The Failure of Mixed-Motives Jurisprudence
Andrew Verstein
Associate Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law.

For helpful comments, I am grateful to Jessica Clarke, Brandon Garrett, Mike Green, Aziz Huq, Martha Nussbaum, Eric Posner, Sean P. Sullivan, David Super, Matthew C. Stephenson, Gabriel Rauterberg, Ron Wright, the participants in the Brooklyn Law School Faculty Workshop, the George Mason Faculty Workshop, and the Yale/Stanford/Harvard Junior Faculty Forum. Andrew Homer and Abby Jacobs provided helpful research assistance.

How should we judge people who act for both good and bad motives?

Enacted Legislative Findings and Purposes
Jarrod Shobe
Associate Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University.

Thanks to Michael Herz, Ethan Leib, Victoria Nourse, Bill Eskridge, Rachel Barkow, Jim Brudney, Peter Strauss, Abbe Gluck, Jesse Cross, Maggie Lemos, Evan Zoldan, Bill Buzbee, Josh Chafetz, Daphna Renan, Paul Stancil, Aaron Nielson, participants at the Legislation Roundtable at Fordham University, the J. Reuben Clark Law Society Workshop, and BYU law faculty workshop for helpful comments on earlier drafts. For excellent research assistance I am grateful to Trevor Nielson, Bonnie Stohel, Eric Abram, Katie Ellis, and Laura Hunt. I am especially grateful for the assistance of Shawn Nevers for help with many of the empirical aspects of this project.

Whether judges should consider legislative history is the most hotly debated issue in statutory interpretation.

Inversion Aversion
Lee Anne Fennell
Max Pam Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School. I am grateful for research support from the Harold J. Green Faculty Fund and the SNR Denton Fund.

For conversations about this Essay, we thank Anupam Chander, Victor Fleischer, Jerry Frug, Calvin Johnson, Michael Knoll, Steven Medema, Richard Schragger,Sloan Speck, Andrew Verstein, and participants in the Harvard Law School conference Celebrating Jerry Frug’s Work on Cities. We also thank Reeves Jordan for excellent research assistance. An earlier, longer draft of this Essay circulated under the title Inverted Theoriesand remains available on Chicago Unbound at http://perma.cc/XB7Q-TXYE.

Richard H. McAdams
Deputy Dean and Bernard D. Meltzer Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.

Some objects, like Weebles and lawn darts, resist inversion. The same is true of certain popular legal theories—or so we argue.

Testing for Trademark Dilution in Court and the Lab
Barton Beebe
John M. Desmarais Professor of Intellectual Property Law, New York University School of Law.

The authors thank Jamie Boyle, Chris Buccafusco, Alex Cadmus, Shari Diamond, Michael Frakes, Jeanne Fromer, John Golden, Scott Hemphill, Marco Kleine, Stephan Tontrup, and Deepa Varadarajan; and participants in workshops at the New York UniversitySchool of Law, the Duke University School of Law, the St. John’s University School of Law, the 2017 Intellectual Property Scholars Conference hosted by the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, the 2018 Munich Summer Institute hosted at the Bavarian Academy of Sciences and Humanities, Georgia State University’s J. Mack Robinson College of Business, and the Intellectual Property, Science, and Technology Workshop hosted by the University of Texas at Austin School of Law for helpful comments and conversations. Thanks also to the Filomen D’Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund for grants that supported this work, and to Ari Lipsitz for excellent research assistance.

Roy Germano
Senior Research Scholar, New York University School of Law.
Christopher Jon Sprigman
Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
Joel H. Steckel
Professor of Marketing and Vice Dean for Doctoral Education, New York University Stern School of Business.
Trademark dilution is among the most elusive concepts in intellectual property law.