Contract or Prison

S.R. Blanchard

For helpful comments, I am grateful to participants in the Contracts Section Works-in-Progress Panel at the 2023 AALS Annual Meeting; faculty workshops at George Mason Scalia Law School, Indiana University McKinney Law School, Notre Dame Law School, the University of Florida Law School, the University of Texas Law School, Vanderbilt Law School, and Washington University Law School; the Legal Scholarship Workshop at the University of Chicago; the Workshop on Law, Economics, and Justice at the University of Lucerne; CrimFest; the Decarceration Law Conference; the Junior Business Law Scholars Conference; Markelloquium; and to Ian Ayres, Lisa Bernstein, Sam Bray, Christian Burset, Eric Fish, Rick Garnett, Sherif Girgis, Nadelle Grossman, Daniel Markovits, Jide Nzelibe, J. Mark Ramseyer, Christopher Slobogin, Avishalom Tor, Francisco Urbina, and Julian Velasco. Noah Austin, Zack Beculheimer, Gwendolyn Loop, Savannah Shoffner, Tri Truong, and Steven Tu provided excellent research assistance. Any errors are mine.

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Critics of the criminal enforcement system have condemned the expansion and privatization of electronic monitoring, criminal diversion, parole, and probation. But the astonishing perversion of contract involved in these new practices has gone unnoticed. Governments are turning to “offender-funded” programs that empower firms to contract with people who are suspected of or have been convicted of crimes—and whose alternative to agreeing to these contracts is prosecution or incarceration. Though incarceration-alternative (IA) contracting is sometimes framed as humane, historical and current context illuminates its coercive nature. IA contracting must be examined under classical contract theory and in light of the history of economic exploitation using criminal enforcement power harnessed to contract, including in the racial peonage system under Jim Crow.

While the norm of expanded choice that justifies enforcement of contracts has prima facie plausibility in this context, IA agreements are not concluded under the conditions assumed in classical contract theory. That is because these contracts are based on coercive background entitlements: rights to sell access to the only escape from punitive government measures. Those coercive entitlements leverage the criminal enforcement system to extract money from defendants and expand the reach of criminal sanctions beyond what the state could achieve without resorting to contract. While regulating IA contracts might in principle restrain their inherent exploitive potential, the minimalistic legal frameworks actually constructed do not do so. This Article documents this systematic underregulation through the first empirical study of legal regimes for IA contracts. It examines forty IA contracting regimes for the presence of features that might mitigate exploitation.

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