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87.3
The Architecture of a Basic Income
Miranda Perry Fleischer
Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law, mirandafleischer@ sandiego.edu.

The Douglas Clark and Ruth Ann McNeese Faculty Research Fund at the University of Chicago Law School provided financial support for this project. For helpful comments, the authors thank Leslie Book, David Gamage, Eric Hemel, Kevin Kennedy, Benjamin Leff, Elisabeth Mayer, Susan Morse, Anna Stapleton, André Washington, Matt Zwolinski, Lawrence Zelenak, participants at the Brigham Young University Law School Tax Policy Colloquium, the Duke University School of Law Tax Policy Colloquium, the 2018 National Tax Association Annual Meeting, and editors of The University of Chicago Law Review.

Daniel Hemel
Assistant Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School, dhemel@ uchicago.edu.

The notion of a universal basic income, or UBI, has captivated academics, entrepreneurs, policymakers, and ordinary citizens in recent years. Across the globe, countries ranging from Brazil to Finland, the Netherlands, Italy, Kenya, Uganda, and Canada are conducting or have recently concluded pilot studies of a UBI.

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Essay
87.2
The Chicago School and the Forgotten Political Dimension of Antitrust Law
Ariel Katz
Associate Professor, University of Toronto, Faculty of Law.

The Chicago School, said to have influenced antitrust analysis inescapably, is associated today with a set of ideas and arguments about the goal of antitrust law. In particular, the Chicago School is known for asserting that economic efficiency is and should be the only purpose of antitrust law and that the neoclassical price theory model offers the best policy tool for maximizing economic efficiency in the real world; that corporate actions, including various vertical restraints, are efficient and welfare-increasing; that markets are self-correcting and monopoly is merely an occasional, unstable, and transitory outcome of the competitive process; and that governmental cures for the rare cases where markets fail to self-correct tend to be “worse than the disease.”

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Essay
87.2
The Case for “Unfair Methods of Competition” Rulemaking
Rohit Chopra
Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission. The views expressed here are Commissioner Chopra’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the Commission or any other individual Commissioner.

For thoughtful engagement and comments, we are grateful to Scott Hemphill, William Kovacic, Fiona Scott Morton, Nancy Rose, Jonathan Sallet, Carl Shapiro, Sandeep Vaheesan, and Joshua Wright, as well as staff at the FTC and participants in the Symposium on Reassessing the Chicago School of Antitrust Law at The University of Chicago Law School. We also thank the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review for careful editing.

Lina M. Khan
Academic Fellow, Columbia Law School; Counsel, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law, US House Committee on the Judiciary; former Le-gal Fellow, Federal Trade Commission. This Essay reflects Ms. Khan’s views and not those of the US House Committee on the Judiciary or any of its members.

Open, competitive markets are a foundation of economic liberty. A lack of competition, meanwhile, can enable dominant firms to exercise their market power in harmful ways.

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Essay
87.2
Startup Acquisitions, Error Costs, and Antitrust Policy
Kevin A. Bryan
Assistant Professor, University of Toronto Rotman School of Management.
Erik Hovenkamp
Assistant Professor, University of Southern California Gould School of Law.

High tech industries are not only lucrative, but also highly innovative and dynamic. Large firms are not their sole source of innovation, however.

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Essay
87.2
The Common Ownership Trilemma
José Azar
Assistant Professor, University of Navarra, IESE Business School, Av Pearson, 21, 08034 Barcelona, Spain, jazar@iese.edu.

I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of Secretaria d’Universitats i Recerca del Departament d’Empresa i Coneixement de la Generalitat de Catalunya. Ref. 2016 BP00358.

Overlapping ownership of large publicly traded companies in the United States has grown dramatically in recent decades. The list of largest shareholders of almost any publicly traded company has a similar set of shareholders, namely the largest asset managers.
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87.1
A Network Theory of Patentability
Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña
JD, PhD, Associate Professor at Northwestern University Pritzker School of Law

We thank Ronald Allen, Omri Ben-Shahar, Brian Casey, Shari Seidman Diamond, Janet Freilich, Ezra Friedman, Yaniv Heled, William Hubbard, Dmitry Karshtedt, Mark Lemley, Jonathan Masur, Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Anya Prince, W. Nicholson Price II, Rachel Sachs, Ana Santos Rutschman, David Schwartz, Michal Shur-Ofry, Matthew Spitzer, and Patti Zettler for helpful insights and comments. In addition, we are grateful for feedback from participants at the DePaul University College of Law faculty workshop, Georgetown University Law School Workshop on Empirical Methods and Patents, Georgia State University faculty workshop, Stanford Law School faculty workshop, The University of Chicago Law School law and economics workshop, 2018 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference (IPSC); CREATe Speaker Series at the University of Glasgow; Peking University School of Transnational Law Speaker Series; 2018 Regulation and Innovation in the Biosciences (RIBS) Conference at Washington University; University of Chicago–Tsinghua University Young Faculty Forum on Law & Social Science; and the University of Hong Kong Law & Technology Speaker Series. We also thank Michael Ellenberger for extraordinary research assistance.

