Big Data and Bad Data: On the Sensitivity of Security Policy to Imperfect Information
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In this Essay, we examine some of the factors that make developing a “science of security” a significant research and policy challenge. We focus on how the empirical hurdles of missing data, inaccurate data, and invalid inferences can significantly impact—and sometimes impair—the security decisionmaking processes of individuals, firms, and policymakers. We offer practical examples of the sensitivity of policy modeling to those hurdles and highlight the relevance of these examples in the context of national security.
Search costs matter and are reflected in many areas of law. For example, most disclosure requirements economize on search costs. A homeowner who must disclose the presence of termites saves a potential buyer, and perhaps many such buyers, from spending money to search, or inspect, the property. Similarly, requirements to reveal expected miles per gallon, or risks posed by a drug, economize on search costs. But these examples point to simple strategies and costs that can be minimized or entirely avoided with some legal intervention. Law can do better and take account of more subtle things once sophisticated search strategies are understood. This Essay introduces such search strategies and their implications for law.
Special thanks to Mario Barnes, Courtney Douglas, Paul Gowder, Deborah Turkheimer, to the audience at Northwestern Law’s Julian Rosenthal Lecture, and to Miranda Coombe, Sam Hallam, Caroline Kassir, and Danielle O’Connell for superb editing. Adeleine Lee and Alex Wilfert provided excellent research assistance. The authors contributed equally to this essay.
Antidemocratic forces rely on intimidation tactics to silence criticism and opposition. Today’s intimidation playbook follows a two-step pattern. We surface these tactics so their costs to public discourse and civic engagement can be fully understood. We show how the misappropriation of the concept of online abuse has parallels in other efforts at conceptual diversion that dampen democratic guarantees. Democracy’s survival requires creative solutions. Politicians and government workers must be able to operate free from intimidation. Journalists and researchers must be able to freely investigate governmental overreach and foreign malign influence campaigns that threaten the democratic process. Surfacing the two-step strategy is a critical start to combating it.
We thank Bruce Ackerman, Lucian Bebchuk, Robert Ellickson, Daniel Epps, Edward Fox, Jens Frankenreiter, Clayton Gillette, Brian Highsmith, Noah Kazis, Reinier Kraakman, Zachary Liscow, Jon Michaels, Mariana Pargendler, and David Schleicher, as well as those who provided feedback from presentations at Yale Law School and the annual meeting of the American Law and Economics Association. We also thank Josh Kaufman, Daniella Apodaca, Jonah Klausner, and the other editors of the University of Chicago Law Review for their excellent feedback on both substance and style.
We thank Bruce Ackerman, Lucian Bebchuk, Robert Ellickson, Daniel Epps, Edward Fox, Jens Frankenreiter, Clayton Gillette, Brian Highsmith, Noah Kazis, Reinier Kraakman, Zachary Liscow, Jon Michaels, Mariana Pargendler, and David Schleicher, as well as those who provided feedback from presentations at Yale Law School and the annual meeting of the American Law and Economics Association. We also thank Josh Kaufman, Daniella Apodaca, Jonah Klausner, and the other editors of the University of Chicago Law Review for their excellent feedback on both substance and style.
When one thinks of government, what comes to mind are familiar general-purpose entities like states, counties, cities, and townships. But more than half of the 90,000 governments in the United States are strikingly different: They are “special-purpose” governments that do one thing, such as supply water, fight fire, or pick up the trash. These entities remain understudied, and they present at least two puzzles. First, special-purpose governments are difficult to distinguish from entities that are typically regarded as business organizations—such as consumer cooperatives—and thus underscore the nebulous border between “public” and “private” enterprise. Where does that border lie? Second, special-purpose governments typically provide only one service, in sharp contrast to general-purpose governments. There is little in between the two poles—such as two-, three-, or four-purpose governments. Why? This Article answers those questions—and, in so doing, offers a new framework for thinking about special-purpose government.