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Volume 90.6
Vagueness and Federal-State Relations
Joel S. Johnson
Associate Professor of Law, Pepperdine Caruso School of Law.

For helpful comments, I am grateful to Jeff Baker, Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Trey Childress, Jake Charles, Adam Crews, Eric Fish, Christine Goodman, David Han, Peter Low, Michael Mannheimer, Barry McDonald, Arjun Ogale, Bob Pushaw, Richard Re, Mark Scarberry, Joseph Storey, and Ahmed Taha.

This Article aims to clarify the content of the void-for-vagueness doctrine and defend its historical pedigree by drawing attention to a fundamental aspect of the Supreme Court’s vagueness decisions—that vagueness analysis significantly depends on whether the law at issue is a federal or state law. That simple distinction has considerable explanatory power. It reveals that the doctrine emerged in the late nineteenth century in response to two simultaneous changes in the legal landscape—first, the availability of Supreme Court due process review of state penal statutes under the Fourteenth Amendment, and second, a significant shift in how state courts construed those statutes. The federal-state distinction also divides the Court’s decisions into two groups with mostly separate concerns. It reveals that separation-of-powers concerns primarily motivate the Court’s vagueness decisions involving federal laws, while federalism concerns are the driving force in its vagueness decisions involving state laws.

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Volume 90.6
Racial Time
Yuvraj Joshi
Assistant Professor, Brooklyn Law School; Research Scholar, UC Berkeley Miller Institute of Global Challenges and the Law; Faculty Affiliate, UCLA School of Law Promise Institute for Human Rights; J.S.D., Yale Law School.

This Article benefited from generous input from Sameer Ashar, Rabia Belt, Michael Bronstein, Osamudia James, Lucas Janes, Renisa Mawani, and Samuel Moyn. Special thanks to Thea Udwadia, Liana Wang, and Kylie Schatz for excellent research and editorial assistance and to the editors of the University of Chicago Law Review, especially Gabrielle Dohmen, Tim Cunningham, and Ivy Truong, for their meticulous work.

Racial time describes how inequality shapes people’s experiences and perceptions of time. This Article reviews the multidisciplinary literature on racial time and then demonstrates how Black activists have made claims about time that challenge prevailing norms. While white majorities often view racial justice measures as both too late and too soon, too fast and too long-lasting, Black activists remind us that justice measures are never “well timed” within hegemonic understandings of time. This Article ultimately argues that U.S. law embodies dominant interests in time. By inscribing dominant experiences and expectations of time into law, the Supreme Court enforces unrealistic timelines for racial remedies and “neutral” time standards that disproportionately burden subordinated groups. Because the legal enactment of dominant time perpetuates structural inequalities, this Article urges U.S. legal actors to consider and incorporate subordinated perspectives on time. The Article concludes with a series of recommendations for centering these perspectives and rendering them intelligible and actionable in law.

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Volume 90.5
The Rise of Nonbinding International Agreements: An Empirical, Comparative, and Normative Analysis
Curtis A. Bradley
Allen M. Singer Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.
Jack Goldsmith
Learned Hand Professor, Harvard Law School.
Oona A. Hathaway
Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe Smith Professor of International Law, Yale Law School.

For excellent research assistance, we thank Josh Asabor, Sofiya Bidochko, Tilly Brooks, Patrick Byxbee, Yilin Chen, Ben Daus-Haberle, Eliane Holmlund, Nina Lin, Simon Jerome, Tori Keller, Ako Ndefo-Haven, Madison Phillips, Allison Rice, Annabel Remudo, Vinay Sriram, Nathan Stull, Danielle Tyukody, and Kaylee Walsh. We also thank Ayoub Ouederni and John Bowers for their outstanding assistance analyzing and presenting the data. We thank the many scholars, lawyers, and government officials from around the world who provided us with insights into the process for making nonbinding agreements. For assistance with the FOIA requests to more than twenty federal agencies and lawsuits against the Departments of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, we thank Arifa Ali, Daniel Betancourt, Charlotte Blatt, Connor Brashear, Jackson Busch, Charles Crain, Rachel Davidson, Kelsey Eberly, Roman Leal, Abby Lemert, Raquel Leslie, Alyssa Resar, Eli Scher-Zagier, David Schulz, Stephen Stich, Sruthi Venkatachalam, Kataeya Wooten, Brianna Yates, and especially Michael Linhorst of the Media Freedom and Information Access Clinic at Yale Law School. We are also grateful to the Yale Law Librarians, especially Lucie Olejnikova and Evelyn Ma. For helpful comments and suggestions, we thank Helmut Aust, Jean Galbraith, Duncan Hollis, Thomas Kleinlein, Tim Meyer, Kal Raustiala, Michael Reisman, Ryan Scoville, David Zaring, and participants in faculty workshops at the University of Chicago Law School, Georgetown University Law Center, Harvard Law School, University of Minnesota Law School, and Yale Law School.

