Local Government Law

When one thinks of government, what comes to mind are familiar general-purpose entities like states, counties, cities, and townships. But more than half of the 90,000 governments in the United States are strikingly different: They are “special-purpose” governments that do one thing, such as supply water, fight fire, or pick up the trash. These entities remain understudied, and they present at least two puzzles. First, special-purpose governments are difficult to distinguish from entities that are typically regarded as business organizations—such as consumer cooperatives—and thus underscore the nebulous border between “public” and “private” enterprise. Where does that border lie? Second, special-purpose governments typically provide only one service, in sharp contrast to general-purpose governments. There is little in between the two poles—such as two-, three-, or four-purpose governments. Why? This Article answers those questions—and, in so doing, offers a new framework for thinking about special-purpose government.

States increasingly deploy aggressive preemption measures against disfavored localities. Scholars have raised the alarm, but cities’ subordinate legal status leaves them disempowered. To push back, municipal advocates need to thoroughly understand the complex bilateral relationship between cities and their states.

That is where I come in. As Mayor of a progressive city in a conservative state, I swim in the hostile symbiosis that characterizes city-state relations. By drawing on real-life examples, closed-door conversations, and previously private documents, my coauthor and I demonstrate the potence of multi-pronged city power. We synthesize our stories into a thicker account of state motivation, and then showcase the city’s “toolbox” for limiting state preemption.

That process unearths preemption’s next frontier. Post-enactment state preemption, or “post-emption,” occurs when a state retroactively nullifies a specific, already-passed municipal law. It has been widely acknowledged but not individually distinguished. Analyzing it independently reveals that it is already ubiquitous and likely to proliferate. Post-emption thus warrants individualized normative assessment, and this Essay begins that surprisingly nuanced discussion.

When a municipality takes property, the former owners can allege a violation of the Takings Clause and try to recover just compensation. But what should happen when the municipality goes broke and enters municipal bankruptcy? Can the municipal bankruptcy code empower judges to release municipalities from their obligation to pay just compensation through a discharge? Or does the Takings Clause provide special constitutional protection to claims for just compensation from a municipality that immunizes the claims from discharge? This issue has played out in municipal bankruptcies in Detroit, Michigan; Stockton, California; and Puerto Rico—where courts are deeply divided on the right approach, resulting in a live circuit split. This Comment provides the first comprehensive analysis that shows takings claims are constitutionally dischargeable. As a threshold matter, the Comment shows that formalist considerations do not require immunizing takings claims from discharge. The Comment then shows that making takings claims dischargeable follows best from the original design of the Takings Clause given the host of procedural and political safeguards within municipal bankruptcy that would protect takings claimants against abuse. Lastly, the Comment shows that making takings claims dischargeable is normatively good.