Print Archive

Standard theories of precedent limit the legal effect of a precedent to cases within the scope of its holding. Yet the widespread use of analogies to precedent in legal reasoning presupposes that precedents have legal implications for cases outside the scope of their holdings. This Article suggests that arguments from analogy to precedent have the currency they do in our legal system because respect for a precedent requires more than treating the precedent’s holding as true: It also requires the judge to update her other beliefs around the assumption that the precedent’s holding is true.

This Article considers how and under what circumstances the “general law,” a species of unwritten law grounded in legal customs and practices shared across different legal jurisdictions, might be used in modern constitutional interpretation. Constitutional originalists have increasingly argued that central provisions of the Constitution incorporate various bodies of general law. This Article argues that, even if the Constitution did incorporate various bodies of general law, most of those bodies of law have now been emptied of content, and must remain empty without profound changes in the practice of federal judicial review. Because the general law requires that nonfederal judicial actors such as state courts, governors, legislatures, the President, and perhaps foreign legal systems participate in the development of public law norms and customs, a general law revival would involve eliminating, or at least curtailing, federal judicial supremacy and would therefore impliedly reject nearly a hundred years of public law precedent.

How many amendments are in the Constitution? Americans should be able to know. But whether the Equal Rights Amendment is—right now—part of the Constitution remains controversial. Thirty-eight states have sought to ratify it, several of them after the seven-year deadline in the proposing resolution. Given President Joe Biden’s last-minute claim that the ERA is now the Twenty-Eighth Amendment, in a future administration this lingering debate could provoke a minor constitutional crisis. Yet there may be a legal answer. Congress has long placed operative language in amendment resolutions that modifies the legal force of the proposed text—not only in the Bill of Rights, as is well-known, but also in the Twelfth and Seventeenth Amendments. This language was deliberately chosen, was repeated by state ratifications, and seems to have been accepted as legally effective. This historical practice suggests that, under Article V, the resolution is the amendment: What matters is the entire constitutional change that Congress proposes, not just the additional language it would append. This understanding means that certain parts of the 1788 Constitution have been repealed, not just superseded. It also means that the ERA’s deadline rendered it incapable, even with thirty-eight states’ assent, of making any change to the Constitution’s text once seven years had passed. Both President Biden’s statement and the ongoing lobbying efforts are therefore seriously misguided. In a divided society, losing consensus on the Constitution’s text carries an especially high cost: The National Archives is the wrong place to play with fire.

This Book Review examines the significance of Professor David E. Wilkins’s newest book Indigenous Governance: Clans, Constitutions, and Consent. It suggests that Wilkins has produced a critically important collection of primary sources related to the origins of tribal government and that his contribution could not come at a better time within the discipline of Indian Law. This Book Review takes the position that Indian Law is seeing the emergence of a fourth wave of scholarship that recenters the conversation from tribal self-determination as a means of decolonization to one embracing the autochthonous powers of tribes themselves. It is distinct from earlier waves of Indian Law scholarship because it does not position tribal powers within the tribal-federal framework but recognizes them as distinct and subject to change at the direction of tribal leadership. To enable this genesis, scholars need primary research material that collects and summarizes the nature of the tribal sovereign using tradition and custom, tribal law and tribal judicial authority, and the founding documents and stories that ultimately create an Indigenous polity. Indigenous Governance is that text.

Law and economics (L&E) emerged as a field in the middle of the twentieth century, it focused on using economic theory to study the common law. During this period, L&E offered insights so novel that it not only profoundly influenced legal doctrine, but the movement’s key figures also became some of the most cited and acclaimed scholars in the American academy. The field of law and economics has since continued to grow and become more technically sophisticated, but it is also a less cohesive movement. Moreover, L&E has been misunderstood and misrepresented by the emerging law and political economy (LPE) movement. This Essay starts the process of reclaiming L&E by offering a definition of the current field: Contemporary law and economics is an academic field that (1) has a commitment to using the social scientific method of inquiry to (2) study questions about the law and legal institutions (3) in a way that is typically informed by economic insights. It then describes L&E’s comparative advantages, explains its relationship to the LPE movement, and suggests a roadmap for its renewed relevance.

Is President Donald Trump appealing in part because he has made contracts seem like provisional arrangements likely to endure only insofar as they serve his (or putatively national) interests? Two political economy studies of U.S. workplaces and firms, one ethnographic and one historical, can begin to shed light. Ilana Gershon’s ethnography explores how people’s everyday legal and political consciousness is formed through their experiences of regulatory decision-making in a contract-filled workplace. Sociologist Melinda Cooper’s historical account reveals how a turn to viewing corporations as a conglomeration of individual contracts paved the way for a veneration of autocratic rule. In making this argument, this Essay contributes to the Symposium in two ways. First, it illustrates the value of an insight that has helped organize the field of law and political economy but not law and economics: namely, that people’s legal and political sensibilities are often shaped by their experiences in economic life. Second, it illustrates the value of interpretative social sciences, which has remained marginal in both fields. It argues that qualitative and ethnographic research methods are particularly useful in moments such as the political present in the United States when what can be assumed about political, legal, and class identities and categories is rapidly changing.

