The Firearm-Disability Dilemma: Property Insights into Felon Gun Rights
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This Essay was written, in part, while Schottenfeld was a lawyer for the NAACP, but it does not necessarily reflect the views of the NAACP. Both of us have worked with or represented members of the Sandridge community and other communities mentioned in this Essay; the views expressed in this Essay are ours alone, but we are deeply grateful for the inspiration and insight we have drawn from these communities and their members. We thank Richard Buery, Devon Carbado, David Chen, Daniel Harawa, and Erika Wilson for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts. We are grateful to Chloe Bartholomew, Suchait Kahlon, Nina McKay, and Briana Thomas for their research assistance; to Kathleen Agno for her ongoing research support; and to Helen Zhao and the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review for greatly improving this Essay. We also appreciate the insights received from participants of the Lutie Lytle Black Women Scholarship Workshop. Finally, we gratefully acknowledge support from the Filomen D’Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund, New York University School of Law.
This Essay was written, in part, while Schottenfeld was a lawyer for the NAACP, but it does not necessarily reflect the views of the NAACP. Both of us have worked with or represented members of the Sandridge community and other communities mentioned in this Essay; the views expressed in this Essay are ours alone, but we are deeply grateful for the inspiration and insight we have drawn from these communities and their members. We thank Richard Buery, Devon Carbado, David Chen, Daniel Harawa, and Erika Wilson for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts. We are grateful to Chloe Bartholomew, Suchait Kahlon, Nina McKay, and Briana Thomas for their research assistance; to Kathleen Agno for her ongoing research support; and to Helen Zhao and the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review for greatly improving this Essay. We also appreciate the insights received from participants of the Lutie Lytle Black Women Scholarship Workshop. Finally, we gratefully acknowledge support from the Filomen D’Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund, New York University School of Law.
Historic discrimination in the process of siting and constructing physical infrastructure has sacrificed the Black communities that bear the costs associated with new roads, power lines, and sewage plants while receiving few of the benefits. This Essay advances a "community equity" framework to recognize and protect the sources of value that people hold in their communities. This approach looks beyond the traditional domains of civil rights and land use law. Instead, it embraces analogies in public nuisance and common law torts doctrines as mechanisms for recognizing community harms above and beyond the aggregate of individual claims.
In February of this year, we published a call for the government to relaunch the federal Gun Control Act’s § 925(c) petition process, which empowers anyone subject to a federal restriction (“disability”) on their ability to purchase or possess firearms to apply to the Department of Justice for restoration of their gun rights.
The Trump Justice Department has moved with some dispatch to relaunch the program—using a workaround we suggested in our piece. In this short Essay, we propose several improvements to the proposed regulation.
I would like to thank Jenna Liu, Jack Brake, Alex Moreno, Miranda Coombe, and the rest of The University of Chicago Law Review editors and staff for their thoughtful feedback. I would also like to thank the attorneys in the DVSJA Practice at Appellate Advocates for introducing me to this area of law and advocating tirelessly for incarcerated survivors.
In this Comment, Zoë Lewis Ewing evaluates the implementation of the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA), a New York law passed in 2019 to provide shortened sentencing ranges for domestic violence survivors convicted of crimes. It identifies an inconsistency in sentencing courts’ application of the law’s causation standard, which requires that a petitioner’s experience of domestic violence be a “significant contributing factor” to their criminal conduct. Some courts interpret the prong narrowly, while others apply a broad causation standard. This Comment argues that courts should opt for the latter approach and consider causation in the DVSJA satisfied if domestic violence was “sufficiently significant to have likely helped bring about the criminal conduct.”