86.4

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86.4
The Underlying Underwriter: An Analysis of the Spotify Direct Listing
Benjamin J. Nickerson
AB 2015, The University of Chicago; JD Candidate 2020, The University ofChicago Law School.

I wish to thank Nicholas B. Aeppel, Douglas G. Baird, William A. Birdthistle, Anthony J. Casey, Ryan D. Doerfler, Thomas J. Miles, and the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review for their thoughtful guidance and advice.

On April 3, 2018, global music streaming company Spotify Technology S.A. (Spotify) went public through a direct listing of its ordinary shares on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Rather than raise money by issuing new shares to the public through a traditional initial public offering (IPO), Spotify made its existing shares available for purchase on the public exchange through the seldom-utilized direct listing process.

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86.4
Partially Tribal Land: The Case for Limiting State Eminent Domain Power under 25 USC § 357
Addison W. Bennett
BA 2016, Skidmore College; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School.

When a state government pursues a utility project, utility lines must often cross land owned by private individuals. Though the state’s power to condemn property is ordinarily sufficient to allow the government to construct such a line through the property, special difficulty emerges when the utility lines are to cross tribal lands.

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86.4
Religious Accommodation, the Establishment Clause, and Third-Party Harm
Mark Storslee
Executive Director, Stanford Constitutional Law Center.

Thanks to Stephanie Barclay, William Baude, Thomas Berg, Samuel Bray, Jud Campbell, Nathan Chapman, Nora Freeman Engstrom, Carl Esbeck, Richard Garnett, Stephanie Inks, Mark Kelman, Andrew Koppelman, Douglas Laycock, Christopher Lund, Ira Lupu, William Marshall, Michael McConnell, Chloe Moon, Douglas NeJaime, Jane Schacter, Geoffrey Sigalet, Lance Sorenson, Charles Tyler, Robin Fretwell Wilson, and participants in the Stanford Law School Fellows Workshop and the Annual Law and Religion Roundtable for helpful conversations and feedback on earlier drafts. Special thanks are also due to Frederick Mark Gedicks, Micah Schwartzman, and Nelson Tebbe for their generosity and for helpful conversations about this topic and others. All errors, of course, are my own.

We occupy a unique moment in the story of American religious liberty. During the Founding period and for much of the twentieth century, it was widely accepted that religious accommodation—the practice of sometimes exempting religious individuals or groups from burdensome laws—was a desirable means of protecting free exercise. But as a matter of cultural consensus, that agreement seems to be quickly unraveling or at least entering a new period of uncertainty.

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86.4
The Logic and Limits of Municipal Bankruptcy Law
Vincent S.J. Buccola
Assistant Professor, The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania.

Thanks to Douglas Baird, Allison Buccola, Steve Buccola, Laura Coordes, Brian Hathaway, Rich Hynes, Juliet Moringiello, Eric Rasmusen, David Schleicher, and David Skeel for extensive comments on earlier drafts; and to Joe Gyourko and Bob Inman for generative conversations. Thanks also to participants in workshops at Wharton and the Indiana University Kelley School of Business. Dorinda and Mark Winkelman provided valuable research support.

Cities and towns across the country face debt burdens of a magnitude not seen since the Great Depression. Four of the five largest municipal bankruptcies in history have been filed in the last decade, and more are bound to come.