Worst-case Scenarios (Harvard 2007). Thanks to Elisabeth Theodore and Jennifer Shkabatur for helpful research assistance.
We are grateful to Bruce Ackerman, Rachel Brewster, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Bob Cooter, Rosalind Dixon, John Ferejohn, David Fontana, Heather Gerken, Tom Ginsburg, Dan Ho, Cheng-Yi Huang, Alison LaCroix, Daryl Levinson, John Matsusaka, Richard McAdams, Drew Navikas, Anne O’Connell, Eric Posner, Adam Samaha, Lior Strahilevitz, Madhavi Sunder, Cass Sunstein, Matthew Stephenson, and Adrian Vermeule for helpful comments and conversations. Johanna Chan, Monica Groat, Stacey Nathan, and Peter Wilson provided excellent research assistance. Financial support was provided by the John M. Olin Foundation and the George J. Stigler Center for the Study of the Economy and the State.
I appreciate helpful conversations with Daniel Carpenter, Michele Dauber, John Ferejohn, George Fisher, Rich Ford, Lawrence Friedman, David Golove, Jill Hasday, Daniel Ho, Don Hornstein, Lewis Kornhauser, David Luban, Eric Muller, Hari Osofsky, Robert Tsai, and Barry Weingast, as well as feedback from workshop participants at Berkeley, Iowa, Oregon, NYU, North Carolina, Southwestern, and Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. David Kennedy provided extremely helpful written comments on an earlier version of this Article. I also benefited greatly from the research assistance of Mindy Jeng, Shivan Saran, Britt Grant, Mrinal Menon, Connor Raso, Brad Hansen, and Jennifer Liu, as well as the staff of the Stanford Law School Library. I am also grateful to the staff at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland, the Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, and the Harry S. Truman Library. All of these people should be secure in the knowledge that they are not responsible for any errors or omissions. This is dedicated to Mateo, Ria, and Lucy.
Very useful comments were provided by Ken Bamberger, Eric Biber, Tino Cuéllar, Dan Farber, Jesse Shapiro, Matthew Stephenson, Adrian Vermeule, and John Yoo. Financial support has been provided by the Hellman Family Faculty Fund, the Boalt Hall Fund, UC Berkeley’s Committee on Research, and the Jerome Kutak Fund at The University of Chicago Law School. Thanks to Tess Hand-Bender, Roman Giverts, Monica Groat, Edna Lewis, Harry Moren, Stacey Nathan, and John Yow for research assistance. An earlier version of this Article was presented at the 2008 annual meeting of the American Law and Economics Association and in the UC Berkeley’s Center for the Study of Law and Society’s Speaker Series.
Thanks to Kevin Davis, Paul Kelly, Geoffrey Miller, Cass Sunstein, students in a Harvard Law School reading group on the Theory of the Administrative State, and audiences at the London School of Economics, NYU Law School and Tel Aviv Law School for helpful comments, and to Elisabeth Theodore for excellent research assistance.
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