Ryan Whalen
JD, PhD, Assistant Professor in the University of Hong Kong’s Faculty of Law.
In the United States, and in every single patent system in the world, one patentability doctrine—the nonobviousness doctrine—stands as the cornerstone of the patent bargain. This bargain ensures that the government only grants the monopoly associated with a patent when the inventor has created something sufficiently different from what came before.
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86.7
Settlement Malpractice
Michael Moffitt
Roger D. Fisher Visiting Professor in Negotiation and Conflict Resolution, Harvard Law School. Philip H. Knight Chair in Law, Professor, and former Dean at the University of Oregon School of Law.

For their feedback, I thank Professors Ian Ayres, Rishi Batra, Glenn Cohen, Noam Ebner, Deborah Eisenberg, John Goldberg, David Hoffman, Louis Kaplow, Andy Kaufman, Andrew Mamo, John Manning, Martha Minow, Bob Mnookin, Scott Peppet, Jeff Seul, Jean Sternlight, Andrea Schneider, Guhan Subramanian, Cass Sunstein, and Rachel Viscomi. I benefited enormously from feedback at faculty colloquia at Harvard, Maryland, and UNLV. And I thank my research assistants Haley Banks, Christopher Dotson, Juhi Gupta, Ayoung Kim, Ben Pincus, Jordan Shapiro, Austin Smith, and Elise Williard, without whose careful work this research would have been impossible.

Most clients likely believe that their lawyers have provided outstanding service in such contexts—and most clients are likely correct in that assessment. Given that most lawsuits settle3 and that lawyers play a central role in settlement negotiations and decision-making, however, we must assume that at least some lawyers sometimes fall short of the profession’s standards of care in the settlement context.
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86.7
High-Value, Low-Value, and No-Value Guns: Applying Free Speech Law to the Second Amendment
Joseph E. Sitzmann
BA 2017, The George Washington University; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School.

The Supreme Court ushered in a dramatic shift in Second Amendment jurisprudence in District of Columbia v Heller, holding that the Second Amendment protects the right to bear arms for “the core lawful purpose of self-defense.” This decision made clear that possession of a firearm need not be tethered to service in a militia. But the Court left open significant questions regarding what exactly that newly defined right entails.

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86.7
Reviewing Presidential Orders
Lisa Manheim
Charles I. Stone Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law

Many thanks to Alex Arkfeld, Ben Crozier, and the librarians at the UW School of Law for their excellent research assistance. Thank you also to those who provided helpful comments on earlier drafts, including Jeff Feldman, David Marcus, and Kevin Stack, as well as to those who shared their thoughts at workshops in which prior versions of this project were presented, including at Emory University School of Law’s Faculty Colloquium, the presidential power lecture series at the University of Arizona, and the Rehnquist Center’s National Conference of Constitutional Law Scholars.

Kathryn A. Watts
Jack R. MacDonald Endowed Chair, University of Washington School of Law.

In early 2017, a newly inaugurated President Donald J. Trump tried to force policy change through a flurry of written orders. While some opponents took to the streets to protest, others identified a different forum for resistance: the federal courts. Lawyers, mobilizing at a breakneck pace, sued the President in name to enjoin the implementation of several of his signature orders, including his first travel ban and an executive order involving sanctuary cities.

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86.7
“Unfair or Unconscionable”: A New Approach to Time-Barred Debt Collection under the FDCPA
Jon D. Fish
BA 2016, University of Kentucky; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School.

In search of an accessible epithet, newspapers across the country have christened debt that is barred by the statute of limitations “zombie debt.” This “funny term” for time-barred debt reflects its tendency to come back to life and attack when, like the first victims in a horror movie, consumers “seal their [ ] fate” by their own heedless approaches to debt collectors.

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86.7
Liability for Data Scraping Prohibitions under the Refusal to Deal Doctrine: An Incremental Step toward More Robust Sherman Act Enforcement
Ioannis Drivas
BA 2015, Amherst College; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School.

Internet giants like Google, Facebook, Microsoft, and Amazon have attracted controversy for their growing influence on our social, political, and commercial activities. Some commentators worry that these companies’ ability to gather data and control who accesses it threatens the competitive health of the digital economy. This trend could harm consumers by stifling innovation in online products and by producing a digital economy with fewer choices and fewer competitors determined to win consumers’ business.

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86.6
Standing for Statues, but Not for Statutes? An Argument for Purely Stigmatic Harm Standing under the Establishment Clause
Merav Bennett
BA 2013, Yale University; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School

In 2016, Mississippi passed the Protecting Freedom of Conscience from Government Discrimination Act, a law exempting Mississippians with “sincerely held religious beliefs or moral convictions” that marriage should be restricted to heterosexual couples from the state’s antidiscrimination laws.