Do police help keep us safe? Do prisons make the world less violent? This Essay argues that effectively engaging with these and other notoriously difficult questions about our criminal legal system requires a diverse suite of methodologies. Too often, however, scholars have purported to answer these questions definitively by reference only to top-down, state-created, data categories and numbers: arrest rates, crime rates, formal adjudication outcomes. This Essay argues that opening up research methods to seek knowledge from grounded and communal sources can help unseat assumptions and guide researchers toward more nuanced and expansive understandings of the relationships between law, politics, economics, and our material world. The Law and Political Economy movement (LPE) has provided a natural intellectual home for those who turn to bottom-up sources of knowledge, precisely because of the attention given by LPE scholars to interplays of power, politics, and the law.

Should legal rules be designed exclusively based on efficiency considerations, or should they also attempt to promote an equitable distribution of social resources? The answer traditionally associated with scholarship in law and economics is that they should focus only on efficiency. Even for a society that cares about achieving an equitable distribution of resources by income, the argument goes, it is generally better to adopt legal rules based exclusively on efficiency considerations while relying on the income tax and transfer system to promote distributional goals. However, even proponents of the claim that social welfare is best promoted through the adoption of efficient legal rules agree that there are certain conditions under which it does not apply. This Essay considers when legal rules should be efficient and when they should not. It focuses on conditions that can cause the socially optimal legal rule to diverge from the efficient legal rule—i.e., the legal rule that would be optimal absent distributional considerations. Its goal is to translate these arguments to settings where the question of interest relates to the design of a legal rule rather than, say, the design of a commodity tax. In particular, it seeks to clarify the types of arguments that can support the adoption of inefficient legal rules when income taxation is available as a policy tool.

Mainstream antitrust policy is grounded in economics and views the protection of competition as antitrust’s singular goal. But the populist “antimonopoly movement” believes that antitrust should focus less on economic issues and more on the political influence of large firms. While the courts have long embraced the economic approach to antitrust, antimonopolists have recently gained some support in politics. This battle of ideas is therefore poised to determine the future of antitrust. Antitrust law currently suffers from a number of problems, but the antimonopoly movement does not offer serious solutions. On the contrary, by deemphasizing tangible economic harms in favor of abstract political concerns, it would cause immense economic damage. Antitrust populism is grounded in the moralistic belief that large companies are inherently detrimental to society, overlooking the fact that most big firms attained their success by providing significant economic benefits to the public, such as better products or lower prices. This Essay argues that rather than punishing bigness for its own sake, antitrust should focus on proscribing anticompetitive behavior and ensuring that all firms can compete on a level playing field.

The law and political economy (LPE) approach is a new scholarly framework that stresses that the economy and politics cannot be separated, but deeply shape one another, and are mediated by law. This Essay describes how LPE scholarship relates to and differs from two other major legal schools of thought that have notably engaged questions of political economy: the legal realism associated with Professor Robert Hale and the law and economics movement associated with Professors Richard Posner, Steve Shavell, and Louis Kaplow. This Essay argues that LPE work, though critically inflected, has also been quite methodologically open. It is oriented by a set of shared critical insights, literatures, normative aims, and practical projects, and does not draw its practices or theories from any single law-adjacent discipline. It is, however, developing a distinctive "reparative" approach, aiming not to reorder the political economy in top-down fashion, but to facilitate democratic shifts in power and help bring about institutions that are more genuinely democratically ordered. One strand of this work calls for “non-reformist” or “power-building” reforms that operate dynamically to empower tenants, workers, and others who have been historically disempowered. Another seeks to bring private power under more public authority, for example by introducing public options or proposing new foundational norms to ground private law.

Experiments sometimes get a bad rap. Critics allege that they don’t illuminate how the real world works, are subject to p-hacking and manipulation, and often don’t study the most important populations of interest. This Essay examines historical uses of experiments to generate knowledge for legal academia. Recently, experiments have become associated with law and economics as part of a broader coupling of quantitative empirical work with law and economics. But experimentation is a highly adaptable, if imperfect, research method that can support causal claims and test assumptions that are useful across many legal theories, including law and political economy. The Essay discusses the strengths, limits, and future directions of experiments as a mode of legal research.

The law and political economy (LPE) movement claims concern for marginalized communities as a motivation for its crime agenda. However, efforts to defund police, elect progressive prosecutors, and eliminate prisons are likely to generate large costs for the very communities LPE scholars say they care about. Existing empirical analyses demonstrate that Black individuals benefit disproportionately from the deterrence provided by police. This Essay also provides new evidence that progressive prosecutors have put Black people in lethal danger. Finally, it argues that there are reasons to believe that decarceration would not be costless for the Black community.