Comment

Print
Comment
Volume 91.6
TikTok the Tortfeasor: A Framework to Discuss Social-Platform Externalities and Arguments Favoring Ex Ante Mitigations
Karan Lala
B.S. 2018, University of California, San Diego; J.D. Candidate 2025, The University of Chicago Law School.

I would like to thank Professor Omri Ben-Shahar and the editors and staff of the University of Chicago Law Review for their thoughtful advice and support.

This Comment reviews Section 230 jurisprudence to develop a novel taxonomy for claims against social media platforms. It divides claims against platforms into three categories—content specific, content dependent, and content agnostic—based on the proximity of the alleged injury to user-generated content and the degree of the platform’s participation. This Comment also formalizes a remedies test that courts can use to distinguish legitimate content-agnostic claims from those in name only. Armed with this vocabulary, this Comment turns its attention to a number of cases pending against social platforms. Applying the remedies test, it determines that a handful of pending allegations give rise to legitimate content-agnostic claims. Noting that content-agnostic injuries are material but not yet fully understood, this Comment ultimately argues that an ex ante regulatory regime operationalized by an expert agency is better suited to address social-platform externalities than an ex post liability regime.

Print
Comment
Volume 91.6
Rogue AI Patents and the USPTO's Rejection of Alice
Joshua A. Zuchniarz
B.S. 2017, University of Miami; Ph.D. 2023, University of Chicago; J.D. Candidate 2025, The University of Chicago Law School.

I would like to thank Professor Jonathan S. Masur, Tanvi Antoo, and all of the University of Chicago Law Review editors and staff for productive comments and feedback.

AI inventions have taken the world by storm. Many of these inventions are protected by patents. Yet a large number of AI patents are flawed, prone to invalidation in court. This Comment asks which AI inventions ought to receive patents. It concludes that AI methods and models should be patent eligible because they are likely to be incentivized by patents and unlikely to chill follow-on innovation. This Comment further argues that both the USPTO’s guidance and much of the Federal Circuit’s recent eligibility case law are inconsistent with finding these inventions patent eligible. However, the Federal Circuit demonstrated an understanding of eligibility that would allow patents for many AI methods and models in its 2016 McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco Games America Inc. decision. This Comment concludes by advocating that the Federal Circuit explicitly apply the holding of this case to hold that an AI invention is patent eligible at the first opportunity.

Print
Comment
Volume 91.5
State Telemedicine Abortion Restrictions and the Dormant Commerce Clause
Laura Hu
B.A. 2019, The University of Chicago; J.D. Candidate 2025, The University of Chicago Law School.

I would like to thank Professor Bridget Fahey and the editors and staff of the University of Chicago Law Review for their invaluable feedback and insight.

Telemedicine abortions allow women to meet virtually with abortion providers and receive abortion medication through the mail, all without ever leaving their homes. This development could be instrumental in facilitating access to abortion care for women living in abortion-restrictive states after the Supreme Court’s decision in Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization. However, many abortion-restrictive states have moved to restrict remote abortion care and impose legal liability on out-of-state telemedicine abortion providers. This Comment outlines a novel argument that these state restrictions on telemedicine abortions violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, which prohibits state regulation that discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce.

Print
Comment
Volume 91.5
Mutually Assured Democracy: Cooperating Under the Compact Clause to Combat Partisan Gerrymandering
Samuel P. LeRoy
B.S. 2018, University of Illinois; M.P.P. 2020, University of Michigan; J.D. Candidate 2025, The University of Chicago Law School.

I thank Professor Bridget Fahey, Professor Curtis Bradley, and my colleagues of the University of Chicago Law Review for their generous advice. I dedicate this Comment to my parents, Janet and Michael LeRoy, who continue to inspire a lifelong love for learning. All errors are my own.

Partisan gerrymandering distorts voter preferences and undermines electoral competitiveness. Single-state redistricting reform has stalled because legislators and voters alike face diminishing incentives to reallocate power to their state’s minority party as partisan polarization increases. In the congressional redistricting context, however, interstate compacts could replace those incentives to compete with incentives to cooperate. The Constitution’s Compact Clause permits states to collaborate with each other but requires congressional consent. Yet the Constitution remains silent about which interstate agreements trigger this requirement, how Congress may provide consent, and how the Compact Clause interacts with the Elections Clause. This Comment explains how states could form redistricting compacts even without affirmative congressional approval.