The treaty process specified in Article II of the Constitution has been dying a slow death for decades, replaced by various forms of “executive agreements.” What is only beginning to be appreciated is the extent to which both treaties and executive agreements are increasingly being overshadowed by another form of international cooperation: nonbinding international agreements. Not only have nonbinding agreements become more prevalent, but many of the most consequential (and often controversial) U.S. international agreements in recent years have been concluded in whole or in significant part as nonbinding agreements. Despite their prevalence and importance, nonbinding agreements have not traditionally been subject to any of the domestic statutory or regulatory requirements that apply to binding agreements. As a result, they have not been centrally monitored or collected within the executive branch, and they have not been systematically reported to Congress or disclosed to the public. Recent legislation addresses this transparency gap to a degree, but substantial gaps remain. This Article focuses on the two most significant forms of nonbinding agreements between U.S. government representatives and their foreign counterparts: (1) joint statements and communiques; and (2) formal nonbinding agreements. After describing these categories and the history of nonbinding agreements and their domestic legal basis, the Article presents the first empirical study of U.S. nonbinding agreements, drawing on two new databases that together include more than three thousand of these agreements. Based on this study, and on a comparative assessment of the practices and reform discussions taking place in other countries, the Article considers the case for additional legal reforms.

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Volume 90.5
Unshackling Cities
Felipe Ford Cole
Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.

I thank Richard Schragger, Nadav Shoked, Niko Bowie, Jay Butler, K-Sue Park, Sophia Lee, Lee Fennell, Guy Charles, Ajay Mehrotra, Karen Tani, Tim Lovelace, Alison LaCroix, Erik Encarnacion, Jasmine Harris, David Skeel, Dave Hoffman, Raff Donelson, Brittany Farr, and Caitlin DiMartino for helpful feedback on earlier drafts, as well as the participants of the Penn Law's Writer's Bloc(k) Workshop, the Northwestern Pritzker School of Law J.D.-Ph.D. Workshop, and the Law and Society Association 2020 Annual Conference. Hang Nguyen of the State Historical Society of Iowa expertly assisted with tracking down archival materials, and Cade Underwood provided excellent research assistance. All errors are my own.

Scholars have long demonstrated that cities are constrained by states and the federal government in the exercise of their power. While important, the emphasis on these “vertical” constraints on cities does not account for the “horizontal” constraints on city power from private actors. This Article suggests that the emphasis on vertical constraints on city power is due to a misunderstanding of the history of local government law that describes its sole function as the vertical distribution of power between cities and different levels of government. I revise the history of Dillon’s Rule, the doctrinal cornerstone of local government law’s vertical distribution of power, by arguing that local government law also distributes public and private power, between private capital and cities. Correcting the historical misunderstanding helps to show how private power still shackles cities in their efforts to address important challenges.

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Volume 90.4
The Fourth Amendment Without Police
Shawn E. Fields
Assistant Professor of Law, Campbell University School of Law.

I am grateful for conversations and discussion at the 2021 Southeastern Association of Law Schools Conference, at which I received helpful input from Cynthia Alkon, Mitch Crusto, Raff Donelson, Jancy Hoeffel, Nicole Iannarone, Christopher Lund, Carla Reyes, Daniel Schaffa, Kate Sneddon, Neil Sobol, Scott Sundby, Anna VanCleave, and Howard Wasserman. I also received enormously helpful comments and feedback from Dwight Aarons, Kristen Bell, Zac Bolitho, Bobbi Jo Boyd, Marcus Gadson, Tony Ghiotto, Noël Harlow, Orin Kerr, Cortney Lollar, and Gustavo Ribeiro. All errors are my own.

