Business Organizations

Online
Essay
AI & the Business Judgment Rule: Heightened Information Duty
Geneviève Helleringer
Professor Geneviève Helleringer, ESSEC Business School-Paris & Oxford University, and research member of ECGI. She is Visiting Professor of Law at Columbia Law School and Paris-Panthéon-Assas University. Her research focuses on comparative Commercial and Corporate Law.

We would like to thank the participants of the How AI Will Change the Law Symposium, cohosted by the Coase-Sandor Institute, the University of Chicago Law Review Online, and Oxford Business Law Blog, for their helpful comments.

Florian Möslein
Florian Möslein is the Director of the Institute for Law and Regulation of Digitalisation and Professor of Law at the Philipps-University Marburg, where he teaches Contract Law, Corporate Law and Securities Regulation.

We would like to thank the participants of the How AI Will Change the Law Symposium, cohosted by the Coase-Sandor Institute, the University of Chicago Law Review Online, and Oxford Business Law Blog, for their helpful comments.

Artificial intelligence (AI) has the potential to alter the interpretation of the duties of care, skill, and diligence. As these duties form the foundation for the BJR and equivalent provisions, the development of AI is also expected to impact the BJR. There is a broadening importance, in an increasingly data-driven business environment, of the requirement to gather sufficient information before making a decision and to use information in a valid manner. Changes are both quantitative (how much information to collect) and qualitative (which types of information to collect). The changes also relate to the methods of decision-making, including the role of measures and statistics over intuition.

Business Organizations Corporate Governance Corporations
Online
Essay
AI Judgment Rule(s)
Katja Langenbucher
Katja is a law professor at Goethe-University, Frankfurt; member of Leibniz Institute SAFE; affiliated professor at SciencesPo, Paris; and visiting faculty at Fordham Law School.

This piece has profited enormously from feedback during the University of Chicago Law School’s workshop on “How AI Will Change the Law.” I would like to thank Stephen Bainbridge and Martin Gelter for enlightening me with expert input in the context of the U.S. business judgment rule. Needless to say, all remaining errors are mine.

This Essay explores whether the use of AI to enhance decision-making brings about radical change in legal doctrine or, by contrast, is just another new tool. It focuses on decision-making by board members. This provides an especially relevant example because corporate law has laid out explicit expectations for how board members must go about decision-making.

Business Organizations Corporate Governance Corporations Technology
2
Article
75.3
The Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity Fund Managers with Profit Shares: What Is It? Why Is It Bad?
Chris William Sanchirico
Professor of Law, Business, and Public Policy and Codirector of the Center for Tax Law and Policy, University of Pennsylvania Law School, Wharton School, Business and Public Policy Department

For helpful comments, I thank Alan Auerbach, Alan Blinder, Mitchell Engler, Victor Fleischer, Mark Gergen, Kevin Hassett, James Hines, Mitchell Kane, Alex Raskolnikov, Julie Roin, Frank Sammartino, Daniel Shaviro, Joel Slemrod, Gene Seago, David Weisbach, Larry Zelenak, and participants at the University of Michigan’s Tax Policy Workshop Series and NYU’s Colloquium Series on Tax Policy and Public Finance. Special thanks to Reed Shuldiner and Michael Knoll for many useful discussions. This research was not supported by funding from any outside source. The working paper version of this Article was first circulated and posted on SSRN on June 25, 2007. See Chris William Sanchirico, The Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity Fund Managers with Profit Shares: What is It? Why is It Bad? (University of Pennsylvania Institute for Law and Economics Research Paper No 07-14, June 25, 2007), online at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 996665 (visited June 8, 2008).

Business Organizations Financial Regulation Tax Law
2
Article
75.4
Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Laws
Chris Brummer
Assistant Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School

This Article has benefited from the comments and suggestions of Professors Bobby Ahdieh, Douglas Baird, Margaret Blair, Bill Bratton, William Christie, Steven Davidoff, Gillian Hadfield, Paul Heald, Larry Helfer, Donald Langevoort, David Millon, Erin O’Hara, Bob Rasmussen, Hans Stoll, Bob Thompson, Joel Trachtman, and Todd Zywicki. The Article also benefited from faculty workshops at the University of Georgia, the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Southern California, and Northwestern University. I would also like to thank Murray Teitelbaum, James Duffy, and the staff of the New York Stock Exchange for their time and valuable insight.

Business Organizations Financial Regulation Securities Law
2
Article
76.1
A Market in Litigation Risk
Jonathan T. Molot
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center

My thanks to Michael Abramowicz, Brad Clark, John Duffy, Howell Jackson, Geoffrey Miller, Richard Nagareda, Robert Rhee, Bill Rubenstein, Anthony Sebok, Mark Spindel, and participants in faculty workshops at Harvard Law School, Georgetown University Law Center, and George Washington University Law School.

Business Organizations Insurance Law and Economics Risk
2
Article
76.1
Public Ownership, Firm Governance, and Litigation Risk
Eric L. Talley
Professor of Law and Co-director, Berkeley Center in Law, Business and the Economy, UC Berkeley School of Law; Robert B. and Candice J. Haas Visiting Professor of Law, Harvard Law School; Senior Economist (Adjunct), RAND Corporation

Thanks to Robert Bartlett, Alicia Davis-Evans, Todd Henderson, Kim Hogrief, Arthur Levitt, Patrick McGurn, Nell Minow, Maureen Mulligan, Adam Pritchard, Robert Reville, two anonymous referees, and conference participants at The University of Chicago Law School, University of Michigan, and the American Bar Association Tort Trial & Insurance Practice Section for helpful comments and discussions, and to the RAND Corporation Institution for Civil Justice for generous support. Many thanks as well to the Corporate Library for granting me access to their data. All errors are mine.

Business Organizations Corporate Governance Law and Economics
2
Article
76.1
How Private Is Private Equity, and at What Cost?
James C. Spindler
Associate Professor of Law and Business, University of Southern California Law School

In preparing this Article, I benefited greatly from conversations with several private-equity partners (both limited and general) as well as the excellent research assistance of Tracey Chenoweth. Thanks also, for insightful comments and advice, to Bobby Bartlett, Kate Litvak, Bob Rasmussen, Larry Ribstein, and Randall Thomas.

Business Organizations Corporate Governance Financial Regulation Securities Law

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