Domestic Violence Law

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Comment
Volume 92.6
Compassionate Causation in the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act
Zoë Lewis Ewing
B.A. 2021, Columbia University; J.D. Candidate 2026, The University of Chicago Law School.

I would like to thank Jenna Liu, Jack Brake, Alex Moreno, Miranda Coombe, and the rest of The University of Chicago Law Review editors and staff for their thoughtful feedback. I would also like to thank the attorneys in the DVSJA Practice at Appellate Advocates for introducing me to this area of law and advocating tirelessly for incarcerated survivors.

In this Comment, Zoë Lewis Ewing evaluates the implementation of the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act (DVSJA), a New York law passed in 2019 to provide shortened sentencing ranges for domestic violence survivors convicted of crimes. It identifies an inconsistency in sentencing courts’ application of the law’s causation standard, which requires that a petitioner’s experience of domestic violence be a “significant contributing factor” to their criminal conduct. Some courts interpret the prong narrowly, while others apply a broad causation standard. This Comment argues that courts should opt for the latter approach and consider causation in the DVSJA satisfied if domestic violence was “sufficiently significant to have likely helped bring about the criminal conduct.”