UCLR Online
Professor Monica Haymond’s Intervention and Universal Remedies article invites scholars to focus on the distinctive ways that public law litigation plays out in practice. This Essay takes up her challenge. By questioning common assumptions at the core of structural-reform litigation, this Essay explains the dangers of consent decrees, settlements, and broad precedents. It then goes on to argue that intervention is an important check on these risks, and should be much more freely available in structural reform cases.
A recurrent problem in adapting law to artificial intelligence (AI) programs is how the law should regulate the use of entities that lack intentions. Many areas of the law, including freedom of speech, copyright, and criminal law, make liability turn on whether the actor who causes harm (or creates a risk of harm) has a certain intention or mens rea. But AI agents—at least the ones we currently have—do not have intentions in the way that humans do. If liability turns on intention, that might immunize the use of AI programs from liability. We think that the best solution is to employ objective standards that are familiar in many different parts of the law. These legal standards either ascribe intention to actors or hold them to objective standards of conduct.
This Essay explores whether the use of AI to enhance decision-making brings about radical change in legal doctrine or, by contrast, is just another new tool. It focuses on decision-making by board members. This provides an especially relevant example because corporate law has laid out explicit expectations for how board members must go about decision-making.
AI applications will put an end to negotiation processes as we know them. The typical back-and-forth communication and haggling in a state of information insecurity could soon be a thing of the past. AI applications will increase the information level of the parties and drastically reduce transaction costs. A quick and predictable agreement in the middle of a visible bargaining range could become the new normal. But, sophisticated negotiators will shift this bargaining range to their advantage. They will automate negotiation moves and execute value-claiming strategies with precision, exploiting remaining information asymmetries to their advantage. Negotiations will no longer be open-ended communication processes. They will become machine-driven chess endgames. Large businesses will have the upper hand in these endgames.
This paper examines the distinct features of artificial intelligence (AI) and reaches a broader conclusion as to the availability and applicability of first-order tort rules. It evaluates the accuracy of the argument that AI is similar in essence to other emerging technologies that have entered our lives since the First Industrial Revolution and, therefore, does not require special legal treatment. The paper will explore whether our current tort doctrines can serve us well even when addressing AI liability.
Changing technologies render tax law’s intricacy legible in new ways. Advances in large language models, natural language processing, and programming languages designed for the domain of tax law make formalizations, or “representation[s] of [ ] legislation in symbols[ ] using logical connectives,” of tax law that capture much of its substance and structure both possible and realistic. These new formalizations can be used for many different purposes—what one might call flexible formalizations. Flexible formalizations will make law subject to computational analysis, including creating automated explanations of the analysis and testing statutes for consistency and unintended outcomes. This Essay builds upon existing work in computational law and digitalizing legislation.
Courts, litigants, and scholars should not be confused by the ongoing debate about nationwide or so-called “universal” injunctions: the proper scope of remedies under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and other statutes providing for judicial review of agency action is “erasure.” This Article aims to save scholars’ recent progress in showing the legality of stays and vacatur under the APA from muddled thinking that conflates these forms of relief with other universal remedies that face growing criticism.
This Essay proposes using the dilemma defendants face in parallel proceedings as a way to measure the Value of Statistical Freedom (VSF). The VSF (sometimes called the Value of Liberty) can be thought of as an individual’s willingness to pay to not be in prison. The VSF is spiritually similar to the far more prevalent “Value of Statistical Life” (VSL), which measures the willingness to trade money or wealth in exchange for an increase in the mortality probability.
How often do Supreme Court opinions include what might be called “lobbying language,” which endorses a policy position while calling for another government entity to realize it? Reviewing relevant cases, this Essay finds that the sample set includes at least a dozen examples of lobbying language. As it turns out, lobbying is not so unusual for the Supreme Court.
This Essay documents the limitations of the parental rights lens for Black families and argues that the more appropriate lens for marginalized families focuses on the survival of both individual families and the larger community tied to these families. With this in mind, it contemplates what the future of the Restatement might hold against the backdrop of a reconfigured framework.
Children’s lives are increasingly shaped by their online environment, quite apart from the physical geographies of home and school. How they make choices in that space, and how those choices are shaped by law and parental authority, warrants deeper discussion than the Restatement of Children and the Law was able to provide. The complex challenges of children’s engagement with social media, both as content creators and consumers, help illuminate some of the core tensions in this Part of the Restatement—namely, the tension between children’s autonomy, parental authority, and state regulation.
The importance of initial prosecutorial decisions in juvenile outcomes is well-studied, but recent developments in the law, including the Supreme Court’s decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma; new laws and proposed legislation pertaining to youth being tried in juvenile or criminal court; and the forthcoming adoption of the Children's Restatement require that we reexamine their significance.