Antitrust Law

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Essay
87.2
Startup Acquisitions, Error Costs, and Antitrust Policy
Kevin A. Bryan
Assistant Professor, University of Toronto Rotman School of Management.
Erik Hovenkamp
Assistant Professor, University of Southern California Gould School of Law.

High tech industries are not only lucrative, but also highly innovative and dynamic. Large firms are not their sole source of innovation, however.

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Article
87.2
The Chicago School’s Limited Influence on International Antitrust
Anu Bradford
Henry L. Moses Professor of Law and International Organization, Columbia Law School, abradf@law.columbia.edu.
Adam S. Chilton
Professor of Law, Walter Mander Research Scholar, The University of Chicago Law School, adamchilton@uchicago.edu.
Filippo Maria Lancieri
JSD Candidate, The University of Chicago Law School, filippolancieri@uchicago.edu.

This Essay was prepared for the symposium organized by The University of Chicago Law Review on Reassessing the Chicago School of Antitrust Law, held on May 10–11, 2019. We thank the participants of the symposium for helpful feedback. Special thanks also to Patrick Todd for illuminating conversations. We are indebted to the over one hundred research assistants at Columbia Law School and The University of Chicago Law School that helped us gather and code the antitrust data we employ in this Essay. Our thanks also to the antitrust enforcers in the 103 agencies that generously provided information for this study. We gratefully acknowledge the funding by the National Science Foundation that supported the early data gathering effort (see NSF-Law & Social Sciences grants 1228453 & 1228483, awarded in September 2012). The coding was subsequently expanded with the generous support of the Columbia Public Policy Grant: “Does Antitrust Policy Promote Market Performance and Competitiveness?,” awarded in June 2015, and additional financial support from Columbia Law School. We also thank the Baker Scholars fund at The University of Chicago Law School for financial support. Except as otherwise noted, all data is available at the Comparative Competition Law Project website, http://comparativecompetitionlaw.org.

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Essay
87.2
The Common Ownership Trilemma
José Azar
Assistant Professor, University of Navarra, IESE Business School, Av Pearson, 21, 08034 Barcelona, Spain, jazar@iese.edu.

I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of Secretaria d’Universitats i Recerca del Departament d’Empresa i Coneixement de la Generalitat de Catalunya. Ref. 2016 BP00358.

Overlapping ownership of large publicly traded companies in the United States has grown dramatically in recent decades. The list of largest shareholders of almost any publicly traded company has a similar set of shareholders, namely the largest asset managers.
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86.7
Liability for Data Scraping Prohibitions under the Refusal to Deal Doctrine: An Incremental Step toward More Robust Sherman Act Enforcement
Ioannis Drivas
BA 2015, Amherst College; JD Candidate 2020, The University of Chicago Law School.

Internet giants like Google, Facebook, Microsoft, and Amazon have attracted controversy for their growing influence on our social, political, and commercial activities. Some commentators worry that these companies’ ability to gather data and control who accesses it threatens the competitive health of the digital economy. This trend could harm consumers by stifling innovation in online products and by producing a digital economy with fewer choices and fewer competitors determined to win consumers’ business.

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Essay
86 Special
Posner on Vertical Restraints
C. Scott Hemphill
Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.

I thank Harry First, Eleanor Fox, Bert Huang, Jon Jacobson, Saul Levmore, and Tim Wu for helpful comments. Alex Gelb, Tim Keegan, Alison Perry, and Phantila Phataraprasit provided outstanding research assistance.

This Essay considers the influence of Richard Posner’s judicial opinions about antitrust law.

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