What role will the Fourth Amendment play in a world without police? As academics, activists, and lawmakers explore alternatives to traditional law enforcement, it bears asking whether the amendment primarily tasked with regulating police investigations would also regulate postpolice public safety agencies. Surprisingly, the answer is often no. Courts are reluctant to recognize protections from government searches or seizures outside criminal investigations, and they are even more reluctant to require probable cause or a warrant for such conduct. Thus, by removing most public safety functions outside the criminal sphere, abolitionists also move intrusive government conduct outside these traditional strictures and guardrails. This Article provides the first sustained evaluation of the Fourth Amendment’s limited role in a postpolice world and examines the implications of this reality.

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Volume 90.4
Regulatory Trading
David A. Weisbach
Walter J. Blum Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.

Send comments to d-weisbach@uchicago.edu. I am thankful for Jen Nou and Mark Templeton for discussions and the many valuable comments from workshops at the University of Chicago Law School and Washington University Law School. Special thanks to Richard Sandor for allowing me to participate in his class at the University of Chicago Law School, The Law and Economics of Natural Resource Markets.

Regulatory trading systems, such as the SO2 cap-and-trade system, are ubiquitous in environmental and natural resources law. In addition to cap-and-trade systems for pollutants such as SO2, NOx, and CO2, environmental and natural resources law uses trading in areas such as endangered species, water quality, wetlands, vehicle mileage, and forestry and farming practices. Trading, however, is rarely used as a regulatory approach in other areas of law. This Article seeks to identify the reasons for this dichotomy. To understand the dichotomy, the Article examines the uses of trading in environmental and natural resources law, where it has been successful, and where problems have arisen, including hot spots problems, environmental justice problems, measurement problems, and moral problems with the use of markets. It then considers the possibility of trading in six nonenvironmental areas of law to see whether trading can be helpful, and if not, why not.

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Volume 90.3
The Uncertain Judge
Courtney M. Cox
Associate Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. D.Phil., University of Oxford; J.D., University of Chicago Law School.

I owe a particular debt of gratitude to David Strauss for his engagement with this project. For generous comments and conversations, I also thank Atinuke Adediran, Aditi Bagchi, Olivia Bailey, Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Pamela Bookman, Andrew Botterell, John Broome, Ruth Chang, Mala Chatterjee, Bruce Cox, Nestor Davidson, Janet Freilich, Caroline Gentile, Abner Greene, Daniel Hemel, Zach Huffman, Clare Huntington, Felipe Jiménez, Brian Lee, Youngjae Lee, Ethan Leib, Brian Leiter, Seth Mayer, Dan Priel, Marcela Prieto, Richard Re, Pamela Samuelson, Steven Schaus, Sepehr Shahshahani, Jeremy Sheff, Seana Shiffrin, Lawrence Solum, Kevin Tobia, Murray Tipping, Ian Weinstein, Maggie Wittlin, Benjamin Zipursky; participants at the Fordham Faculty Workshop, UCLA Legal Theory Workshop, North American Workshop on Private Law Theory, NYC IP Law & Philosophy Workshop, St. John’s Faculty Workshop, UVA Hard Cases Workshop, USC Law & Philosophy Workshop, and Edinburgh Legal Theory Workshop; and my fall 2021 Philosophical Perspectives students. I am grateful for the opportunity to have discussed this project in its early stages with Hon. Sandra L. Lynch and Hon. David J. Barron of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. I am greatly indebted to the Fordham Law Librarians, especially Kelly Leong. For excellent research assistance, I thank my RAs, especially Edward Ernst, Eric Hechler, Jocelyn Lee, Maya Syngal McGrath, Jordan Phelan, Juliann Petkov, M. Ryan Purdy, Eleni Venetos, and Pamela White.

The intellectually honest judge faces a very serious problem about which little has been said. It is this: What should a judge do when she knows all the relevant facts, laws, and theories of adjudication, but still remains uncertain about what she ought to do? Such occasions will arise, for whatever her preferred theory about how she ought to decide a given case—what I will call her preferred “jurisprudence”— she may harbor lingering doubts that a competing jurisprudence is correct instead. And sometimes, these competing jurisprudences provide conflicting guidance. When that happens, what should she do?