Print
Comment
Volume 91.5
Weak-Willed Legislatures and Statutory Interpretation
Helen Zhao
B.A. 2021, Yale University; MPhil 2022, University of Cambridge; J.D. Candidate 2025, University of Chicago Law School.

I would like to thank Professor Brian Leiter and the editors and staff of the University of Chicago Law Review for their thoughtful advice and insights.

Contributing to the literature on “super statutes,” I suggest that an analogy to the philosophical concept of weakness of will can illuminate circumstances under which some statutes ought to stand above others. Analogizing to philosopher Richard Holton’s account of weak will, I develop an account in which some statutes express long-term commitments, are intended to foreclose future deliberation, and enact reasons into the law. Such statutes have the status of what Holton calls “resolutions.” Congress can be weak willed when it violates such statutes, and this weak-willed action jeopardizes the advantages of enacting such statutes in the first place. I propose that courts may apply familiar canons of statutory interpretation to hold Congress accountable to its commitments.

Print
Comment
Volume 91.4
Effective Removal of Article III Judges: Case Suspensions and the Constitutional Limits of Judicial Self-Policing
Jack Brake
B.A. 2018, University of Virginia; M.M. 2019, Tsinghua University; Ph.D. 2022, Universi-ty of Cambridge; J.D. Candidate 2025, The University of Chicago Law School.

I would like to thank Professor David Strauss and the editors and staff of the University of Chicago Law Review for their valuable input.

Under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, it falls to federal judges in each circuit to investigate and redress complaints about their colleagues’ behavior. A controversial provision of the Act authorizes the temporary suspension of misbehaving judges from new case assignments. Judges suspended under the Act have argued that this amounts to effectively removing them from office without impeachment, violating constitutional protections of judicial tenure and independence. This Comment develops and defends a bright-line rule for conceptualizing effective removal. When a case-suspension sanction even temporarily has the effect of disqualifying a judge who lacks assigned cases from further assignments, it unconstitutionally removes the judge from office. After crystallizing this concept, the Comment attends to non-merits-related reasons that courts are unlikely to accept this challenge to the JCDA; assesses the risk that the Act’s case-suspension provision could be abused; and proposes an amendment that would foreclose effective removal.

Print
Comment
Volume 91.4
Deciphering the "Traditional Property Interests" Test for Property-Based Mail and Wire Fraud
Grant Delaune
B.A. 2019, University of California, Los Angeles; Certified Fraud Examiner (CFE); J.D. Candidate 2025, The University of Chicago Law School.

I would like to thank Professor Sharon Fairley and the editors and staff of the University of Chicago Law Review for their thoughtful advice and edits.

The mail and wire fraud statutes are the “first line of defense” against fraudulent activities. Adaptable and broadly written, they are go-to tools in the white-collar prosecutor’s arsenal. But this flexibility has also raised concern about their expansive and indeterminate scope. Unfortunately, the vagueness of the traditional property interests test has resulted in a confusing morass of inconsistent judgments. With limited guidance from the Supreme Court on how to conduct such an inquiry, lower courts have struggled to consistently determine whether alleged property interests are covered by these statutes. This has led to overturned convictions in high-profile mail and wire fraud cases. This Comment aims to aid courts conducting the traditional property interest analysis by synthesizing the Supreme Court’s property-based case law and proposing a hallmarks-of-property test.

Print
Comment
Volume 91.4
The Finality of Reinstated Orders of Removal Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252
Jonah Klausner
B.A. 2020, University of Michigan; J.D. Candidate 2025, The University of Chicago Law School.

Thank you to the University of Chicago Law Review editors for their tireless work and invaluable contributions, Professor Nicole Hallett for her guidance and oversight, and my family and partner for their unwavering support and unconditional love.

Federal law authorizes the reinstatement of a prior removal order when a noncitizen “reenter[s] the United States without authorization after having already been removed.” The question whether a noncitizen is removable is thus definitively settled immediately upon reinstatement. But the question to where the noncitizen will be removed is less certain. This is because noncitizens subject to reinstated orders of removal retain the right to pursue “withholding-only” relief, which precludes removal to the noncitizen’s home country when extreme dangers await them there. This lag—between when removability, on one hand, and the country of removal, on the other, are determined—has exposed an ambiguity in the statute providing for judicial review of a “final order of removal,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252. Specifically, § 1252(b)(1) requires that a noncitizen file a petition for review within thirty days of the final order of removal. But when does a reinstated order of removal become final? Specifically, does finality attach when the prior removal order is reinstated (such that removability is determined) or when the administrative process for adjudicating claims for withholding-only relief has concluded (such that the country of removal is determined)? This Comment contends that the soundest construction of § 1252 deems reinstated orders of removal final when withholding-relief proceedings conclude.

