Criminal Law

Each year, more than half of criminal defendants subject to the career offender sentencing enhancement are those with prior drug convictions. Because the goal of the Sentencing Guidelines is to “inject transparency, consistency, and fairness” into federal sentencing, clarity on how courts should assess decriminalized drug offenses as § 4B1.1 predicates is needed to restore uniformity to the system and satisfy the Guidelines’ original goals. This Essay calls upon the Sentencing Commission to clarify its intent, place time limits on decriminalized drug predicates for § 4B1.1, and restore greater uniformity to the system.

The law and political economy (LPE) movement claims concern for marginalized communities as a motivation for its crime agenda. However, efforts to defund police, elect progressive prosecutors, and eliminate prisons are likely to generate large costs for the very communities LPE scholars say they care about. Existing empirical analyses demonstrate that Black individuals benefit disproportionately from the deterrence provided by police. This Essay also provides new evidence that progressive prosecutors have put Black people in lethal danger. Finally, it argues that there are reasons to believe that decarceration would not be costless for the Black community.

Because, unlike natural persons, a corporation does not have a single, unitary mind, the question of how to ascertain mens rea in a prosecution of a corporate entity presents an epistemological conundrum. The recent revival of the field of management cybernetics presents a new lens through which to examine those questions. This Essay draws on several of the central insights of management cybernetics to argue that a collective knowledge instruction is appropriate in cases where certain regulatory systems within the corporation have been attenuated to the point where they cannot operate with the complexity required by law.

The Constitution’s pardon power offers a direct path to protect an ally from federal criminal liability. However, another vehicle for absolution exists—one which simultaneously avoids public scrutiny while securing amnesty. By issuing a discreet, specific nonenforcement directive to the Department of Justice (DOJ), a politically vulnerable President can achieve the result of pardon without signing one. This phenomenon, which this Essay terms the “shadow pardon,” transforms prosecutorial discretion into a covert form of amnesty, invisible to the public and immune from reversal once the relevant crime’s statute of limitations expires.

In this Comment, Zoë Lewis Ewing evaluates the implementation of the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA), a New York law passed in 2019 to provide shortened sentencing ranges for domestic violence survivors convicted of crimes. It identifies an inconsistency in sentencing courts’ application of the law’s causation standard, which requires that a petitioner’s experience of domestic violence be a “significant contributing factor” to their criminal conduct. Some courts interpret the prong narrowly, while others apply a broad causation standard. This Comment argues that courts should opt for the latter approach and consider causation in the DVSJA satisfied if domestic violence was “sufficiently significant to have likely helped bring about the criminal conduct.”

In this Comment, Sabrina Huang argues that courts should eliminate the subjective malice requirement for Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution claims. She draws on other constitutional torts that arise during encounters with actors in the criminal justice system to show that a plaintiff-friendly objective standard is more appropriate than a subjective standard. If courts are unwilling to eliminate the malice requirement, the Comment proposes an alternative to the requirement: a burden-shifting test. The intended effects of both proposals are to expand relief to more litigants across jurisdictions, harmonize Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, and deter police and prosecutorial misconduct.

This Case Note offers some direction for handling competing interests in this developing body of law and other complex cases weighing intersecting constitutional rights against governmental interests. Parts I and II provide background information, describing the Sell test and the current state of constitutional and statutory religious protections. Part III critically analyzes how courts, including the Fifth Circuit, have considered religious objections in Sell determinations so far. Because such analysis remains underdeveloped in the courts, Part IV suggests frameworks for coherently integrating Free Exercise doctrine into Sell inquiries based on the “hybrid theory” of constitutional rights.

Critics of the criminal enforcement system have condemned the expansion and privatization of electronic monitoring, criminal diversion, parole, and probation. But the astonishing perversion of contract involved in these new practices has gone unnoticed. Though incarceration-alternative (IA) contracting is sometimes framed as humane, historical and current context illuminates its coercive nature. IA contracting must be examined under classical contract theory and in light of the history of economic exploitation using criminal enforcement power harnessed to contract, including in the racial peonage system under Jim Crow. This Article documents this systematic underregulation through the first empirical study of legal regimes for IA contracts. To the extent that the theoretical limits of contract are not presently reflected in the common law of contract, regulatory reforms that better regulate seller and government practices might reduce the risk of exploitation.

This Case Note first provides a background on the doctrine of absolute immunity. It then evaluates the court’s analysis in Gay and compares Gay with the Third Circuit’s decision in Williams v. Consovoy (3d Cir. 2006). Finally, this Case Note argues that Gay is more consistent with Supreme Court precedent on absolute immunity and more in line with historical understandings of the doctrine. This issue has particularly high stakes, as psychologists’ medical role can create a “guise of objectivity.” As a result, even a biased psychologist might still receive strong deference from a judge and could then be the reason a person spends the rest of their life in prison.

How often do Supreme Court opinions include what might be called “lobbying language,” which endorses a policy position while calling for another government entity to realize it? Reviewing relevant cases, this Essay finds that the sample set includes at least a dozen examples of lobbying language. As it turns out, lobbying is not so unusual for the Supreme Court.