Essay

The Norm against Economic Espionage for the Benefit of Private Firms: Some Theoretical Reflections

Samuel J. Rascoff

Professor of Law, Faculty Director, Center on Law and Security, NYU School of Law

Share The University of Chicago Law Review | The Norm against Economic Espionage for the Benefit of Private Firms: Some Theoretical Reflections on Facebook
Share The University of Chicago Law Review | The Norm against Economic Espionage for the Benefit of Private Firms: Some Theoretical Reflections on Twitter
Share The University of Chicago Law Review | The Norm against Economic Espionage for the Benefit of Private Firms: Some Theoretical Reflections on Email
Share The University of Chicago Law Review | The Norm against Economic Espionage for the Benefit of Private Firms: Some Theoretical Reflections on LinkedIn

For decades, the American intelligence community has adhered to a norm against spying for the sake of enriching private firms. More recently, the norm has figured in a prominent presidential directive as well as in various international agreements. But notwithstanding its durability and its newfound renown, the norm has largely eluded scholarly consideration. In this Essay, I aim to address that gap by showing how theories of agency capture and institutional culture can help make sense of the norm’s past and inform judgments about its future.

PDF

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Business Organizations Cybersecurity Privacy Separation of Powers

Article

85.1

Institutional Loyalties in Constitutional Law

David Fontana

Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University

Our thanks to Michael Abramowicz, Joseph Blocher, Mary Anne Case, Justin Driver, Alison LaCroix, Jonathan Masur, Jon Michaels, Douglas NeJaime, Martha Nussbaum, David Pozen, David Schleicher, Paul Schied, Naomi Schoenbaum, Micah Schwartzman, Michael Selmi, Ganesh Sitaraman, Lior Strahilevitz, and Laura Weinrib for thoughtful comments and suggestions. Lael Weinberger, Brent Cooper, and other editors at the Review also supplied useful critical thoughts. We also received helpful feedback from workshops at the George Washington Law School and the University of Chicago Law School. Support for one of us (Huq) was supplied by the Frank J. Cicero, Jr. Fund. Our errors are our responsibility alone.

Aziz Z. Huq

Frank and Bernice J. Greenberg Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School

The Constitution’s separation of powers implies the existence of three distinct and separate branches.

Constitutional Law Institutional Design Separation of Powers

Essay

Pseudonymous Litigation

Lior Jacob Strahilevitz

Deputy Dean, Professor of Law and Walter Mander Teaching Scholar, The University of Chicago Law School

The author thanks Omri Ben-Shahar, Alison LaCroix, Jonathan Masur, Paul Ohm, KarlNicholas Peifer, Matt Tokson, Paul Schwartz, and my editors at The University of Chicago Law Review for helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts, as well as Katie Heinrichs for excellent research assistance, and the Morton C. Seeley Fund and Milton and Miriam Handler Foundation for research support.

Privacy

Essay

Justifying Jones

M. Todd Henderson

Business Organizations Financial Regulation