Antitrust Law

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Article
87.2
The Effective Competition Standard: A New Standard for Antitrust
Marshall Steinbaum
Assistant Professor of Economics, University of Utah.
Maurice E. Stucke
Douglas A. Blaze Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law.

The authors would like to thank Peter Carstensen, Bert Foer, Gene Kimmelman, Jack Kirkwood, Ganesh Sitaraman, Sandeep Vaheesan, Spencer Weber Waller, and participants in the April 2018 Roosevelt Institute Twenty-First Century Antitrust Conference for their helpful comments.

2
Article
87.2
The Arc of Monopoly: A Case Study in Computing
Randal C. Picker
James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago Law School.

I thank participants at the Symposium and in the Work-in-Progress Workshop at the Law School for comments and the Jerome F. Kutak Faculty Fund for its generous research support

2
Article
Chicago and Its Discontents
Timothy J. Muris
Foundation Professor of Law, Antonin Scalia Law School at George Mason Universi-ty; Senior Counsel at Sidley Austin LLP. Professor Muris previously served as the Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection (1981–83), the Director of the Bureau of Competition (1983–85), and as Chairman of the Federal Trade Commission (2001–04).
Jonathan E. Nuechterlein
Partner, Sidley Austin LLP. Mr. Nuechterlein previously served as General Counsel of the FTC (2013–16).

We thank William Blumenthal, C. Frederick Beckner III, and the participants in the Law Review’s May 2019 Symposium on Reassessing the Chicago School of Antitrust for their helpful comments, as well as Dylan Naegele for his able research assistance.

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Article
The Chicago Obsession in the Interpretation of US Antitrust History
William E. Kovacic
Global Competition Professor of Law and Policy, George Washington University Law School; Visiting Professor, King’s College London; and Non-Executive Director, United Kingdom Competition and Markets Authority.

The author is grateful for comments from Andrew Gavil, participants at The University of Chicago Law Review’s annual symposium, and workshops at King’s College London and University College London. The author also thanks the staff of The University of Chicago Law Review for their excellent editorial guidance. The views expressed here are the author’s alone. Email: wkovacic@law.gwu.edu. 

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Essay
87.2
The Chicago School and the Forgotten Political Dimension of Antitrust Law
Ariel Katz
Associate Professor, University of Toronto, Faculty of Law.

The Chicago School, said to have influenced antitrust analysis inescapably, is associated today with a set of ideas and arguments about the goal of antitrust law. In particular, the Chicago School is known for asserting that economic efficiency is and should be the only purpose of antitrust law and that the neoclassical price theory model offers the best policy tool for maximizing economic efficiency in the real world; that corporate actions, including various vertical restraints, are efficient and welfare-increasing; that markets are self-correcting and monopoly is merely an occasional, unstable, and transitory outcome of the competitive process; and that governmental cures for the rare cases where markets fail to self-correct tend to be “worse than the disease.”

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Article
Labor Antitrust’s Paradox
Hiba Hafiz
Assistant Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.

I am deeply grateful to Eric Posner, Sanjukta Paul, Brian Callaci, and the participants of the Reassessing the Chicago School of Antitrust Law Symposium for their helpful comments and suggestions.

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Essay
87.2
The Case for “Unfair Methods of Competition” Rulemaking
Rohit Chopra
Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission. The views expressed here are Commissioner Chopra’s and do not necessarily reflect those of the Commission or any other individual Commissioner.

For thoughtful engagement and comments, we are grateful to Scott Hemphill, William Kovacic, Fiona Scott Morton, Nancy Rose, Jonathan Sallet, Carl Shapiro, Sandeep Vaheesan, and Joshua Wright, as well as staff at the FTC and participants in the Symposium on Reassessing the Chicago School of Antitrust Law at The University of Chicago Law School. We also thank the editors of The University of Chicago Law Review for careful editing.

Lina M. Khan
Academic Fellow, Columbia Law School; Counsel, Subcommittee on Antitrust, Commercial, and Administrative Law, US House Committee on the Judiciary; former Le-gal Fellow, Federal Trade Commission. This Essay reflects Ms. Khan’s views and not those of the US House Committee on the Judiciary or any of its members.

Open, competitive markets are a foundation of economic liberty. A lack of competition, meanwhile, can enable dominant firms to exercise their market power in harmful ways.

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Essay
87.2
Startup Acquisitions, Error Costs, and Antitrust Policy
Kevin A. Bryan
Assistant Professor, University of Toronto Rotman School of Management.
Erik Hovenkamp
Assistant Professor, University of Southern California Gould School of Law.

High tech industries are not only lucrative, but also highly innovative and dynamic. Large firms are not their sole source of innovation, however.

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Article
87.2
The Chicago School’s Limited Influence on International Antitrust
Anu Bradford
Henry L. Moses Professor of Law and International Organization, Columbia Law School, abradf@law.columbia.edu.
Adam S. Chilton
Professor of Law, Walter Mander Research Scholar, The University of Chicago Law School, adamchilton@uchicago.edu.
Filippo Maria Lancieri
JSD Candidate, The University of Chicago Law School, filippolancieri@uchicago.edu.

This Essay was prepared for the symposium organized by The University of Chicago Law Review on Reassessing the Chicago School of Antitrust Law, held on May 10–11, 2019. We thank the participants of the symposium for helpful feedback. Special thanks also to Patrick Todd for illuminating conversations. We are indebted to the over one hundred research assistants at Columbia Law School and The University of Chicago Law School that helped us gather and code the antitrust data we employ in this Essay. Our thanks also to the antitrust enforcers in the 103 agencies that generously provided information for this study. We gratefully acknowledge the funding by the National Science Foundation that supported the early data gathering effort (see NSF-Law & Social Sciences grants 1228453 & 1228483, awarded in September 2012). The coding was subsequently expanded with the generous support of the Columbia Public Policy Grant: “Does Antitrust Policy Promote Market Performance and Competitiveness?,” awarded in June 2015, and additional financial support from Columbia Law School. We also thank the Baker Scholars fund at The University of Chicago Law School for financial support. Except as otherwise noted, all data is available at the Comparative Competition Law Project website, http://comparativecompetitionlaw.org.

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