Volume 92.8

December

2025

In recent years, many states passed constitutional amendments prohibiting modern day slavery in the form of forced prison labor allowed by the Thirteenth Amendment. However, the state amendments' text alone has not ended prison slavery in those states. This Article examines why. It grounds its discussion in the history of American slavery after the Civil War as well as the various attempts of legislation, litigation, and constitutional amendments to dismantle forced prison labor. Drawing on this discussion, it suggests how organizers might craft these amendments and how judges and lawyers should interpret them. It argues that, ultimately, amending constitutional text alone is not enough. To achieve their goals amendments must work in tandem with litigation, governmental structural reform, and the inevitable political battles that arise over the shape of the criminal legal system.

Historic discrimination in the process of siting and constructing physical infrastructure has sacrificed the Black communities that bear the costs associated with new roads, power lines, and sewage plants while receiving few of the benefits. This Essay advances a "community equity" framework to recognize and protect the sources of value that people hold in their communities. This approach looks beyond the traditional domains of civil rights and land use law. Instead, it embraces analogies in public nuisance and common law torts doctrines as mechanisms for recognizing community harms above and beyond the aggregate of individual claims.

In Woodford v. Ngo , the Supreme Court cemented the judicial assumption that most prisons have effective and navigable internal grievance procedures within the doctrinal rules surrounding the Prison Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA) exhaustion requirement. Reliance on the assumption has contributed to a body of PLRA exhaustion doctrine that maps poorly onto the factual realities of the prison context and requires constant clarification by the Supreme Court. Indeed, the Supreme Court has been called upon twice in the past decade to sort out the mess of doctrinal rules governing PLRA exhaustion, first in Ross v. Blake and just this year in Perttu v. Richards . Examining the Court's path to Ross and Perttu , this Comment argues that the Court's reliance on the assumption mandated in Woodford blinded it to the potential constitutional problems generated by Ross, which led to the circuit split at issue in Perttu . Thus, the Court must clarify the boundaries of PLRA exhaustion for the second time in fewer than ten years. Efficiency is one of the core purposes of PLRA exhaustion, and the Supreme Court’s perpetual cycle of clarifying (and reclarifying, and reclarifying again) its construction of a single statutory provision fails to serve that end.

In Snyder v. United States , the Supreme Court held that a federal criminal statute covers only bribes, not gratuities. The key issue in factually similar cases is whether a quid pro quo agreement occurred. The Snyder Court provided no guidance on this issue. This Comment responds by turning to antitrust law. Antitrust faces the same problem as bribery law: determining whether an illegal agreement occurred when both parties benefit from it. Antitrust has developed several “plus factors” to explain what circumstantial evidence suffices to prove an illegal agreement. This Comment uses that antitrust framework to propose ten bribery plus factors.

In 1977, a company convicted of conspiring with the mob asked President Carter for a pardon. The government speculated that the President could so exercise the pardon power, but ultimately no pardon ever issued. Nearly fifty years later, President Trump has pardoned a company convicted of violating the Bank Secrecy Act. People are again speculating that the pardon power covers companies, but few can offer evidence either way. History shows that the pardon power covers companies. Before the Founding, the King would often pardon corporations. Both the city of London and the Massachusetts Bay Company were pardoned before the Founders were even born. This tradition was the background against which the Pardon Clause and many of its state analogs were drafted. That the President can pardon companies might feel surprising or even unsettling. But the prerogative fits comfortably into the nation's separation of powers. Congress can make exercising the power less attractive by withholding refunded fines or shifting crimes to civil infractions. These checks come with more tradeoffs when exercised int he context of human beings, which might explain why Congress has not exercised them so far.

In 1977, a company convicted of conspiring with the mob asked President Carter for a pardon. The government speculated that the President could so exercise the pardon power, but ultimately no pardon ever issued. Nearly fifty years later, President Trump has pardoned a company convicted of violating the Bank Secrecy Act. People are again speculating that the pardon power covers companies, but few can offer evidence either way. History shows that the pardon power covers companies. Before the Founding, the King would often pardon corporations. Both the city of London and the Massachusetts Bay Company were pardoned before the Founders were even born. This tradition was the background against which the Pardon Clause and many of its state analogs were drafted. That the President can pardon companies might feel surprising or even unsettling. But the prerogative fits comfortably into the nation's separation of powers. Congress can make exercising the power less attractive by withholding refunded fines or shifting crimes to civil infractions. These checks come with more tradeoffs when exercised int he context of human beings, which might explain why Congress has not exercised them so far.

When prisoner officials burden the free exercise rights of prisoners, prisoners can seek recourse under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, due to the specialized and restrictive nature of prisons, courts adjudicate these claims under a reasonableness test set out in the case Turner v. Sadfley instead of a strict scrutiny standard. While circuits agree on using the Turner test for prisoner free exercise claims, there is a deep circuit split on the proper threshold test for these types of claims. While some circuits hold that inmates need to show that their religious practice was substantially burdened, other circuits hold that inmates just need to show that their religious practice was sincere. These threshold tests produce significant differences in how prisoner free exercise claims are litigated in court. After exploring the relevant Supreme Court guidance, this Comment aims to settle the split by examining each threshold test on its respective merits, considering neutral criteria such as screening ability, adherence to judicial capacity, and workability.