UCLR Online

In his recent article, Against Bankruptcy Exceptionalism, Professor Jonathan M. Seymour argues that bankruptcy courts have wrongly bucked the Supreme Court’s trend toward textualism. Bankruptcy courts believe that they need to approach the Bankruptcy Code pragmatically in light of the unique dynamics inherent in bankruptcy practice and therefore adopt purposivist, equitable, or “rough justice” approaches to facilitate that kind of pragmatism—an attitude that Professor Seymour calls “bankruptcy exceptionalism.”

In his quixotic bid to buy and reform Twitter, Elon Musk swiftly arrived at the same place nearly every tech mogul does: he doesn’t want censorship, but he does want to be able to suppress some legal speech.

Speaking on Chevron deference at Duke University School of Law in 1989, Justice Antonin Scalia told the audience to “lean back, clutch the sides of your chairs, and steel yourselves for a pretty dull lecture.” Perhaps he would have withheld his cynicism if he could have seen the Supreme Court’s administrative-law rulings in the past year.

Over the past 225 years, the Supreme Court witnessed two presidential impeachment trials and two pathogenic shutdowns. This term had it all: guns, abortion, DACA, Little Sisters, LGBT discrimination, Trump’s tax returns, and more.

This Essay concerns a constitutional puzzle, the puzzle of for-cause removal. For a century the Supreme Court has been attempting to answer a simple question: when is it constitutional for Congress to provide that an agency head or lower official can be removed only for cause?

Chief Justice John Roberts mystified and frustrated court watchers with his opinions in the closing weeks of the Supreme Court’s October 2019 term.

In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Board, the Supreme Court invalidated a statutory provision that protected the director of the Consumer Finance Protection Board (CFPB) from removal by the president except for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John Roberts announced a new test for evaluating the constitutionality of “for cause” restrictions on presidential removal of high-level agency officials.

The majority and dissenting opinions in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau disagreed about the interpretation of previous Supreme Court decisions that considered the president’s power to remove executive branch officials. But in many ways the more important disagreement was about historical practice.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s June 29, 2020 decision in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau fixed a glaring constitutional defect in the way Congress structured the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB or Bureau).

In the last Supreme Court term, the Court ruled in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau that Article II of the U.S. Constitution and separation of powers prohibit Congress from shielding the Bureau’s director from termination except for cause. More troubling, Seila Law could open up the financial system to destabilization by paving the path for a full-scale assault on the traditional independence of federal financial regulators and presidential manipulation of the economy.

The Court in Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau did not hold that the restriction on presidential removal of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) director was unconstitutional. At least, it did not do so according to standard principles of stare decisis and the orthodox account of the law of judicial review—the legal principles under which courts implement the hierarchical superiority of the Constitution to all other legal norms.

In Seila Law LLC v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice John Roberts, invalidated the provision of the Dodd-Frank Act restricting the president’s removal of the director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) to cases of “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” The Court’s decision leaves the director subject to removal by the president for any reason or no reason at all.