Severing Unconstitutional Amendments
Thanks to John Brinkerhoff, Abbe Gluck, Ted Lee, Daryl Levinson, Scott Levy, and Mike Showalter for helpful comments and conversations. Thanks also to the careful editors at the University of Chicago Law Review. All errors are our own.
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I would like to thank Professors Saul Levmore and Lior Strahilevitz for their thoughtful advice and insight and the editors and staff of The University of Chicago Law Review for their valuable feedback and edits.
In Stop the Beach Renourishment v. Florida Department of Environmental Protection, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that the Takings Clause applies to the judiciary as it does to any government actor. In the more than fifteen years since, none of the sixty courts to consider judicial takings claims have found a judicial taking. In this Comment, Coby Goldberg provides the only comprehensive analysis of the judicial takings caselaw since Stop the Beach, in order to determine why no court has found a judicial taking. Based on this analysis of the caselaw, this Comment suggests that finding a judicial taking is all but impossible. That conclusion does not mean that judicial takings doctrine has had no influence on property jurisprudence in the years since Stop the Beach, however. This Comment identifies three cases in which state courts have used the possibility of judicial takings as reasons not to make decisions that undercut property rights. In those cases, judicial takings doctrine is functioning as something akin to a canon of constitutional avoidance. If decided the other way, none of those three decisions would have avoided actions that would have amounted to judicial takings. This Comment thus concludes that judicial takings doctrine leads to worse outcomes in property law, and so, out of a concern for constitutional problems that never arise, courts reject decisions they would otherwise adopt.
The common law is, among other things, a mode of legal development. In this mode, judges develop the law yet simultaneously act as if they were only discovering law that already existed. This sketch of the common law introduces contemporary readers to a way of thinking and talking about law that was once instinctive for judges. The common law as a mode of development may seem alien at certain points, yet its influence on the legal systems of the United States has been enormous, and it is critical background for understanding the grant of “the judicial power” in the U.S. Constitution.
Welcome to the Supreme Court’s emergency docket. Like the Twilight Zone, the emergency docket is “the middle ground between light and shadow,” and hence is the core of the so-called “shadow docket.” Commentators have criticized the Court’s shadow-docket interventions: Summary orders shirk the Court’s responsibility to resolve important legal issues in reasoned opinions informed by complete briefing and oral argument, are unwise because they risk premature decisionmaking before issues percolate in the lower courts, provide insufficient or confusing direction for lower courts, and undermine the Court’s legitimacy because of their “shadowy” deliberation. My big problem is that shadow-docket stays deeply (not just technically) undermine the rule of law and violently affect the lives of people like O.C.G. without sufficient legal justification.