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Volume 92.6

Disclosure Puzzles in Patent Law

Jonathan S. Masur
John P. Wilson Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.

For helpful comments, thanks to Sarah Burstein, Bernard Chao, Kevin Collins, Laura Dolbow, Tabrez Ebrahim, Jeanne Fromer, Jordi Goodman, Paul Gugliuzza, Tim Holbrook, Mark Lemley, Oskar Liivak, Mike Meurer, Andrew Michaels, Lidiya Mishchenko, Nicholson Price, Arti Rai, Jason Rantanen, Jason Reinecke, Michael Risch, Andres Sawicki, Jake Sherkow, and participants at the Intellectual Property Scholars Conference and the Works-in-Progress Intellectual Property Colloquium. We thank Victoria Fang, Josh Leopold, Joseph Robinson, and Marissa Uri for excellent research assistance. Masur thanks the David and Celia Hilliard Fund and the Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz Program in Behavioral Law, Finance and Economics for support.

Lisa Larrimore Ouellette
Deane F. Johnson Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.

For helpful comments, thanks to Sarah Burstein, Bernard Chao, Kevin Collins, Laura Dolbow, Tabrez Ebrahim, Jeanne Fromer, Jordi Goodman, Paul Gugliuzza, Tim Holbrook, Mark Lemley, Oskar Liivak, Mike Meurer, Andrew Michaels, Lidiya Mishchenko, Nicholson Price, Arti Rai, Jason Rantanen, Jason Reinecke, Michael Risch, Andres Sawicki, Jake Sherkow, and participants at the Intellectual Property Scholars Conference and the Works-in-Progress Intellectual Property Colloquium. We thank Victoria Fang, Josh Leopold, Joseph Robinson, and Marissa Uri for excellent research assistance.

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Since its inception, patent law has required that inventors publicly disclose information about their inventions in exchange for receiving patent rights. This foundational requirement is policed through multiple doctrines: patents fail “enablement” if “undue experimentation” is needed to practice the invention, and they lack adequate “written description” when they fail to establish the inventor’s “possession” of the invention.

Despite disclosure doctrines’ centrality, fundamental puzzles about their application remain unresolved. What are the boundaries between enablement and written description? Do equivalents claimed via the doctrine of equivalents have to be enabled or described? Are the rules different for after-arising technologies? Federal Circuit caselaw provides few clear answers. In Amgen v. Sanofi, the Supreme Court recently took up one such puzzle: Must a patent enable the full scope of the claim or merely some number of working examples? But the Court failed to address long-standing puzzles surrounding this issue. For example, most patents cover devices that add new elements to the invention and thus have effectively infinite scope, so how could the “full scope” ever be disclosed?

More fundamentally, these puzzles reveal a deep conceptual tension. Disclosure doctrines exist to restrict patentees from claiming property rights over inventions that they did not really invent or bring to the public. Yet at the same time, if patentees were confined strictly to the precise invention they created, patents would be nearly worthless. The disclosure rules must chart a course between these two competing objectives.

In this Article, we tackle these questions and more. We attempt to bring conceptual order to the disclosure doctrines, reconciling them with one another and with the broader animating principles of patent law. These puzzles must be solved if patent law is to fulfill its promises; if they are not, the resulting doctrinal gaps will expose the patent system to strategic behavior by nefarious noninventors—including those aided by new generative artificial intelligence tools—who learn how to acquire the patent quo without paying their quid. Our Article aims to plug these gaps.

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