Print
Comment
Volume 90.8
Undefined "Ground": Form or Substance in PTO Estoppel
Tanvi Antoo
B.S. 2020, Santa Clara University; J.D. Candidate 2024, The University of Chicago Law School.

I would like to thank Professor Jonathan Masur and the editors and staff of the University of Chicago Law Review for their thoughtful edits and insight.

This Comment seeks to resolve a dispute among district courts on how to interpret the term “ground” in 35 U.S.C. § 315(e)(2), the America Invents Act’s (AIA) estoppel provision. The question of whether a party that asserts a printed publication or patent in an inter partes review (IPR) proceeding is estopped from asserting real-world prior art, such as a device, in a later civil action under § 315(e)(2) has resulted in a district court split. Some courts have construed the estoppel provision narrowly, reasoning that because a physical object like a device is not something that could have been raised during IPR, estoppel cannot apply. Under this interpretation, “ground” is interpreted to mean a piece of evidence. Because physical products are not the same type of evidence offered during IPR, litigants are not estopped from using them in later civil actions. On the other side of this, courts have determined that estoppel can apply, but does not in situations where the physical object being raised is either “superior and separate” or presents a “substantive difference” to the paper prior art raised in IPR. Here, “ground” is interpreted to mean argument, such that estoppel applies when the device offers no arguments other than those already put forth during IPR—in other words, when litigation would be duplicative. The resolution to this question carries significant consequences for the cost, efficiency, and institutional division of labor of the patent system. This Comment argues that the AIA’s text and purpose support adopting the substantive difference approach. This approach strikes a workable balance in focusing on the legal arguments to ensure that litigants are not unduly relitigating the same arguments already decided by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB). The substantive difference approach also advances the AIA’s purpose in offering IPR as a cheaper, faster alternative to district court litigation. It also promotes a reasonable division of responsibilities between the PTAB and district courts. Overall, as this Comment explains, this interpretation best aligns with the patent system’s goals.

Print
Comment
Volume 90.8
Decarcerating Immigrant Detainee Medical Care: A Path to Doctrinal Redemption
Kieran Dosanjh
B.A. 2019, University of California, San Diego; J.D. Candidate 2024, The University of Chicago Law School.

I would like to thank Professor Nicole Hallett and the editors and staff of the University of Chicago Law Review for their thoughtful advice and insight. I would also like to credit Dr. Christine Montross, whose work sheds a much-needed interdisciplinary light on this topic. Finally, I would like to acknowledge the countless immigrants with whom I grew up in central California. You remain a constant source of strength in our community.

Government detention is a quid pro quo: the government may deprive persons of their physical liberty, but in exchange, it owes them a level of care. The critical question is, how much care does the Constitution require the government to provide? In a series of federal judicial decisions (collectively, the detainee medical care doctrine), courts have found that the Constitution requires different standards of care for different classes of government detainees. These courts’ standard of care for immigrant detainees is erroneous. Modern U.S. immigration detention’s descriptive resemblance to criminal confinement has prompted courts to (wrongly) find that immigrant detainees are constitutionally entitled to the same standard of medical care as pretrial criminal detainees. Yet, the constitutionally civil status of immigration detention distinguishes it from pretrial criminal detention in doctrinally salient ways such that the Constitution entitles immigrant detainees to a higher standard of medical care. This Comment charts a path to conforming the immigration detention jurisprudence within the doctrine to what the Constitution requires by answering this question of law, which was recently unsettled by the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson and the Fourth Circuit’s 2021 decision in Doe 4 ex rel. Lopez v. Shenandoah Valley Juvenile Center Commission: What adjudicatory standard should govern immigrant detainees’ claims of constitutionally inadequate medical care? After devising a doctrinal test and applying it to immigrant detainees, this Comment concludes that the Constitution entitles them to “medical professional judgment”: medical care must not substantially depart from accepted medical standards.