Ilan Wurman

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The Origins of Substantive Due Process
Ilan Wurman
Visiting Assistant Professor and incoming Associate Professor, Sandra Day O’Connor College of Law, Arizona State University.

Thanks to William Baude, David Bernstein, Nathan Chapman, and John Harrison; to the participants of the 2018 Rocky Mountain Junior Faculty Colloquium, the 2019 Federalist Society Young Legal Scholars panel, and the 2019 University of Richmond Junior Scholars Workshop; and in particular to my colleagues Zack Gubler, Rhett Larson, Kaipo Matsumura, Trevor Reed, Josh Sellers, Bijal Shah, and Justin Weinstein-Tull for their early interventions. Thanks also to Jessica Kemper and Katherine Johnson for tremendous research assistance.

There has been renewed interest in recent years in the original understanding of “due process of law.” In a recent article, Professors Nathan Chapman and Michael McConnell argue that historically, due process meant only that an individual could not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without a general and prospective standing law, the violation of which had been adjudicated according to a certain minimum of common-law judicial procedures.